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The Dean Reports
The photograph on the cover of 
this issue of In Brief illustrates in a 
concrete way the scholarly achieve­
ment of our faculty. Taken together, 
that scholarship forms a body of 
work that has made a significant 
contribution to legal thought and to 
the profession. I hope that our 
alumni and friends are proud of the 
achievements represented by this 
scholarship and understand how 
important it is that we continue and 
expand this work.
It is easy to see the product of our 
scholarship in concrete terms— 
weight, volumes, or footnotes. What 
is more difficult to see is its impact 
and meaning within the profession 
and academic life. As a salute to our 
faculty's scholarly accomplishments 
and aspirations, I would like to talk 
about the role that I believe scholar­
ship plays.
Our profession is one that thrives 
on thought and creativity. Indeed, 
there are few other professions 
where the life of the mind is called 
upon as the main ingredient of the 
final product. Our dependence on 
our ideas as well as on our ideals 
makes our profession one in which 
academic scholarship and writing are 
absolutely central.
Moreover, in our information age it 
is indispensable that we gather, syn­
thesize, and disseminate information 
in a meaningful and timely manner. 
Computers may link us together and 
feed our information appetite, but it 
is still the human mind that provides 
the wisdom that harnesses the energy 
of the computer age.
Although it is sometimes said that 
there is tension between scholarship 
and teaching, that tension is more 
illusory than real. Quality scholarship 
and teaching both take time. Both 
take energy. Both take creativity. But 
they work together. The best teaching 
is that which is infused with new 
ideas and insights. If we expect our 
graduates to lead the bench and bar, 
we must make sure that our students 
are stimulated to examine old ques­
tions in new ways and to understand 
new ideas through traditional frame­
works. At its best, scholarship sup­
ports this ideal. Although there are 
some who may be able to expound 
great thoughts or derive new theo­
rems without setting pencil to paper, 
for most of us the discipline of writ­
ing is itself a process of testing, dis­
covery, and enlightenment. The dia­
logue with oneself, once on the 
yellow pad and now on the video 
screen, is the best way of ensuring 
that the ideas that are brought to the 
classroom are fully blossoming.
Nor is there an inevitable tension 
between academic writing and writ­
ing that is relevant to the profession. 
Like the practice of law, academic 
writing comes in boxes of different 
sizes and shapes, with a variety of 
wrapping paper 'and ribbons. Some 
academic writing is directly relevant 
to the profession and is consulted 
frequently. Legal treatises and trial 
practice manuals are pulled from the 
shelves fairly often. Outlines for 
continuing education lectures are 
often precursors of more elaborate 
and detailed scholarship. Yet even 
scholarship that is thought to be 
"esoteric," that is hardly ever pulled 
from the shelves, is an important 
ingredient in the profession. Thought 
shapes the law, and whether read by 
several or by many, and whether 
used today or stored away as a 
resource for tomorrow, thought con­
tained in scholarship provides the 
creative energy by which the law is 
moved and transformed.
We are reminded of this by the 
recent visit of Judge Richard A. 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals. His academic writing was 
of the most theoretical, paradigmatic 
kind. Few lawyers faced with closing 
a deal or trying a personal injury case 
would have pulled one of his works 
from the shelf for assistance. Yet 
Judge Posner's academic writing has 
had a profound impact on the shape 
of the law and thus on the life of the 
practitioner. Even had he not been 
appointed to the bench, the influence 
of his scholarship would be perva­
sive.
Although we cannot all aspire to 
that kind of influence, it is not idle to 
suggest that over time the ideas ema­
nating from this law school have a 
positive impact on the profession. 
Most important, scholarship is part of 
our job. It is legal academics who 
have the time for reflection. It is legal 
academics who are freed from the 
constraints of representing a client or 
billing another hour. It is, therefore, 
academics who have the responsibil­
ity to use the resources available to 
them for the production of ideas.
All of these thoughts about scholar­
ship also have a practical side. Our 
quality is measured in many ways, 
from various perspectives. As a train­
ing ground for new legal talent, we 
depend on the reputation of our fac­
ulty to attract the best students from 
around the country. We also depend 
on their reputation to attract the best 
minds from other law schools to our 
faculty and to attract the many distin­
guished visitors who come to our law 
school. Our reputation depends in 
large part on judgments by other
academics, and their judgments are 
significantly influenced by the quality 
and amount of faculty scholarship.
Quality scholarship is not simply a 
matter of individual faculty mem­
bers' doing their own thing. It is a 
collegial endeavor to which we have 
an institutional commitment. Colle­
gial scholarship is supported by fac­
ulty workshops in which faculty 
members and invited speakers 
present their work in progress in an 
informal setting; through these dis­
cussions the faculty are exposed to a 
range of ideas, and ideas are exposed
to different critical points of view. 
Our faculty routinely exchange drafts 
of articles for comment and criticism. 
We are developing an ethos of collegi- 
ality in which we each have an inter­
est in, and a stake in, each other's 
work.
In addition to nurturing each oth­
er's scholarly efforts, we are invigo­
rated by visitors from outside our 
walls: teachers from other law 
schools, scholars in related disci­
plines, guest lecturers, practitioners, 
Judges, government officials. Ours is 
a rich intellectual life. The Sumner 
Canary lectures and the Halle visiting 
scholars program are only its most 
visible manifestations. No week goes 
by without at least one visiting 
speaker or panel, and often there are 
several. I had heard of the reputation 
that the Law School has for the range 
and depth of its lecture series and its 
extra-curricular programs, but I had 
to be here to see the excitement that 
all of this brings to legal scholarship 
and the study of law.
Moreover, the annual conferences 
sponsored by the Canada-United 
States Law Institute and the Law- 
Medicine Center add considerably to 
our intellectual life. These confer­
ences promote and subsidize scholar­
ship by bringing the best minds 
together to bear on a topic of current
interest, and then publishing the 
proceedings so that others, also, can 
benefit from their exchange of ideas.
Our institutional commitment to 
faculty scholarship is shown by our 
summer research grants and by our 
support of student research assis­
tants. As resources become available, 
I want to expand this support by 
giving student assistants more visibil­
ity and higher pay, and by giving 
selected faculty reduced teaching 
loads when they are undertaking 
particularly important and demand­
ing research projects. Quality 
research is time consuming and thus 
expensive. Yet we can do ourselves 
no greater favor than to support the 
work of our faculty that will earn us 
national distinction.
I hope that our alumni and friends 
share my pride in our faculty's con­
tributions to the profession. I look 
forward to reporting periodically in 
these pages on our continued pro­
gress in scholarship, which will mean 
an ever-stronger reputation for the 
Law School and a future that is 
bright indeed.
—Peter M. Gerhart 
Dean
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, 
and the Interpretation of Statutes 
and the Constitution-Excerpts
by Richard A. Posner
On October 15, 1986, Judge Richard 
A. Posner, formerly of the University of 
Chicago law faculty and now of the 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh 
Circuit, spent a day at the Law School 
as Sumner Canary Lecturer. He deliv­
ered his address in the Hostetler Moot 
Courtroom to an audience of students, 
law faculty, and invited guests.
Here are some excerpts from Judge 
Posner's speech. They are taken from 
his preliminary remarks where he 
explained what he was going to say. For 
the meat of his talk, actual examples of 
his application of his theory of statutory 
and constitutional interpretation, you 
will have to wait for the publication of 
Volume 37, Number 2, of the Case 
Western Reserve Law Review. (There 
you will also find complete footnotes, 
here omitted.) It will not be too long a 
wait. That issue is scheduled to appear 
in February.
Formalism and 
Realism Defined
The terms "legal formalism" and 
"legal realism" have a long history in 
legal thought, and over the years 
have accreted so many meanings and 
valences that, surpassing even "judi­
cial self-restraint" and "judicial activ­
ism," each has become an all-purpose 
term both of approbation and of 
disapprobation. "Formalist" can 
mean narrow, conservative, hypocrit­
ical, resistant to change, casuistic, 
descriptively inaccurate (that is, 
"unrealistic" in the ordinary-language 
sense of the word), ivory-towered, 
fallacious, callow, authoritarian—but 
also rigorous, modest, reasoned, 
faithful, self-denying, restrained. 
"Realist" can mean cynical, reduc­
tionist, manipulative, hostile to law, 
political, left-wing, epistemologically
naive—but also progressive, humane, 
candid, mature, clear-eyed. These 
usages reflect the polemical character 
of so much writing about law. "Legal 
realism" is also used to refer to the 
work of specific academic lawyers 
mainly on the Yale and Columbia 
faculties during the 1920s and 1930s 
and specific (and diverse) ideas held 
by those men, and "formalism" to 
refer to the judges and academic 
lawyers whom the "legal realists" 
attacked and who attacked the real­
ists in turn.
I want to use "formalism" in a 
precise sense that is related but not 
identical to the "formalism" of 
Langdell and the other nineteenth- 
century American legal formalists. I 
want to use it to mean the use of 
deductive logic to derive the outcome 
of a case from premises accepted as 
authoritative. Used as a mode of
evaluating judicial decisions, formal­
ism enables the observer to pro­
nounce the outcome of the case cor­
rect or incorrect, in the same way 
that the solution to a mathematical 
problem can be pronounced correct 
or incorrect. By "realism" I mean 
deciding a case so that its outcome 
best promotes public welfare in non- 
legalistic terms; it is policy analysis.
A "realist" decision is more likely to 
be Judged sound or unsound than 
correct or incorrect, the latter pair of 
words suggesting a more demonstra­
ble, verifiable mode of analysis than 
will usually be possible in weighing 
considerations of policy. Such equity 
maxims as "No person shall profit 
from his own wrongdoing," which 
Professor Dworkin calls "principles," 
are in my analysis policy consider­
ations.
My definitions of "formalism" and 
"realism" enable these terms to be 
used descriptively rather than eva- 
luatively, and precisely rather than 
vaguely. One can speak of good and 
bad formalism, and good and bad 
realism. But—and this is the impor­
tant point—one can use "formalism" 
and "realism" as I have defined them 
only in discussing common law. The 
common law has a logical structure, 
and its premises are determined by 
notions of public policy. Statutes and 
constitutions are fundamentally dif­
ferent. They are communications; 
and neither logic nor policy is the 
key to decoding them (unless the 
communication, when decoded, is 
discovered to be saying to the courts, 
"Make common law"). This distinc­
tion, which is central to this paper, 
has now to be explained.
Formalism, Realism, 
and the Common Law
The common law (which I use 
broadly to mean all legitimately 
judge-made law) is a collection of 
concepts, such as negligence, consid­
eration, possession, good faith, con­
spiracy, impossibility, and laches, 
which furnish major premises for the 
decision of cases; the minor premises 
are the facts of the case. The model 
is "All men are mortal; Socrates is a 
man; therefore Socrates is mortal." 
The major premise is a concept or 
definition, the minor premise a fac­
tual statement. So if an enforceable 
contract is a promise supported by 
consideration, and Als-promise to B 
was supported by consideration, the 
promise is a contract. Of course the 
syllogistic structure of a real case is 
more complicated (what with 
defenses, exceptions, etc.), but that 
no more affects my analysis than the 
fact that some mathematical prob­
lems are harder than others.
Obviously the choice of premises is 
critical, and that is where public
Judge Posner, whose predecessors as Sumner 
Canary Lecturers have included (thenj Chief 
Justice Warren Earl Burger and Associate 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, is often 
mentioned as a probable appointee to the 
United States Supreme Court. A graduate of 
Yale University, he took his law degree at 
Harvard, where he was president of the Law 
Review. He went on to a year's Supreme 
Court clerkship, with Justice Brennan, and 
thence into government service—first with the 
Federal Trade Commission, then the 
Office of Solicitor General, and finally 
(before entering the academic world)
President Johnson's Task Force on 
Communications Policy.
policy comes in. Why enforce only 
promises supported by consideration, 
or only promises that are consciously 
accepted? The reason, if it is a good 
reason, has to be traceable to some 
notion of policy rather than just be 
the result of arbitrary personal pref­
erences or antipathies, or class bias, 
or some other thoroughly discredited 
ground of judicial action. It can't be 
logic. You use logic to go from the 
premises to the conclusion, not to 
obtain the premises. Of course, a 
premise may be the result of deduc­
tion from some more basic premise. 
But eventually one is forced back to a 
premise that cannot be obtained or 
proved by deduction. The nineteenth- 
century formalists sometimes over­
looked (or perhaps deliberately cpn- 
cealed) this point. Since the choice of 
premises on grounds of policy is 
usually more iffy than the deduction 
of a conclusion from iti premises, the 
formalists preferred to focus on the 
process of deduction rather than on 
the process of choosing their prem­
ises. They liked to give the impres­
sion that the premises were self- 
evident—meanwhile packing as much 
into the major premises as possible, 
to shorten the chain of deductions. 
The result is a kind of nominalism, or 
conceptualism, or Platonism: the idea 
that concepts exist "out there," like 
trees or rocks, rather than are cre­
ated.
Thus Langdell said that a person 
who returns a lost article for which 
the owner has offered a reward has 
no contractual right to the reward if 
he didn't know about the offer, 
because then the act of return could 
not have been a conscious acceptance 
of the offer. Langdell's ground was 
that since there is no contract with­
out such acceptance, the owner's 
failure to honor his promise would 
not be a breach of contract. But, in so 
reasoning, Langdell was treating the 
concept of contract as if it were a 
thing which couldn't be altered with­
out becoming something different. If 
you take the legs off a table (I mean 
permanently—not just for storage or 
moving), it is no longer a table. But it 
doesn't follow that if you don't have 
an acceptance you don't have a con­
tract. A contract is just a promise that 
courts enforce, and if there is a good 
reason of policy for doing so they can 
decide to enforce a promise even 
though it was not "accepted" because 
the promisee didn't know about the 
promise. The question for the court 
should be (putting aside the issue of 
adherence to precedent): ought the 
unconscious acceptance be deemed to 
create a contract? The answer should 
depend, I would think, on whether, if 
it is, more lost articles will be 
returned, at an acceptable cost to the 
legal system—a difficult question, as 
it happens.
*
Holmes mounted a series of fierce 
realist attacks on Langdell's formal­
ism, insisting that the law was not a 
set of preexisting concepts of fixed 
scope but a tool of government which 
would and should be reshaped as the 
desires of the community or (more 
realistically) its politically dominant 
groups changed. He made the point 
in his most memorable academic 
aphorism ("The life of the law has 
not been logic; it has been experi­
ence") and in his famous definition of 
law as a prophecy of what the judges 
would do when confronted with a 
given set of facts. The definition is 
incomplete. It is not usable by the 
judges of the highest court in the 
jurisdiqtion, or even by the judges of 
the lower courts in the absence of 
clear precedent on the question at 
issue on personal knowledge of their 
judicial superiors' views on it. Never­
theless it is significant in pointing us , 
away from concepts as the defining 
characteristic of law.
But despite much derision by 
Holmes of formal logic (the syllogism 
can't wag its tail, and so forth), there 
is no inconsistency between realism 
in Holmes's sense and formalism in 
the sense of deductive reasoning. 
Once the basic premises are chosen 
on realist grounds (e.g., once the rule 
of capture is given a scope cotermi­
2
nous with its economic rationale), 
deduction can proceed without violat­
ing realist norms.
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The modern exemplar of formalism 
in common law is the positive eco­
nomic analysis of the common law 
that Professor Landes and I and oth­
ers have expounded. Taking as our 
premise the claim that the common 
law seeks to promote efficiency in 
the sense of wealth maximization 
(that is, abstracting from distributive 
considerations), plus certain informa­
tion about technology and human 
behavior, we deduce a set of optimal 
common law doctrines and institu­
tions and then compare them with 
the actual common law. I mean 
deduction in a literal sense. Eco­
nomic theory is a logical system like 
calculus or geometry (hence eco­
nomic theory can be and often is 
expressed mathematically), or more 
precisely a family of such systems. If 
the positive economic theory of the 
common law is right, the common 
law is a logical system; and deductive 
logic—formal reasoning—can be used 
to reach demonstrably correct results 
in particular cases, or to demonstrate 
the correctness of results in particu­
lar cases. Provided, of course, that 
our major premise (that of wealth 
maximization), along with a bunch of 
minor premises, is accepted. Whether 
it is or is not belongs to the realm of 
policy analysis; it is the realist com­
ponent of the economic theory of the 
common law. It is realist because we 
assume that the concepts which pro­
vide the major premises for common 
law reasoning (whether an overarch­
ing premise such as wealth maximi­
zation, or particular legal concepts 
such as negligence that can be 
deduced from it) can be and are 
altered by the judges in accordance 
with changing perceptions of public 
policy. Of course the pace of change 
is affected by the need to preserve a 
reasonable degree of stability in law, 
but this is just another policy consid­
eration.
The essence of common law is that 
the law itself is made by the judges. 
They are the legislators. They create 
(modify, etc.) the doctrines of the 
common law, from which further 
doctrines are deduced, and the entire 
doctrinal structure then supplies 
major premises and the trial process 
the minor ones (the facts), thus 
enabling case outcomes to be pro­
duced by a deductive method. The 
actuality is far, far messier, in part 
because a number of minor premises 
involving motivation, information, 
etc. are contested, but the nature and 
direction of the process are clear 
enough to suggest the utility of the 
terms "legal formalism" and "legal 
realism," as I have defined them, in
analyzing common law decision­
making.
The Nature of Textual 
Interpretation: 
Decoding 
Communications
The major premise of a syllogism is 
always in the nature of a definition 
(like "All men are mortal"), or what 
is the same thing, a rule (e.g., the 
perfect-tender rule), or what is again 
the same thing, a concept (e.g., negli­
gence, which stated as a rule or defi­
nition is "All persons are prima facie 
liable for accidents resulting from 
their failure to take due care, i.e., the 
cost-justified level of care"). The 
common law, like the system of real 
numbers, is a conceptual system—not 
a textual system. The concept of 
negligence, of consideration, or of 
reliance, etc. is not tied to a particu­
lar verbal formulation, but can be 
restated in whatever form of words 
seems clearest in light of current 
linguistic conventions, etc. Common 
law thus is unwritten law in a pro­
found sense. There are more or less 
influential statements of every doc­
trine, but none is authoritative in the 
sense that the decision of a new case 
must be tied to the statement, rather 
than to the concept of which the 
statement is one of an indefinite 
number of possible formulations.
Statutory and constitutional law 
differs fundamentally from common 
law in that every statute and consti­
tutional provision—the starting point 
for decision, and in that respect (but 
that respect only) corresponding to a 
common law concept—is in some 
important sense not to be revised by 
the judges. The judges cannot treat 
the statute as a stab at formulating a 
concept which they are free to 
rewrite in their own words. This 
might seem just to entail that formal­
ist reasoning in statutory or constitu­
tional law would be deduction from a 
text and would therefore be possible 
as long as the text was as precise as a 
common law concept. But there is no 
such thing as deduction from a text. 
No matter how clear the text seems, 
it must be interpreted (or decoded) 
like any other communication, and 
interpretation is neither logical 
deduction nor policy analysis. The 
terms "formalism" and "realism" as I 
have defined them thus have no 
application to statutory or constitu­
tional law, except, as I have said, 
when the framers' command is sim­
ply that the judges go out and make 
common law.
A conclusion obtained by deduction 
is already contained in the premises 
in the sense that the only materials 
used to obtain the conclusion are the 
premises themselves and the rules of 
logic. But meaning cannot be
extracted from a text merely by tak­
ing the language of the text and 
applying the rules of logic to it. All 
sorts of linguistic and cultural tools 
must be brought to bear on even the 
simplest-seeming text to get meaning 
out of it. This is not to suggest that 
all texts are ambiguous. A text is 
clear if all or most persons having the 
linguistic and cultural competence 
assumed by the authors of the text 
would agree on its meaning. Most 
texts are clear in this sense, which is 
the only sense that captures the 
meaning of the word "clear" as 
applied to texts.
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The idea of legislation as communi­
cation may seem to have no utility 
beyond showing the fatuity and con­
fusion of applying the terms "legal 
formalism" and "legal realism" to the 
interpretation of legislation. For most 
of the time it is impossible to ask the 
legislature to repeat an unclear mes­
sage. But by considering what the 
possible responses are to an unclear 
message when the sender cannot be 
queried about his intended meaning, 
we shall see that the notion of legisla­
tion as communication has consider­
able utility. One possible response of 
the receiver is to ignore the message, 
and this might seem the appropriate 
posture for a court faced with an 
enactment whose meaning with 
respect to the case at hand cannot be 
deciphered. Yet that kind of response 
can be profoundly unresponsive. 
Suppose the commander of the lead 
platoon in an attack finds his way 
blocked by an unexpected enemy 
pillbox. He has two choices: go 
straight ahead at the pillbox, or try to 
bypass it to the left. He radios the 
company commander for instruc­
tions. The commander replies,
"Go—"; but the rest of the message is 
garbled, and when the platoon com­
mander radios back for clarification, 
he is unable to get through. If the 
platoon commander decides that, not 
having received or being able to get 
an intelligible command, he should 
do nothing until communications can 
be reestablished, his decision would 
probably be wrong. For it is plain 
from the part of the message that 
was received that the company com­
mander wanted him to get by the 
enemy pillbox, either by frontal 
attack or by bypassing it, and it is 
likely that the company commander 
would have preferred the platoon 
commander to decide by himself 
which course to follow rather than to 
do nothing and let the attack fail. At 
all events, for the platoon com­
mander to take the position that he 
can do nothing, just because the 
communication was garbled, would 
be an irresponsible "interpretation."
The situation with regard to legisla­
tive interpretation is analogous. In
our system of government the fram­
ers of statutes and constitutions are 
the superiors of the judges. The fram­
ers communicate orders to the judges 
through legislative texts (including, of 
course, the Constitution). If the 
orders are clear, the judges must obey 
them. Often, however, because of 
passage of time and change of cir­
cumstance the orders are unclear, 
and normally the judges cannot 
query the framers to find out what 
the order means. The judges are thus 
like the platoon commander in my 
example. And it seems to me not a 
responsible discharge of their func­
tion to take the position that if the 
orders are unclear, they will refuse to 
act. They are part of an organization, 
an enterprise—in the case of federal 
judges, the enterprise of governing 
the United States—and when the 
orders of their superiors are unclear 
this does not absolve them from 
responsibility for helping to make the 
enterprise succeed. The platoon com­
mander will ask himself, if he is a 
responsible officer, what would the 
company commander have wanted 
me to do if communications failed? 
Judges should ask themselves the 
same type of question when the 
"orders" they receive from the fram­
ers of statutes and constitutions are 
unclear: what would the framers 
have wanted me to do in this case of 
failed communication? Obviously this 
question is often difficult to answer, 
but it seems to me to be the right 
question to frame the interpretive
issue in cases where the enactment is 
unclear.
Clear versus Unclear 
Cases
I am naturally more interested in 
the unclear cases of interpretation 
than the clear ones. But it is impor­
tant to insist that there are clear 
cases, though they are under-repre­
sented both in appellate opinions and 
in academic debate .... A text is 
clear only in virtue of a linguistic and 
cultural competence ....
But the present point is that the 
rejection of formalism as a method of 
statutory interpretation doesn't con­
demn us to universal skepticism 
about the possibility of interpretation. 
Interpretation is no less a valid 
method of acquiring knowledge 
because it necessarily ranges beyond 
the text. As I have said, no text is 
clear except in terms of a linguistic 
and cultural environment, but it 
doesn't follow that therefore no text 
is clear. The relevant elements of the 
environment, and their bearing on 
the specific interpretive question, 
may be clear.
Nevertheless it is true that many 
statutory and constitutional texts, 
including the most illustrious and 
also many that seem clear "on their 
face" (a pernicious usage), are 
unclear in the sense of my hypotheti­
cal company commander's order. The 
lack of clarity does not, however, 
entitle the court to say that it will not
Nancy Halliday Canary, herself a partner in the firm of Thompson, Mine & Flory, continues 
support of the lecture series established by the bequest of her late husband, Sumner Canary, '28, 
whose career included practice with the firm now known as Arter & Hadden, five years as U.S. 
attorney for the Northern District of Ohio, and appointment to the Ohio Court of Appeals.
apply the text until it is rewritten by 
the authors. The court still has the 
duty to interpret, and that requires, 
as I have suggested, figuring out 
what outcome will best advance the 
program or enterprise set on foot by 
the enactment. This conclusion is 
entailed by my assumption that the 
best way to look at the relationship 
between legislatures (or the adopters 
of the Constitution and its amend­
ments) and courts is that of superior 
and subordinate officers, with the 
former being often unable to commu­
nicate clearly with the latter.
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by Peter Junger 
Professor of Law
The appearance of a paper by 
Posner, who is well on his way to 
adjectival status—as in the phrase 
"Posnerian analysis"—and who has 
earned the right not to have his name 
tarnished by honorifics like Judge 
or—Lord help us!—Professor, is 
always a significant occasion. To one, 
like myself, who is not enamored of 
Posnerian analysis, not enamored of 
the economic analysis of law, there is 
a certain paradoxical pleasure to be 
had in recognizing the consistently 
high value of his production, which 
seems to belie the validity of the 
economic doctrine that there are 
diminishing returns to scale. I trust 
that the judge will not take it badly if 
I suggest that Posnerian analysis is 
quite incapable of explaining the 
phenomenon that is Posner.
When Peter Gerhart suggested that 
I was qualified to write this com­
ment, I understood that "qualified” 
meant that I was the only one around 
who would be foolhardy enough to 
commit himself to get something 
written and in the hands of the 
printer in a mere eight days, a period 
during which Posner would probably 
turn out a dozen opinions and an 
article or two. I also felt that I had a 
certain disqualification for the task; 
for I find economic analysis a most 
partial (in more than one sense) tool.
It will not hurt if you keep that bias 
in mind when you read these 
remarks. There is, however, good 
reason why I should not recuse 
myself from commenting upon 
"Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, 
and the Interpretation of Statutes and 
the Constitution" (hereafter 
LFLRISC).
Sir Isaiah Berlin has, following 
Archilochus and Erasmus, pointed 
out one of the great intellectual 
dichotomies: that between the fox 
and the hedgehog. As Archilochus 
put it, "The fox knows many things, 
but the hedgehog knows one great 
thing." In Sir Isaiah's words:
There exists a great chasm between
those, on one side, who relate every­
thing to a single central vision, one
system less or more coherent or artic-
A Fox Interprets
the Hedgehog
vf
ulate, in terms of which they under­
stand, think and feel—a single, uni­
versal, organizing principle in terms 
of which alone all that they are and 
say has significance—and, on the 
other side, those who pursue many 
ends, often unrelated and even contra­
dictory, connected, if at all, only in 
some de facto way, for some psycho­
logical or physiological cause, related 
by no moral or aesthetic principle; 
these last lead lives, perform acts, and 
entertain ideas that are centrifugal 
rather than centripetal, their thought 
is scattered or diffused, moving on 
many levels, seizing upon the essence 
of a vast variety of experiences and 
objects for what they are in them­
selves, without, consciously or uncon­
sciously, seeking to fit them into, or 
exclude them from, any one unchang­
ing, all-embracing, sometimes self­
contradictory and incomplete, at times 
fanatical, unitary inner vision. The 
first kind of intellectual and artistic 
personality belongs to the hedgehogs, 
the second to the foxes; and without 
insisting on a rigid classification, we 
may, without too much fear of contra­
diction, say that, in this sense, Dante 
belongs to the first category, Shakes­
peare to the second; Plato, Lucretius, 
Pascal, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, 
Ibsen, Proust are, in varying degrees, 
hedgehogs; Herodotus, Aristotle, 
Montaigne, Erasmus, Moliere,
Goethe, Pushkin, Balzac, Joyce are 
foxes.
Now Posner is the Great Hedgehog, 
and the Great Thing that he knows is 
economic efficiency and the Coase 
Theorem, while I am, at best, one of 
"the little foxes, that . . . ." But I will 
let you finish the quotation.
In normal circumstances a fox, 
even a big fox, would be crazy—and 
not like a fox—to take on a hedgehog. 
But the appearance of LFLRISC is not 
a normal circumstance; in that piece 
the Great Hedgehog is, mirabile dictu, 
making like a fox. Suddenly Posner is 
not doing economic analysis—or 
rather, he does it, but only in passing. 
Suddenly Posner is into hermeneu­
tics. Faute de mieux, I feel I should
'I. Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox (1953),
pp. 1-2.
take this opportunity to present the 
foxes' defense against this incursion 
into what, up to now, has been our 
territory.
Now Posner does not use the word 
'hermeneutics' in his article, but 
LFLRISC itself is about the "art or 
science of interpretation"—and that is 
hermeneutics. If hermeneutics 
comes, can deconstruction be far 
behind? Does LFLRISC signify a 
rapprochement between the Univer­
sity of Chicago and the Frankfurt 
school? The semiotic implications of 
LFLRISC could be earthshaking: 
when Twentieth Century Fox releases 
The Son of the Name of the Rose, will 
we discover that Jorge de Burgos 
(who did not actually die at the Rei- 
chenbach Falls) has embraced the 
faith of William of Baskerville?
I would not suggest that Posner has 
revealed himself as a member of the 
Critical Legal Studies movement: his 
ideology clearly is not theirs. But 
could he be doing to the Crits what 
Marx did to Hegel?—standing their 
arguments on their heads.
If that were the true interpretation 
of LFLRISC, its appearance would be 
a happy occasion for the foxes, and a 
great honor to our cause. Being a fox, 
or a hedgehog, is not a matter of 
ideology: Roberto Unger, the theolo­
gian of Critical Legal Studies, is prob­
ably a hedgehog; Milton Friedman is 
most likely a fox; Ronald Dworkin is, 
beyond question, a hedgehog; Wil­
liam Buckley is Volpone himself. The 
chief difference is one of style: foxes 
chatter, hedgehogs proclaim; foxes 
interpret, hedgehogs have revela­
tions. A fox can never win an argu­
ment with a hedgehog. Hedgehogs do 
not argue. Hedgehogs do not listen. 
But if Posner were truly concerned 
with interpretation, that foxy craft, 
he would be compelled to listen to 
our arguments in all their inconsis­
tency. And listening, doubt. And 
doubting, shed the prickly armor of 
his austere faith. Tertullian was a 
hedgehog.
Despite LFLRISC's concern with 
interpretation, it gives no sign that 
Posner has abandoned, or modified, 
or questioned his Great Thing; quite 
the contrary. Posner is too politic
ever to say explicitly that economic 
analysis is a Theory Of Everything 
(hereafter "TOE"), but it is impos­
sible to interpret his writings—and 
Posner concedes in LFLRISC (a most 
magnanimous concession) the 
unavoidable necessity of interpreting 
written texts—without concluding that 
for him economic analysis is indeed a 
TOE.
It is a TOE, As the Chilean physiol­
ogist (and hedgehog) Humberto 
Maturana has discovered in his strug­
gles to explain the workings of the 
eye of a frog: "one can only say with 
a given language what the language 
permits."^ The language of Posnerian 
analysis does not permit one to say 
anything about many things of con­
cern to foxes (and other hedgehogs): 
it cannot explain the eye of a frog.^ 
But in this conceptual weakness lies 
its strength; for economic analysis 
can explain everything that can be 
said in the language of economic 
analysis. As for the rest, well, to that 
which cannot be said, one must 
remain deaf.
The Great Hedgehog has not 
exchanged his utilitarian armor for a 
fox coat; there has been no change in 
his preference ordering. (Hedgehogs 
have ordered preferences; foxes, 
disorderly inclinations.) But this does 
not mean that LFLRISC is an eco­
nomic analysis: nor is it a set of 
instructions as to how to do eco­
nomic analysis. LFLRISC can best be 
interpreted as a demonstration of 
some of the metaprinciples which 
underlie the Posnerian TOE, a revela­
tion of the Great Hedgehog's ground 
of being. As such it is a most impor­
tant paper.
The key to interpreting Posner's 
thought lies in LFLRISC's implicit 
denial of the truism that to know 
something is to know it in a context. 
To know something in a context 
entails the necessity of interpretation 
(in the light of the context). But it is 
the major claim of LFLRISC that 
interpretation is needed by a judge 
only in the case of written texts and 
perhaps—the point is not addressed— 
only in the case of statutes and con­
stitutions. Thus LFLRISC denies the 
necessity, ancj may ,well be intended 
to deny the possibility, X)! interpreting 
concepts, traditions, or ourselves.
^H. Maturana, Introduction, in H. 
Maturana and F. Varela, Autopoiesis and 
Cognition (1980), p. xiii.
“But cf. B. Heinrich, Bumblebee Economics 
(1979).
This denial places LFLRISC 
squarely within our dominant intel­
lectual tradition, the grand tradition 
of the physical sciences and the engi­
neering arts. The mode of thought 
handed down through this tradition is 
objective (as opposed to subjective), 
reductive, analytic (as opposed to 
synthetic), quantitative, mechanistic, 
logicist, radically this-worldly, and, 
for the most part, empiric. It denies 
the god in the machine; when it 
deigns to look at man, it sees only 
mechanism.
So long as it confines its attention 
to Newtonian mechanisms—and it 
cannot conceive of anything else—it 
works. Glockenspiels, steam engines, 
automobiles, rockets, fast-food joints, 
television sets, chicken factories, and 
computers: our lives are lived among 
its triumphal monuments. On the 
other hand, it does not work very 
well if one's purpose is to explain 
God's way to man, or vice versa. It 
does not work very well if one's 
purpose is to explain oneself—or to 
explain one's purpose. The mechanis­
tic tradition has no room for teleolog­
ical concepts, human (or even brute) 
feelings, or—if Maturana is right—the 
insight of a frog.
This being so, one would not 
expect the dominant tradition, the 
tradition of Posner's TOE, to be capa­
ble of dealing with the moral sci­
ences; for the subject of such sci­
ences is man, and man is a subjective 
being, with aspirations, feelings, and 
purposes. Man is a self-interpreting 
animal in the hermeneutic sense.
This hermeneutic concept of interpre­
tation—the craft of discovering the 
significance to ourselves of the phe­
nomena (including ourselves) that 
form our world—is totally alien to the 
mode of thought that is the context of 
LFLRISC.
In the words of Charles Taylor:
The thesis that man is a self­
interpreting being . . . runs against 
one of the fundamental prejudices, or, 
to sound less negative, leading ideas 
of modern thought and culture. It 
violates a paradigm of clarity and 
objectivity.
According to this, thinking cleaply 
about something, with a view to arriv­
ing at the truth about it, requires that 
we think of it objectively, that is, as 
an object among other 'objects. This 
means that we avoid attributing to it 
properties, or describing it in terms of 
properties, which are 'subjective' in 
the sense that they are only properties 
of the object in our experience of it.
This was one of the basic compo­
nents of the seventeenth-century revo­
lution in scientific thought, which we 
still see rightly as the foundation of
modern science, and indeed of mod­
ern thought in general.''
The dominant tradition is so perva­
sive, however, that its prejudices 
have been adopted by the social 
sciences, albeit at great cost to their 
explanatory power. The way—the 
only way—for a human being to 
study human beings from a non- 
subjective viewpoint is to study 
something else, some surrogate that 
lacks the attributes of humanity.
One way in which this objectifica­
tion of man can be accomplished is 
to adopt a radically empiricist 
approach: in psychology, behaviorists 
observe behavior and nothing more; 
in economics, econometricians 
observe the ebb and flow of aggre­
gates of goods and factors, and noth­
ing more human than 'propensities' 
to consume or save. Such studies 
may have predictive value, but they 
are totally without explanatory 
power: they are uninterpreted.
This empiric way is, however, not 
the way of LFLRISC or of the eco­
nomic analysis of law. The objects 
which economic analysis studies, 
which are the Everything within the 
Posnerian TOE, are not observable, 
are not empirical. They are mathe­
matical models whose symbols are 
not interpreted within the theory. 
Whatever meaning they have must 
be given in some metatheory for 
meaning cannot reside within an 
uninterpreted model. In particular, 
the profit-maximizing creatures of 
economic analysis are not self­
interpreting.
LFLRISC does not set out the well 
known characteristics of the crea­
tures which inhabit the economic 
model. (Those creatures are simply 
mathematical functions with real 
values—usually measured in 'dol­
lars'—, which take something—
'goods' and 'factors'—as their argu­
ments, have the property of 
transitivity, and are subject to certain 
mathematical constraints, and which 
maximize their value subject to those 
constraints.) LFLRISC is not about 
economic analysis. But just because it 
deals with matters outside the normal 
scope of economic models, LFLRISC 
contains the clearest statement that 
has yet appeared of the conceptual 
constraints which make that type of 
objective analysis possible.
As should by now be clear, an 
essential feature of Posnerian analysis 
is that its objects are concepts, not 
empirical data, and that these objects 
are what they are defined to be. In 
this sense Posner can be taken to be 
an extreme nominalist; his words
‘C. Taylor, Human Agency and Language 
(1985), pp. 45-6.
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mean whatever he means them to 
mean.^ (Humpty Dumpty was a 
hedgehog.I A corollary is that words 
in LFLRISC often do not have their 
ordinary meanings.
This latter point is made explicitly 
when Posner redefines 'legal formal­
ism' and ‘legal realism' to establish 
his mode of analysis as the rightful 
heir to both traditions. It is exposed 
more strikingly, however, by the 
claim that the formalists, with their 
preference for treating their premises 
as self-evident, were indulging in "a 
kind of nominalism, or conceptual­
ism, or Platonism; the idea that con­
cepts exist 'out there,' like trees or 
rocks, rather than are created." The 
terms 'Platonism' and 'nominalism' 
are normally treated as opposites, but 
in LFLRISC they appear to have 
identical meanings—because the 
Posnerian TOE cannot admit that 
there is any "out there" there, for 
Posner is a conceptualist by his own 
definition: all there is are concepts, 
and it makes no matter whether a 
concept is a nominal tree or a Pla­
tonic idea.
In LFLRISC we are told that the 
common law "is a collection of con­
cepts, such as negligence, consider­
ation, possession, good faith, conspir­
acy, impossibility, and laches, which 
furnish major premises for the deci­
sion of cases; the minor premises are 
the facts of the case." The major 
premises are reached on 'policy' 
grounds; the minor premises are 
statements of facts. It appears that 
both types of concepts, major and 
minor, are simply given to us; there 
is no need nor room for interpreta­
tion. 'Legal realism' is defined as the 
"critical" task of determining the 
principles which supply the major 
premises; 'legal formalism' is nothing 
more—or less—than the logical 
deduction of the conclusions which 
follow with mathematical inevitabil­
ity from the premises. By these defi­
nitions, realism and formalism are 
not opposed; they are complemen­
tary. Together they are necessary and 
sufficient to decide any common law 
issue, though Posner insists that they 
are not capable of dealing with stat­
ute and constitutional law, a point to 
which I shall return in a moment.
LFLRISC has nothing to say about 
fact finding, except for the casual 
remark that though case arguments 
are in theory determined by the 
"deductive method," "the actuality is 
far, far messier, in part because a
^Cf. Leff, "Economics Analysis of Law; 
Some Realism About Nominalism," 60 
Virginia Law Review (1974). In this article, 
Leff, the greatest legal fox of the century- 
may his legacy endure!—makes a compari­
son of legal formalism and legal realism 
that is, at once, quite similar to LFLRISC 
in formulation and very different from it 
in spirit (pp. 453-56).
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number of minor premises [i.e., facts] 
involving motivation, information, 
etc., are contested." That concepts 
like 'motivation' are subjective and 
discoverable only by some type of 
interpretation is not recognized 
within LFLRISC.
Nor does it have much to say about 
the choice of the major premises, the 
resolution of the "critical" issues of 
public policy. LFLRISC contends that 
the premises of the law must be 
chosen so that the outcome of a case 
"best promotes public welfare in 
nonlegalistic terms," "rather than just 
be the result of arbitrary personal 
preferences or antipathies, or class 
bias, or some other thoroughly dis­
credited ground of judicial action," 
but it makes no affirmative sugges­
tion as to how a judge or anyone else 
is to determine what best promotes 
the public welfare. It cannot logically 
make such suggestions, for—what­
ever Posner may have claimed else­
where—a basic tenet of the dominant 
tradition is the Humean doctrine that 
one cannot get from an 'is' to an 
'ought'; within LFLRISC 'public wel­
fare' can only be an 'objective' con­
cept without normative content. It 
appears that there is nothing within 
Posner's Great Thing that speaks to 
such issues. Nor need there be, for 
Posner simply posits the premise that 
"the common law seeks to promote 
efficiency in the sense of wealth 
maximization." No attempt is made 
in LFLRISC to justify this premise. 
Ultimately it just assumes "that the 
concepts which provide the major 
premises for common law reasoning
(whether an overarching premise 
such as wealth maximization, or 
particular legal concepts such as 
negligence that can be deduced from 
it) can be and are altered by judges in 
accordance with changing percep­
tions of public policy." Ultimately, in 
the case of common law decisions, 
the judges are "the legislators." And 
that is all there is to say about it.
What is starkly missing is any 
sense that common law judges are 
constrained by "precedent, custom, 
tradition, expected ways of doing 
things, predicted patterns of behav­
ior,"® the traditional sources of the 
oracles of the law. The only refer­
ence to the problem of following 
precedents (which might, of course 
involve interpretation) is the casual 
aside: "Of course the pace of change 
is affected by the need to preserve a 
reasonable degree of stability in law, 
but this is just another policy consid­
eration." It is obvious on this view 
that the premises of the law cannot 
be arrived at by any process of inter­
pretation. There is nothing to inter­
pret.
Far more important to an interpre­
tation of Posner's thought is the 'for­
malist' component, for in LFLRISC 
Posner pins the label 'formalist' on 
himself with a gusto that could 
scarcely be matched by his boldest 
critic: "The modern exemplar of 
formalism in common law is the 
positive economic analysis of the 
common law that Professor Landes 
and I and others have expounded."
And how formal is this formalism?
As formal as mathematics: "Eco­
nomic theory is a logical system like 
calculus or geometry . . . , or more 
precisely a family of such theories." 
And how formal is the common law? 
As formal as economic theory: "If the 
positive economic theory of the com­
mon law is right"—and it is clear that 
the Great Hedgehog is positive that it 
is right—then "the common law is a 
logical system; and deductive logic- 
formal reasoning—can be used to 
reach demonstrably correct results in 
particular cases, or to demonstrate 
the correctness of results in particu­
lar cases."
And thus does the Great Hedge- \ 
hog's Theory Of Everything explain— 
or explain away—the common law. 
There are only premises chosen to 
enhance the public welfare—which, 
of course, in LFLRISC means chosen 
to maximize wealth—and conclusions 
(holdings) logically deduced from 
such premises. Everything is 
accounted for and there is nothing to 
interpret.
But this leaves us with a consider­
able puzzle. Why is the major portion
“Buchanan, "Good Economics—Bad Law," 
60 Virginia Law Review (1974), pp. 483, 
489.
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of LFLRISC devoted to interpreta­
tion?
To answer that question requires us 
to distinguish between Professor
Posner and Judge Posner. To the 
professor economic analysis is a the­
ory of everything, including the com­
mon law. To the judge it is a theory 
of almost everything, including the 
common law. What it cannot explain 
to the judge is the deference that he 
owes as a judge to statutes and to the 
Constitution. In LFLRISC the judge is 
a legislator who creates and modifies 
"the doctrines of the common law."
But to Posner "statutory and constitu­
tional law differs fundamentally from 
common law in that every statute 
and constitutional provision ... is in 
some important sense not to be 
revised by the judges."
But why is that difference funda­
mental? The fact that someone other 
than the judge supplies the premises 
does not seem to prevent the judge 
from deducing their logical conse­
quences as required by Posnerian 
formalism.
As it turns out, that is not the prob­
lem. The difficulty lies in the fact 
that the judge—that good soldier— 
receives his orders in the form of 
words, and words—language, a text- 
are something with which our domi­
nant tradition—Posner's TOE—is not 
prepared to deal. On the other hand, 
"the common law, like the system of 
real numbers, is a conceptual sys­
tem—not a textual system .... Com­
mon law thus is unwritten law in a 
profound sense. There are more or 
less influential statements of every 
doctrine but none is authoritative in
the sense that the decision of a new 
case must be tied to the statement, 
rather than to the concept of which 
the statement is one of an indefinite 
number of possible formulations."
But statutes and constitutions are text 
and "meaning cannot be extracted 
from a text merely by taking the 
language of the text and applying the 
rules of logic to it." Texts have to be 
"interpreted (or decoded)."
To contend that common law con­
cepts are so clear that they—like real 
numbers—do not have to be inter­
preted can only be described as 
heroic. I am sure that Posner is clear 
on what a real number is; as for me,
I have trouble understanding inte­
gers. But this doctrine of the inherent 
clarity of concepts—simply by virtue 
of their not being said—seems to be 
an essential component of the theory 
of almost everything that is LFLRISC.
After that contention, to further 
contend that "all sorts of linguistic 
and cultural tools must be brought to 
bear on even the simplest-seeming 
text to get meaning out of it" can 
only be described as straining at a 
gnat after swallowing a camel.
As a fox, I cannot help but believe 
that all sorts of linguistic and cultural 
tools must be brought to bear to get 
meaning out of the sources of the 
common law and that even more 
tools are needed to get meaning out 
of a fact.
I think, however, that I know why 
Posner finds a text so difficult. As I 
said earlier, Posnerian analysis cannot 
explain the phenomenon that is
Posner. At least in part this is so 
because Posner is a linguistic being, a
discursive being, an "animal possess­
ing logos," as Aristotle puts it. The 
language, like the ontology, of
LFLRISC is too powerfully limited to 
be able to deal with language itself, 
for when we speak the subjective 
element inevitably sneaks in.
As a fox I would suggest that
Posner's Great Thing is too simple to 
deal with common law concepts, just 
as it is too simple to deal with the 
much easier—I submit—task of apply­
ing statutory provisions. The fact that 
the common law is not to be found in 
a single authoritative text does not 
mean that it is does not have to be 
interpreted.
As a lawyer I am a bit concerned at 
the idea that a judge is a legislator 
rather than an interpreter of our legal 
tradition. I am more concerned, how­
ever, at the idea that a judge is a 
good soldier who simply obeys orders 
from the legislature, even though he 
has on occasion difficulty in decoding 
them.
On balance, though, I am delighted 
that the greatest of our hedgehogs 
does see that interpretation can be a 
problem—and a necessity—for a 
judge, that the life of the law is more 
than mathematics. Texts require 
interpretation because they are 
embedded in language, that most 
subjective and human of contexts.
Is it not possible that the law itself 
is much like language, equally sub­
jective and human? And that, in 
consequence, all law, not just stat­
utes, needs interpretation?
The Portab]
by Erik M. Jensen
Associate Professor of Law
For the second time in a year, read­
ers of In Brief are blessed with a 
contribution from John Tiley. (See 
"U.S. Tax Reform: An Alien Being's 
View," May 1986.) In these pages 
you are receiving an introduction, all 
too brief, to the wisdom, knowledge, 
and wit of this extraordinary man. If 
you are challenged and intrigued by 
these writings—and'hpi^ could you 
not be?—think how lucky those of us 
in residence at the Law School have 
been: Professor Tiley, currently uni­
versity lecturer, Faculty of Law, Uni­
versity of Cambridge, and fellow of 
Queens' College, Cambridge, visited 
with us from August 1985 until Octo­
ber 1986. And we are further 
blessed:' Tiley has agreed to return to 
CWRU for several weeks each fall.
It would be difficult to overstate
e John Tiley
what Professor Tiley's visit has meant 
to this law school. Tiley is an interna­
tionally known tax scholar (hence the 
wisdom, knowledge, and wit); his* 
mere presence brought honor to us.
But John Tiley was not at CWRU to 
relax and accept accolad^es. He is a 
scholarly dynamo, and he was a 
vigorous participant in the intellec­
tual life of this institution. During the 
year, he published and lectured 
widely, carrying the CWRU banner 
with him. He left his intellectual 
mark in other, less easily quantifi­
able, ways as well. He prodded his 
colleagues and students, when prod­
ding was appropriate, and our work 
was the better for it. He provided 
flattery, when the egos of some junior 
faculty members needed boosting.
And the Law School administration
did not escape the Tiley influence: to 
the lasting benefit of the school, he 
politely (he is English, after all), but 
pointedly, noted serious gaps in the 
library's collections.
Those who would like further 
exposure to Tiley's tax writings—and 
that should include many of you— 
might examine his most recent 
article, "More on Receivability and 
Receipt," 1986 British Tax Review 152. 
Although directed to a British audi­
ence, the article discusses an issue 
that is also at the cutting edge of
United States tax law, the timing of 
income inclusion. As usual, Tiley 
demonstrates that grace and scholarly 
writing about taxation are not mutu­
ally exclusive. More pleasures await 
us. We can look forward to the publi­
cation of at least two articles that will
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be directly traceable to Tiley's time 
in Cleveland. Tiley is reexamining 
the United States tax doctrine of 
"substance over form" (and its identi­
cal twin, the "step transaction" doc­
trine), under which the form of a 
carefully crafted transaction may be 
disregarded and the "substance" 
given tax effect. From his American 
research Tiley will educate British tax 
lawyers about this curious doctrine 
that is creeping, perhaps galloping, 
into British law. And he will educate 
us Americans as well, providing a 
much needed fresh look, a compara­
tive look, at a principle that American 
tax lawyers have come to take for 
granted.
Lest I scare readers from "Two 
Nations Divided by a Common Law," 
let me assure you that it has little to 
do with taxation (except insofar as 
everything has a great deal to do 
with taxation). Tiley is a student of 
jurisprudence, of comparative law, of 
history. The breadth and depth of his 
learning, from which all of us at 
CWRU benefited this year, are amply 
reflected in that essay.
As a teacher. Professor Tiley 
brought to the classroom a perspec­
tive that American students must 
have found invaluable. As Professor 
Karen Nelson Moore, with whom 
Tiley has taught a pair of courses, 
comments, "John Tiley afforded the 
Law School a unique opportunity to 
explore comparative tax questions.
He brought to our international and 
foreign tax class helpful insights into 
another tax system's choices with
respect to the taxation of domestic 
and foreign income." Tiley also 
brightened Professor Leon Gabinet's 
already glowing courses in corporate 
income taxation, integrating into the 
course of instruction the fruits of 
Tiley's research on form and sub­
stance.
Scholar, teacher, and, of course, 
friend, John Tiley was a personal 
delight throughout his time here.
And, although 1 cannot speak for 
Tiley, I believe that he enjoyed his 
stay in Cleveland (as much as one 
can when separated from family). His 
support for the city's cultural activi­
ties shamed the rest of us. There was 
no more regular visitor to Severance 
Hall. He joined and regularly visited 
the museums of art and natural his­
tory. He partook of Cleveland's ath­
letic offerings, albeit not always with 
the best results. (Students of intellec­
tual history interested in the origins 
of his article's reference to the Indi­
ans' search in far-off lands for pitch­
ing—a humorous treatment of a fun­
damentally serious subject—need 
look no farther than Cleveland Sta­
dium. Tiley visited that venerable 
ball yard on two nights last summer 
when the Indians lost by scores of 
19-2 and 24-5, the low points of an 
otherwise vibrant 1986 campaign.)^ 
Were this a eulogy, I would end by 
stating that we shall not see John 
Tiley's likes again. Happily, it is not, 
and we shall—next August. Perhaps 
another In Brief offering will then be 
available. To tide you over until that 
time, however, I commend to you
Two Nations Divided by a Common 
Law, an essay bristling with insights, 
with questions to ponder,'* and with 
humor.
NOTES
'Whether blessings can be counted (the so- 
called "pennies from heaven" theory of 
the Chicago School) or whether they must 
be otherwise evaluated is an issue that 
sharply divides scholars. On that question, 
see the article by Professor Peter Junger, 
"A Fox Interprets the Hedgehog," in this 
journal,
"Tiley did, however, witness a Cleveland 
victory on Independence Day, a fact that I 
should somehow be able to analyze in 
terms of U.S.-U.K. relations. And I should 
note that Professor Cabinet also attended 
the 24-5 rout, his first baseball game since 
the time of Abner Doubleday, and he 
must share the blame for that miserable 
evening.
"For example, was Professor John Austin 
really different from the Professor Austin 
we have here? Or, if he was different, can 
that difference be attributed to the fact 
that John Austin "taught and wrote in the 
nineteenth century"?
About the author: Erik M. Jensen joined the 
faculty in 1983, quickly established himself 
as teacher and scholar, and was recently 
promoted to the rank of associate professor. 
He teaches tax courses and Business 
Planning. Jensen’s law degree is from Cornell 
University: before coming here, he clerked 
for Judge Monroe G. McKay of the Tenth 
Circuit and practiced in New York with 
Sullivan & Cromwell.
TWo Nations
Divided by a Common Law
by John Tiley
Visiting Professor of Law
On September 30, just before he completed 
his teaching assignment and returned to his 
home base in England, Professor Tiley lec­
tured to the Law School Academy. This is a 
transcription, minimally edited.—K.E.T.
I suspect that the best thing about 
this particular talk is the title: "TWo 
Nations Divided by a Common Law." 
It does beg a lot of questions about 
what we understand by "common 
law," and what I'm going to be doing 
is to try and highlight some of the 
differences between law here and 
law as we have it in England.
A Common Law
When you came to this law school,
I suppose one of the first things you 
did was to seek a definition of "the 
common law." You knew that you 
were going to study a common law 
system, and so you started along the 
lines that common law was the body 
of rules administered by common
law courts. And then, being good 
historians, you would go to the books 
and you would find that the common 
law courts were judicial bodies that 
emerged in England in the course of 
the thirteenth century. And that set 
you up for three years in the law 
school of intense historical study.
A moment ago I described the 
common law as a body of rules, a 
very positivist notion. There is 
another way of looking at "the com­
mon law," and that is to say it is the 
customary law, which is accepted by 
a particular group of people, a partic­
ular elite (a notion explored by Pro­
fessor Simpson in his contribution to 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 2d 
series). The particular elite we have 
in mind, of course, would be the
legal profession in England at the end 
of the thirteenth century and in the 
fourteenth century, because one of 
the most significant changes that 
came about was at the very end of 
the thirteenth century, when it was 
decided that judges should be 
selected from the ranks of lawyers. 
That meant selected from the ranks 
of senior lawyers, so that you had a 
career leading to a judicial appoint­
ment that presupposed practice at the 
bar first of all. This is totally differ­
ent from the civil law countries, 
where they have a separate profes­
sion of judge.
From that thirteenth-century begin­
ning we seem to have come a long 
way. You seem to have traveled this 
road with a little more exuberance 
than we have, and you have done all 
sorts of things which strike the for­
eign lawyer as—according to last 
week's National Law Journal—bizarre.
I want to focus on one or two of 
these rather curious features just for 
a minute.
The U.S. System—A 
Caricature
In the interests of caricature—now 
in all caricature there is an underly­
ing substance of truth!—foreign law­
yers, even lawyers coming from 
England, do find the U.S. system 
bizarre. Our vision of U.S. attorneys 
is colored by lawyers flying into 
India immediately after the Bhopal 
disaster seeking to sign up clients, 
much the same way that the general 
manager of the Cleveland Indians 
might go into the jungles of South 
America to find a tribe that does 
nothing but pitch.
Then we read about people who 
wait ten years on death row, waiting 
to be executed. At the same time as 
the National Law Journal was carrying 
that suggestion that the U.S. law 
system seemed bizarre to outsiders, 
tire New York Times was reporting 
that attorneys seemed reluctant to 
take appeals against death sentences 
now because of the emotional drain, 
the lack of financial reward, and the 
small chance of success. Spelt out in 
that way, you seem to be offering law 
as a substance in the marketplace, 
much as the same as other sub­
stances.
Then we find juries giving $12 
billion damages. Juries! Why $12 
billion is bad enoughj But to have 
these things decided by juries strikes 
us—even from England—as strange. 
Then we read about the jury awards 
in personal injury cases, and we 
wonder why the judges aren't con­
trolling your juries better. And then I 
get told, "Well you don't understand 
the American institution of the jury.
It is an invaluable bulwark of free­
dom of the individual." I read with
interest about your proposals to limit 
damages in various cases of personal 
injuries. What strikes me as a cynical 
observer is that it's not much use 
setting a maximum because what 
begins as a maximum very soon 
becomes the norm.
Then you have combined civil and 
criminal jurisdiction in the state 
courts. And you have elected judges! 
Now all this strikes me, coming from 
where I come from, as strange. But 
we can go further.
The Role of Law
You have a view of the role of law 
in society. The range of issues that 
are susceptible to the legal process is 
unlimited. It is beyond the imagina­
tion of an ordinary Englishman to 
imagine any limit to the questions 
that you will litigate somewhere, 
sometime, and preferably at someone 
else's expense.
But then you also attack your legal 
questions in a different way. You are 
always looking for policy. You are 
always looking for the reasons 
behind rules, and as a result you 
believe—and at this stage I think 
exaggeratedly—that there are no such 
things as fixed rules. You will find 
when you get into practice that there 
are a lot of rules that are very fixed, 
and no amount of pleading of policy 
will enable you to convince a court 
that this will should be probated or 
that particular trust upheld. But you 
will no doubt condemn this as a very 
parochial wills-and-trusts outlook.
So you litigate all the time, any­
where, and in the most bizarre way. 
At least it must seem so to a for­
eigner, because we are all wedded to 
the system we know. The law course 
we ourselves took was always the 
best law course. And so it was.
The Divided Profession
I now want to come to some insti­
tutional differences between the U.S. 
and the U.K., and I suppose the first 
one I have to address is the phenom­
enon of the divided profession. But 
by way of preface let me stress that I 
am dealing with England. The Uruted 
Kingdom is a different entity. The 
United Kingdom consists of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. There 
is some little difficulty ^bout North­
ern Ireland at the moment, but we 
will gloss over that. In Great Britain 
we also have Scotland, which is a 
separate legal jurisdiction that has its 
origins in the civil law and not in the 
common law, and there are some 
fascinating differences between the 
two. I'm going to concentrate on 
England, which for this purpose 
includes Wales, because Wales was 
conquered before Scotland was con­
quered and they were given English 
law as a bonus.
John Tiley, an Oxford B.A. now teaching at 
Cambridge, is a much-published tax scholar 
and a peripatetic teacher: he has held visiting 
appointments at Dalhousie University and 
the University of Western Ontario in 
Canada, the University of Auckland in New 
Zealand, the University of Melbourne in 
Australia, the Universities of Tilburg and 
Leiden in the Netherlands (where he met up 
with CWRU's Leon Gabinet], and most 
recently at Case Western Reserve. When he 
spoke to the Academy just before his 
departure, he graciously allowed In Brief 
to wire him up with a tape recorder.
Wigs and Things
So in England we find a divided 
profession, divided between barris­
ters and solicitors. When you go into 
court you know the difference 
because the barristers wear wigs and 
the solicitors do not. As you go 
around the London courts, you will 
see people clutching papers which 
are tied in a nice pink ribbon; those 
bundles are called briefs. The distinc­
tion between a lady barrister and a 
solicitor, according to one particular 
high court judge, is that lady barris­
ters are the ones with briefs and solic­
itors are those without. Which tells 
you what judicial humor is like in 
England. (Much the same as here. We 
have found a similarity. What a pity.)
Two (inaccurate) differences are 
often put forward. These are that 
barristers do court work whereas 
solicitors don't, and that barristers 
have expertise whereas solicitors do 
not.
As to court work,' quite a lot of 
barristers don't go to court at all.
They are, particularly in the tax and 
trusts area, people who advise, peo­
ple who draw up settlements and 
who wouldn't dream of going into 
court. Moreover, many solicitors do a 
lot of court work and do it extremely 
well.
With regard to expertise, it is true 
to say that some barristers have great 
expertise, but in many areas solicitors
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have equal if not greater expertise. In 
my own area, that of tax, solicitors 
have become more and more expert. 
They go to tax counsel only if there is 
a very, very abstruse issue and they 
want to shift the risk of liability from 
their own insurance policy onto the 
barrister's insurance policy—or if 
there is a risk of litigation.
Audience and Partnerships
But the more crucial and the more 
precise differences are that barristers 
have the sole right of audience in the 
higher courts in England and that 
barristers cannot be instructed by a 
lay client: all work has to come to 
barristers through a solicitor, 
although you, as U.S. attorneys, can 
instruct a barrister direct. There are 
differences in structure in that the 
barristers are a much smaller profes­
sion grouped around the four inns of 
court (everyone has to be a member 
of an inn of court), whereas there are 
many more solicitors and they are 
organized by the Law Society. Histori­
cally barristers are not officers of the 
court; solicitors are. And—a differ­
ence which is of great importance in 
practice, at least to people in your 
particular position—members of the 
bar are not allowed to practice in 
partnership.
This last point is of great impor­
tance as it means that it is very hard 
to start at the bar, as fans of Rumpole 
will have seen. By contrast, solicitors 
join law firms Just as you do, and 
they find it easy to start with, and 
they draw huge salaries of perhaps 
seven thousand pounds a year. That's 
about ten thousand dollars, and 
they're worth every penny.
Reasons for the Division
Now this division, which always 
seems to interest American lawyers, 
naturally invites some degree of justi­
fication. Of course that is a very un- 
English thing to do. In England you 
don't ask "why,” you ask "since 
when," and we could spend a lot of 
time on "since when." But there are 
some practical reasons which do 
justify the present set-up.
Under the present structure barris­
ters' services are available to all, so a 
high-powered barrister can be 
instructed one day by a leading city 
firm and the next day by some very 
small firm out in the country. This 
enables small local practices to 
remain in a fairly flourishing condi­
tion and also gives the talent of the 
bar to every client who can afford it.
The second justification is that the 
barrister, because everything is fil­
tered before it reaches him, is 
removed from the everyday organiza­
tion of the case and therefore brings 
a fresh mind to it. The danger of a 
fresh mind is that it can be an unin­
formed mind. But the theoretical 
justification I think is sound.
There is also a surprising justifica­
tion, which is that it is often cheaper 
to use a barrister than it is to use a 
solicitor. A busy solicitor does not 
want to go down to a court and 
spend all day waiting for a case to 
come on. He would much rather pay 
a barrister a set fee to go and sit and 
wait, and send some junior clerk to 
sit with him during the day.
The arguments against it of course 
are that you necessarily have a dupli­
cation of personnel, particularly in 
high court cases, and in major cases 
it can lead to very serious excess 
costs. But whether you think it's 
justified or not, it is there, and as the 
rules of professions are always writ­
ten by people who have succeeded in 
them, it is difficult to change.
Possible Changes
So, I would have said, perhaps 
even at the start of this year (1986), 
but there is some evidence that we 
are going to get a change. There is 
some evidence that solicitors are 
going to be given the right of audi­
ence in all cases, and it will be very 
interesting to see whether that hap­
pens. The judges think that it is 
within their jurisdiction to decide 
who will appear before them and 
they don't need a statute to change 
that. Judges will suddenly one day 
decide that solicitors have that right, 
and then the barristers with equal 
grace and speed will retaliate by 
taking cases direct from the public. 
And what will we then have? We will 
have de facto fusion of the profes­
sion. But not de jure—heaven for- 
fend! It would be most un-English to 
have a de jure fusion.
Judges
Our judges are different from 
yours. Like you we have various tiers 
of judges, and I will just talk about 
some of them. In the high court itself 
we have a lot of judges. They are full 
time, they are usually extremely 
good, and they have all spent a con­
siderable amount of time in the very 
senior ranks of the profession. They 
tend to get appointed around about 
the age of fifty, and they serve for at 
least fifteen years. There is now a 
retiring age of seventy-five. There are 
many of these judges now, well over 
a hundred.
At the other end of the judicial 
system we have magistrates. These 
are lay people who have a profes­
sional clerk to advise them on the 
law. They deal with a lot of petty 
crime and a lot of family work.
In between we have judges called 
circuit judges who operate in the 
crown courts and in the county 
courts. The crown courts are criminal 
courts, and the county courts are
civil courts. The circuit judges who 
are appointed to these are full time, 
but they are assisted by an extensive 
network of recorders and assistant 
recorders who are part-time people.
If you are a barrister of a certain age, 
you usually do three years as an 
assistant recorder and then three 
years as a recorder, and then when 
the system has had a good chance to 
see whether you are any good as a 
judge, you may be invited to become 
a circuit judge, or sometimes directly 
a judge of the high court.
The judicial system in England 
could not operate at the moment 
without the help of these deputy 
judges. It may well now be the case 
that more judge-days are provided by 
these part-time judges than by the 
full-time judges.
From this structure a number of 
differences flow. English judges go 
through a process of judicial training, 
which yours do not. They are not 
elected; they are emphatically 
appointed. They are appointed only 
after sitting for a certain amount of 
time and having their abilities 
checked. The caseload that they have 
to cope with is nothing like so great 
as the load that your judges are asked 
to deal with. They have no clerks in 
your sense.
Moreover we don't have a system 
whereby the judge has control of the 
litigation all the way through, from 
start to finish. We have a whole 
range of court officials whose job it is 
to make sure the case is prepared for 
trial, make sure all the applications 
for discovery are dealt with, and so 
on. All the procedural matters are 
dealt with by various court officials 
and registrars, and then the matter is 
brought to trial before the judge. And 
it may well be that if you've had an 
application for an injunction earlier 
on, some quite different judge has 
dealt with that application from the 
one who deals with the matter when 
it comes to final resolution. And we 
have civil and criminal cases in quite 
separate structures. And we have no 
juries in civil cases, with the excep­
tion of defamation and malicious 
prosecution and one or two others 
like that. The result of all this is a 
great deal of judicial control and a 
great burden on the judge in a civil 
case as he has to decide all the issues 
of fact, all the questions of law, and 
then give damages.
Law Students
Now how do these people get 
there? What about your equivalents 
over there? Students, people who are 
keen, well informed, and always 
prepared; that is intended as a 
description of you. What are your 
counterparts over there like?
They are younger. Law in England 
is an undergraduate subject. It is
studied therefore by people between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. 
This is a product of our English edu­
cational system, which is much more 
specialized than yours is at an earlier 
age. From ages sixteen to eighteen 
most people in English schools who 
are going on to university study just 
three subjects, maybe four if they're 
scientists and they're doing maths, 
physics, chemistry. If they're on the 
arts side, they tend to do English, 
history, and French, or some other 
grouping of three subjects, and that is 
it. But they are being molded for in- 
depth study on a fairly narrow range.
'This process is continued when 
they get to university. They do a 
three-year course consisting of lec­
tures—and some of you will have 
gathered that I am used to lecturing 
in England—and the lecturing con­
sists of a talking book. There are no 
questions. The definition of a lecture 
is "information being conveyed from 
the lecturer's notebook to the stu­
dent's notebook without passing 
through the mind of either." There is 
a case for observing that there is such 
a thing as a printed book now, and 
that it may follow that the talking 
book is not necessary, but that is 
another matter.
The lectures are backed up by a 
series of tutorials or "supervisions,” 
depending on which university you 
come from. These are meetings in 
groups of three or four. Each of the 
three or four people writes an essay 
each week for the tutorial, and there 
are about two a week. For each of 
those essays the student will be 
expected to read perhaps fifty pages 
of a textbook—yes, there are text­
books in England, and we expect 
students to read them! They would 
also read five or more articles, 
twenty-plus cases, perhaps ten com­
mentaries on cases, and when they 
have gathered in the thoughts of 
others and assimilated them, they 
direct their minds to answering ques­
tions. There may be an essay on a 
particular topic, or there may be a 
series of problems which they are 
required to answer. They bring those 
with them to the session, or prefera­
bly hand them in in advance for 
marking, and matters are discussed. 
You will appreciate that in a group of 
three or four there is less place to 
hide if you are unprepared, which 
has happened, I believe, once or 
twice here in>the history of this law 
school.
While these people are studying 
law, they do very few subjects com­
pared with you; they do five subjects 
a year at most. The year is split up 
into three terms with no semester 
system, so in their three years they 
do perhaps fourteen subjects. The 
advantages, we think, are that it 
gives the student time to let the ideas
sink in; we develop very specific 
skills; we get to know the students 
very well (inevitably); and we think 
we are providing an education rather 
than a professional training.
Professional Training
Now that is important, because a 
graduate of a law school in the 
United Kingdom is not qualified to 
practice. How you become qualified 
to practice depends on whether 
you're going to be a barrister or a 
solicitor. If you're going to be a bar­
rister, you go into a one-year course 
at something called the Council of 
Legal Education, which is organized 
by the bar. After that you do twelve 
months' serving in chambers as a 
pupil, and after that you are allowed 
to practice. If you want to be a solici­
tor, you do a different twelve 
months' course which is very inten­
sive and very practical. You fill in 
lots of forms and learn how to do 
that, which is invaluable, and then 
you serve two years in articles in a 
firm. Only after that are you quali­
fied to practice on your own.
There are advantages and disadvan­
tages in these things. English law 
students are young. They are very 
young. They are very bright. And 
despite their youth they can cope 
with English rules of law, English 
notions of what law is about. The 
price paid is that they do far too few 
subjects. Fourteen in three years 
compared with the number you do 
means that in most universities there 
is only one tax course, and in Oxford 
and Cambridge there are no tax 
courses in the undergraduate curricu­
lum.
The Nature of Law
These things are all related to the 
nature of the law itself. If I begin by 
saying English judges are respected, I 
might be thought to be making a 
contrast. English judges are 
respected. We are a much more def­
erential society than yours. English 
law tends to respect precedent far 
more than you do. It may well be 
that we have respected precedent too 
much. In the 1950s, when I began 
my legal studies, we had the great 
Lord Simmonds sitting ^t the top of 
the English legal system, and he was 
a conservative of the darkest hue. He 
produced the memorable line, "Het­
erodoxy is not made the more attrac­
tive to me by being blessed with the 
name of reform." He did not think it 
was his function as a judge to change 
the law. Changing the law was a 
matter for Parliament. And of course 
we had a relatively active Parliament. 
We believe in the sovereignty of 
Parliament. Parliament can do any­
thing it likes.
Now there are reasons for our 
difference from you in this respect. 
We are a single jurisdiction; you are 
emphatically not. English cases have 
a common law. We generally think 
that there is a right answer to most 
issues that come before the court.
Yes, a right answer. Not politically 
right, not justifiably right, but a tech­
nically correct decision. And that is 
something that causes some of you 
amusement, I see, but if you read the 
writings of Ronald Dworkin you will 
find there is a strong jurisprudential 
cases for saying that there is a right 
answer in most cases. You of course 
have fifty jurisdictions to contend 
with—judges who have an immense 
caseload, whose opportunity for error 
(or divergence of opinion, according 
to taste), is necessarily much greater 
than ours.
But at the same time as we have 
this respect for case law, we have 
done a lot to destroy case law by 
going in for legislation. We have a 
body called the Law Commission, 
which is entrusted with the process 
of law reform, and they are expected 
to act through the legislature. This 
reduces the role of judges in reform­
ing the law and increases the pattern 
of legislation in the very areas where 
judges probably ought to be active.
It's not quite as bad as that. There 
is a contrast, but it is not pure carica­
ture. Our judges have become much 
more active, partly because we 
believe that education is important 
and many of the judges now on the 
bench have studied the American 
realists' movements when they were 
undergraduates, and many of them 
have studied law in the United States 
anyway. We have a great deal of 
development going on, particularly in 
the area of public law.
So what does it all add up to?
We are different. We are very dif­
ferent. I envy you much of the things 
you do. I envy you your vigor, your 
vitality, your willingness to go for a 
reason behind a rule and then formu­
late the rule in terms of that reason. I 
envy you your willingness to treat 
questions broadly, your energy in 
treating legislation as embodying 
principle.
Your law is much more difficult as 
a result of this than ’English law is. It 
is more subtle, it is more elusive, it is 
more complex—and therefore per­
haps more suited for study by older 
people.
It's also, as I read the cases, very 
irritating, because many of your 
judges rarely give what strike me as 
adequate reasons for the decisions 
they reach—reasons in terms of the 
technical arguments that have been 
placed before them. The judge will
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simply say, "I decide this, I decide 
that." You think our cases are far too 
long, that our judges are prolix, and 
maybe you are right. I think your 
cases are far too short. It's almost as 
though every case was designed to be 
put into a casebook for study in law 
school, trying to work out whatever 
it is that the judge might actually 
have meant.
And yet, what you are looking at is 
a difference of philosophy. We go 
back to the beginning—common law 
as a body of rules. In England we are
An Insider
by Donald L. Korb, '73
On October 22, 1986, President 
Reagan signed into law the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, which some 
commentators are saying is the most 
comprehensive overhaul of our fed­
eral income tax system since its 
inception in 1913. Since the new tax 
law dramatically reduces tax rates, 
repeals or restricts scores of tax 
incentives written into the tax code 
over the years to encourage activities 
deemed economically or socially 
beneficial, and makes such funda­
mental changes to the law as elimi­
nating (for the first time since 1921) 
the tax rate differential for capital 
gains, it is easy to see why it is being 
billed as the most significant piece of 
tax legislation in our lifetime.
From May 29, 1984, until Septem­
ber 12, 1986, I served as assistant to 
the commissioner of internal reve­
nue. One of my responsibilities dur­
ing that time was to be the overall 
coordinator of the IRS's participation 
in the tax reform legislative process. 
This meant that I had a front-row 
seat from which I could watch as 
well as take part in this historic tax 
reform effort. Talk about being in the 
right place at the right time!
Looking back at the legislative 
process now, it is a wonder to me 
that the tax bill survived at all. It 
came close to death many times. 
Perhaps no other legislation in recent 
years survived so many narrow 
escapes.
Much has already been written 
about the roller coaster ride that the 
tax bill took from the time nearly 
three years ago when President 
Reagan announced in his State of the 
Union message on January 25, 1984, 
that he was directing his "Treasury 
secretary Donald Regan to develop a 
plan "to simplify the entire tax code
still very much under the influence 
of Professor Austin—Professor John 
Austin, who taught and wrote in the 
nineteenth century and was therefore 
different from the Professor Austin 
you have here.
Austin, Bentham, and the juris- 
prudes of that particular school 
taught us that there was a right 
answer, that law could be reasonably 
certain, and that legislation could 
make things more certain still. And 
so we have been led to believe. We 
believe that law is a body of rules. I
so all taxpayers, big and small, are 
treated more fairly."
First, there was the Treasury 
Department plan developed by Secre­
tary Regan which became known as 
Treasury I. It was hailed by academic 
tax specialists because it reduced tax 
rates and abolished almost all deduc­
tions, including many significant tax 
breaks enjoyed by business that had 
been enacted into law in 1981 at the 
urging of the Reagan administration. 
As might have been expected for the 
kind of plan that politicians have 
rejected for years, the White House 
kept its distance from Treasury I.
Next came Treasury II, prepared 
under the direction of the new Trea­
sury secretary James Baker (the 
former White House chief of staff 
who switched jobs with Secretary 
Regan in January 1985) and endorsed 
by the president in a nationally tele­
vised speech on May 28, 1985. The 
new plan followed the basic outline 
of Treasury I but retained more busi­
ness tax breaks. Unfortunately, Trea­
sury II had an almost fatal flaw: it
don't think you do. You appear to 
think "a body of rules" is the wrong 
way to characterize it, that what you 
have instead is a body of principle. 
And this shows up in the issues you 
submit to the courts and the vigor 
and energy with which you argue 
them. I suspect that deep down you 
may be closer to what those 
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century 
judges thought they were up to than 
we are.
made too many concessions to spe­
cific interests like the oil and gas 
industry for the document to be 
acceptable to the Democratically 
controlled House of Representatives.
After formal Congressional hearings 
on tax reform were held during the 
summer of 1985, the House Ways 
and Means Committee, chaired by 
Congressman Dan Rostenkowski, 
began drafting the tax bill, on Sep­
tember 26, in sessions closed to the 
public. Instead of using the presi­
dent's proposal (Treasury II) as the 
mark-up document, Rostenkowski 
presented his own plan, which, while 
it followed the basic structure and 
outline of the president's proposal, 
was more favorable to poor and mid­
dle-income taxpayers and less favor­
able to upper-income taxpayers and 
businesses. Still, Secretary Baker, 
who attended many of the mark-up 
sessions himself (a most unusual step 
for a Treasury secretary), worked 
closely with Rostenkowski and the 
other members of the Ways and 
Means Committee so that a bill
Looks at Tax Reform
When Don Korb returned to Cleveland last fall, one of his first acts was to offer his 
considerable experience and expertise to the Law School: he spent the better part of a day here 
talking to tax classes, including Professor Leon Gabinet's seminar. (Yes, that's Cabinet's head in 
the foreground.!
13
would be reported out of committee. 
Baker knew that if the tax bill died in 
that committee there would be no tax 
reform.
Despite Rostenkowski's and Baker's 
efforts, on several occasions during 
the committee's mark-up process the 
bill almost collapsed, only to be 
revived through old-fashioned horse­
trading by Rostenkowski and through 
Baker's willingness to compromise 
where necessary. Shortly before dawn 
on November 23, 1985, their efforts 
were rewarded when the Ways and 
Means Committee approved the legis­
lation. After a surprise procedural 
attack by House Republicans on the 
House floor had been overcome by 
some extraordinary personal lobbying 
by the president himself, the full 
House of Representatives passed the 
bill in mid-December.
The next step for the tax legislation 
was the Senate Finance Committee— 
sometimes referred to as the grave­
yard of tax reform—chaired by Sena­
tor Bob Packwood. Packwood (once 
quoted as saying he "kinda liked the 
code the way it is") came up with an 
entirely new plan on March 18, 1986, 
which retained many tax breaks for 
business that had already been 
rejected by the House, including 
those for the timber industry in Pack- 
wood's home state of Oregon. But 
timber was not the only industry 
protected by the Packwood proposal. 
In an effort to gain support for his 
package from the other members of 
the committee, Packwood had made 
concessions throughout his proposal 
to the particular interests represented 
by committee members.
What followed, however, was even 
worse. Over the next month of mark­
up sessions, the Senate Finance Com­
mittee proceeded to reject nearly 
every attempt to restrict tax breaks 
and, meanwhile, approved dozens of 
new tax breaks for individual taxpay­
ers and for businesses. Finally on 
April 18 Senator Packwood, faced 
with the politically embarrassing 
possibility that the Republican- 
controlled Senate Finance Committee 
would kill a Republican president's 
chief domestic policy initiative, had 
to adjourn the committee's delibera­
tions before his bill sank in a sea of 
red ink.
At this point, Packwood decided to 
go back to square one with a bold 
change in strategy that he hoped 
would revive his dying Jpill. He spent 
the last two weeks in April working 
with a small group of loyal sup­
porters (often referred to as "the core 
group") to develop a new plan that 
would drastically cut the top individ­
ual tax rate to the 27-percent range 
and would end almost all tax prefer­
ences, including those for capital 
gains and for contributions to individ­
ual retirement accounts. The new
plan also included a provision that 
would effectively abolish almost all 
tax shelters by denying taxpayers the 
capacity to deduct passive losses 
against income from salaries, profes­
sional fees, interest, and dividends. 
This bill (based in large part on the 
Bradley-Gephardt Fair Tax Act intro­
duced by Senator Bill Bradley and 
Congressman Richard Gephardt in 
1982) caught the imagination of the 
Senate Finance Committee's members 
and passed by a 20-to-0 vote, after 
only two days of debate, just after 
midnight on May 7, 1986. In June, 
the full Senate would approve the bill 
with few amendments (thanks mainly 
to a no-amendment strategy devel­
oped by Packwood and Bob Dole, the 
majority leader) by a vote of 97 to 3.
When the two houses of Congress 
each pass a different version of a tax 
bill, selected members of the two tax­
writing committees meet in confer­
ence to iron out the differences. The 
conference to write the final version 
of the tax reform bill began on July 
17. For three weeks little was accom­
plished. To make matters worse, 
Rostenkowski and Packwood had 
given the conferees a deadline: they 
had to complete action on the bill 
before Congress recessed for the 
summer on August 15. Otherwise, it 
was feared, the special interests 
would be able to delay action on the 
bill when the Congress returned in 
September and there would be no 
action before the legislators left town 
in October to campaign for re- 
election. So time was running out.
On August 12, just three days 
before the deadline, the morning 
session of the conference degenerated 
into a shouting match. Once again, it 
looked as if the bill would die. But 
that afternoon one of the conferees 
suggested that the two chairman try 
to hammer out a bill in private, one- 
on-one negotiations. After four days 
and nights of marathon negotiations, 
an agreement was reached. On 
August 16, close to midnight—all 
important votes on this bill seemed to 
take place in the dead of night—the 
conferees adopted a compromise bill. 
The bill was eventually passed by 
both houses in late September and* 
was signed by the president in 
October.
In my view, the reason we have a 
new tax law is that four principal 
players in the process were extraordi­
narily persistent: President Reagan, 
Secretary Baker, Congressman Ros­
tenkowski, and Senator Packwood.
The president made tax reform his 
number-one domestic policy issue 
during his second term, and he was 
able to force the Democratic leader­
ship in the House of Representatives 
to join him in a serious effort to
reform the tax code. Both Speaker 
Tip O'Neill and Ways and Means 
Chairman Rostenkowski decided it 
was to their advantage to do so. They 
hoped to win some of the credit for 
the Democratic Party in what was 
really a traditional Democratic issue 
but one that had been seized by the 
president for the Republicans.
The president also established one 
of the most important guiding princi­
ples that were to shape the contours 
of the tax reform debate. He decided 
that he could support and sign into 
law only a tax bill that was "revenue 
neutral." What this meant was that 
the new tax system must raise the 
same amount of revenue as the cur­
rent tax system—no more, no less. 
This concept of revenue neutrality 
would put real discipline into the tax 
reform process because it required 
congressmen and senators who 
wanted to create new revenue-losing 
tax breaks to find ways to pay for 
them either by raising tax rates or by 
taking away tax benefits from other 
taxpayers. Without the insistence on 
revenue neutrality, there would never 
have been a tax bill.
Perhaps the most dramatic single 
episode in the whole process 
occurred on December 16, 1985. On 
December 11, House Republicans 
had mounted a surprise procedural 
attack and had voted overwhelmingly 
(164 to 14) to reject a procedural 
resolution that had to be adopted 
before the actual tax bill itself could 
be brought up for debate. (By con­
trast, the Democrats had supported
Don Korb, '73 jLL.M., Georgetown 
Universityl recently rejoined the Cleveland 
firm of Thompson, Mine & Flory after two 
years in Washington as assistant to the 
commissioner of internal revenue, in charge 
of the IRS's participation in the legislative 
process that led to the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986. The photo shows him looking 
over the shoulder of IRS deputy 
commissioner James Owens, who served 
for a time as acting commissioner.
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the resolution by a margin of better 
than 3 to 1.) The only way to save 
the bill at that point was for the pres­
ident to make an extraordinary per­
sonal lobbying trip to Capitol Hill.
On December 16 he met with House 
Republicans in an effort to persuade 
enough of them to change their votes 
so that the bill could be approved by 
the House and the tax reform process 
could move on to the Senate. He 
promised them that he would veto 
the bill if it arrived on his desk with­
out significant changes, but he urged 
them to vote for it to keep the pro­
cess alive. The next day the House 
approved the bill by a voice vote 
after a motion to kill it was rejected, 
256 to 171. The president had per­
suaded 34 Republicans to switch 
their votes, and that was the differ­
ence between victory and defeat.
Secretary Baker also played a key 
role. He was responsible for taking 
Treasury I—a purist, academic, politi­
cally unrealistic document—and turn­
ing it into the much more politically- 
viable Treasury II. He was also the 
administration's legislative tactician. 
He maneuvered the bill through 
Congress by knowing when to make 
compromises and when to hold firm 
for the president's principles.
Congressman Rostenkowski was 
astute enough to realize that if he did 
not report a tax bill out of the Ways 
and Means Committee the Demo­
cratic Party could end up being 
labeled as opponents of tax reform. 
He saw the need to Join with Presi­
dent Reagan and work with the 
Republican administration in what 
was a traditional Democratic stance 
against tax loopholes.
It was also Rostenkowski who 
managed to avert a disaster for the 
bill during the closed mark-up in his 
committee in mid-October 1985.
After days of minor changes and 
nibbling around the edges, the Ways 
and Means Committee, faced with its 
first vote on a controversial issue, 
caved in and—against the chairman's 
strong desire—approved an important 
tax break for banks. The lobbyists in 
the hallway outside the committee 
room—known as Gucci Gulch in 
honor of the footwear that many of 
them favored—were ecstatic. Ros­
tenkowski was furious.
Some analysts pronounced the bill 
dead at that point: the vote on the 
bank issue, they said, showed that 
Congress was unwilling to take on 
the powerful special interests. Ros­
tenkowski had other ideas. He 
stopped the mark-up for more than a 
week and he set about trading favors 
for votes. For example, he agreed 
with one group of members to sup­
port continued federal tax deductions 
for state income and sales taxes. With 
another group he agreed not to argue 
for the taxation of employee fringe
benefits. In return for his support for 
those items and for a host of smaller 
issues important to particular mem­
bers' constituents, he demanded the 
members' support for the overall bill. 
The committee reconvened and voted 
to overturn its decision of the pre­
vious week. The tax break for banks 
went out the window, and the legisla­
tion was back on track.
Finally, Bob Packwood saved tax 
reform with his revolutionary pro­
posal last May. If he had not come up 
with his modified flat-tax proposal 
when he did, the bill would surely 
have died in the Senate Finance Com­
mittee. And Packwood knew when to 
compromise. The unanimous 20-to-0 
vote in the Senate Finance Commit­
tee is a little misleading because 
there had not even been a majority 
for the bill before a last-minute 
change allowing certain oil and gas 
interests to be excluded from the 
passive-loss rule applicable to all 
other tax shelters. Faced with a 
choice between no bill and a bill with 
the extra tax advantage for oil and 
gas exploration, Packwood knew he 
had to compromise and he did 
exactly that.
In conclusion, whether you are for 
or against tax reform, you have those 
four men either to thank or to blame. 
You also can either thank or blame, 
as the case may be, the following key 
strategic decisions:
• The concept of revenue neutrality. 
Without it, there would have been no 
tax bill. This was particularly true in 
the Senate. The Senate began its 
debate with an agreement to require 
that all amendments be revenue- 
neutral, and that provided an unusual 
amount of discipline to that normally 
unruly body.
• The closed-door sessions of the 
Ways and Means Committee. Outside 
the glare of the public eye, the com­
mittee was able to deal openly with 
the elimination of many favorite tax 
preferences in a way that would have 
been impossible in open sessions.
• The two-day blitz by Packwood II. 
Caught off guard by Senator Pack- 
wood's revolutionary proposal in 
early May, the lobbyists were never 
able to recover. Had the bill been 
debated longer, it might have been 
reported out of the Senate Finance 
Committee in quite a different form— 
if it had been reported out at all.
• The no-amendment strategy on the 
Senate floor. Most analysts agreed that 
the key feature of the revised Pack- 
wood bill was the low tax rates.
There was a fear that if the bill were 
amended on the Senate floor, by 
adding a deduction that would cause 
tax rates to rise, support for the bill 
could evaporate. The no-amendment
strategy passed its toughest test 
when, by the narrow margin of 51 to 
48, the Senate rejected an amend­
ment to continue the deduction for 
contributions to individual retirement 
accounts. Had this amendment 
passed, the fate of the bill clearly 
would have been in doubt.
• The private negotiations of the two 
chairmen. Senate and House con­
ferees were as far apart after three 
weeks of conference as they had 
been on the first day. Only one-on- 
one private negotiations between 
Congressman Rostenkowski and 
Senator Packwood could produce a 
compromise bill. And that is exactly 
what happened.
During my service in Washington, I 
maintained my residence in Cleve­
land, commuting home about every 
other weekend.
Soon after Senator Packwood had 
pulled his first bill off the table, my 
wife asked me, during one of our 
long-distance phone calls, when I 
thought the Senate Finance Commit­
tee would finish its work and report 
out a tax bill so I could end my 
Washington assignment and come 
home to Cleveland for good. I 
remember telling her that night, 
"There is about as much chance of 
getting a bill out of the Senate 
Finance Committee right now as 
there is of the Cleveland Indians' 
being in first place."
Those of you who no longer have 
the sports pages from your daily 
paper for May 7, 1986—the day of 
the 20-to-0 vote in the Senate Finance 
Committee—might wonder who was 
in first place that day. The Cleveland 
Indians, of course.
Luckily for tax reform, the tax bill 
proved to have greater staying power 
than the Indians did.
Focus on Academe
by Wilbur C. Leatherberry, '68 
Professor of Law
Seven of the Law School's faculty are its graduates: Dan Clancy, Liz Brandt, Peter Joy, and 
Katy Mercer (standing); Ken Margolis, Bill Leatherberry, Laura Chisolm (seated).
We have recently refined our 
alumni computer records to include 
information about legal specialty. In 
doing that we confirmed what we 
had long believed: that there is a 
large, diverse, and interesting group 
of our alumni in law teaching.
Laura Chisolm, '80, and I are now 
the only regular law faculty members 
at Case Western Reserve who gradu­
ated from this law school. Peter Joy, 
'77, and Kenneth Margolis, '76, 
teach in our clinical program (and 
Margolis is director of continuing 
legal education], and Elizabeth 
Barker Brandt, '82, and Kathryn 
Sords Mercer, '83, are research and 
writing instructors. Daniel Clancy, 
'62, is the school's vice dean and 
director of the Center for Criminal 
Justice.
Many other graduates have chosen 
the academic life. Here is a hopefully 
representative sample of that group.
Let us begin with a dean. J. Nor­
man McDonough, '36, LL.M. '37, 
began teaching in 1937 as a teaching 
fellow at New York University School 
of Law. From there he went to Loy­
ola of Los Angeles for a one-year stint 
and then left teaching for other work, 
including service in the Air Force 
during World War II. He returned to 
Cleveland to join the law faculty here 
in 1947. He "fathered." .pur law 
review—serving as the faculty adviser 
in its first few years of existence. In 
1953 he accepted the opportunity to 
become the dean at St. Louis Univer­
sity School of Law. Leaving here was 
"a tough decision," he says, because 
he enjoyed teaching and had devel­
oped close friends on the faculty. He 
served as dean at St. Louis from 1953 
to 1962 and then went back to full­
time teaching there until he retired to
emeritus status in 1980. He and his 
wife, Elizabeth, returned for the 
fiftieth reunion of his graduating 
class last fall. He describes that 
reunion as "the only alumni reunion 
I ever attended" and says that they 
both enjoyed it enormously.
The largest delegation of our gradu­
ates at a single law school is the trio 
at the University of Toledo. My class­
mate, Frank S. Merritt, '68, special­
izes in courses in criminal law and 
criminal procedure including an 
intriguing course called Corporate, 
Organized, and White Collar Crime. 
He is working on an article, "The 
Limits of Electronic Incarceration," 
which will be published in Criminal 
Justice Magazine. He explains that 
electronic incarceration means the
use of electronic devices to track the 
whereabouts of convicts who are 
allowed to live at home and go to 
work.
James M. Klein, '69, and Robin 
M. Kennedy, '70, are co-directors of 
the College of Law Legal Clinic.
Klein has returned tp Toledo after 
spending the last academic year as a 
visiting professor at the University of 
New Mexico. He just finished an 
article on the unemployment insur­
ance program of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. He and his wife toured 
Germany for the research. Since he 
speaks no German and she is fluent 
because of her German heritage, she 
served as his interpreter. He is now 
applying for grants to make a similar 
study of a recently enacted unem-
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ployment compensation system in the 
People's Republic of China and, yes, 
his wife is now learning Mandarin 
Chinese. In addition, Klein has been 
preparing annual supplements for 
Professor Sidney Jacoby's Ohio Civil 
Practice Manual. He and two co­
authors are hard at work on a new 
book which Banks-Baldwin will pub­
lish to replace Jacoby's. Professor 
Jacoby was Klein's Civil Procedure 
teacher, and Klein says he "really 
liked him." It is appropriate that one 
of Jacoby's students is carrying on his 
work.
Kennedy is principally involved in 
clinical teaching. He supervises stu­
dents in practice, teaches a course 
called Interviewing, Counseling and 
Negotiating, and gets involved in 
cases in his specialty, legal aspects of 
mental illness. He also teaches 
Administrative Law and expects to 
teach Constitutional Law next year.
Richard D. Balnave, '77, and 
Patricia Mell, '78, are also involved 
in clinical teaching—at Virginia and 
Delaware, respectively. Like many 
clinicians, Balnave worked in a feder­
ally supported legal services program. 
Legal Services of Northeastern Penn­
sylvania, from 1977-80. He left that 
program and went into private prac­
tice in the same city, Wilkes-Barre,
for a few years before taking the 
teaching position at Virginia in 1984. 
He runs the Family Law Clinic in 
which students spend one semester 
of classroom time preparing for fam­
ily law practice and then one semes­
ter practicing as interns. This spring 
he will run the Criminal Practice 
Workshop, a simulation course in 
which the twelve students will simu­
late all of the legal proceedings 
involved in an airline hijacking case 
from the initial charges through trial. 
Local practitioners will assist in 
supervising the students as they play 
roles as prosecutors and defense 
counsel. A federal magistrate and a 
federal judge will play the judicial 
roles.
Immediately after her graduation, 
Mell went to work in the office of 
the Ohio attorney general. In four 
and a half years there she got valu­
able trial and appellate experience 
including arguing two cases in the 
Ohio Supreme Court. She began 
teaching in the clinical program at 
Capital and then moved to Toledo, 
where she expanded the Toledo trio 
into a quartet for one year. She is 
now in her first semester of teaching 
at Delaware Law School. The school 
is the only one in the state and runs 
both a day and a night program. She 
is teaching Criminal Law, Business 
Organizations, and Consumer Law. 
Her experience in the Consumer 
Frauds and Crimes Unit of the Attor­
ney General's office is particularly 
valuable in the Consumer Law class. 
One of her colleagues at Delaware is 
Mary Brigid McManamon, who ear­
lier had a stint at Case Western 
Reserve as a research and writing 
instructor.
Jay Pendergrass, '79, is a recent 
convert to the teaching profession. 
He began this fall as a visiting assis­
tant professor at Chicago-Kent Law 
School of the Illinois Institute of 
Technology. The school hires young
teachers to teach research and writ­
ing and some regular courses, gives 
them a two-year commitment, 
arranges for experienced teachers to 
visit their classes and provide helpful 
comments, and then pledges to assist 
them in finding teaching positions 
elsewhere at the end of the two 
years. Pendergrass will be teaching 
Administrative Law this spring and 
summer. Next fall he will teach a 
course on hazardous wastes, trading 
on experience as an environmental 
lawyer in the U. S. Department of 
the Interior and in private practice in 
Madison, Wisconsin. He reports: 
"Teaching is fun—so far."
David A. Funk, '51, LL.M., '72, 
began teaching at Indiana University 
(Indianapolis) in 1973 after more than 
twenty years in practice in Wooster, 
Ohio, where he was a partner in the 
firm of Funk & Funk. Interestingly, 
he teaches "perspective" courses like 
Jurisprudence, World Legal History, 
and Sociology of Law, rather than 
substantive law courses with an obvi­
ous relation to his practice experi­
ence. He also teaches Professional 
Responsibility, a course in which his 
practice experience must provide a 
wealth of material. He is the author 
of Group Dynamic Law: Integrating 
Constitutive Contract Institutions, a 
book in which he surveys ways in 
which our laws influence cooperation 
and conflict among people in groups. 
Professor Funk is the uncle of a 
recent graduate of this law school, 
Laura Funk Shunk, '83. He is now 
completing work on an article on 
world legal history.
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Richard G. Bell, '51, LL.M. '61, 
one of David Funk's classmates, 
teaches at Wake Forest. He did his 
first year of law school at Kentucky, 
where it counted as his final year of 
study for his A.B. degree, and then 
came here for the last two years. He 
practiced in a small firm in Bedford, 
Ohio, for fourteen years and com­
pleted his LL.M. degree while in 
practice. He began teaching at Wake 
Forest in 1965. After twenty years in 
teaching he took a leave last year and 
spent the time in private practice 
working on some interesting and 
important matters in estate planning. 
In addition to the estates course he 
teaches commercial law courses. 
Besides law review articles, he has 
written several student study aids for 
the Cambridge Law Studies series.
He says he enjoys the natural beauty 
of the Winston-Salem area and 
reports that he plays golf all year 
round.
Charles Preston Rose, Jr., '67, is 
a colleague of Richard Bell at Wake 
Forest. He began teaching while in 
the Army JAG Corps and joined the 
faculty at Akron University upon 
leaving the service. He finds the 
ambience at Wake very much like 
that of his alma mater: warm and 
friendly with faculty very open and 
accessible to students. His principal 
courses are Criminal Law and Crimi
nal Procedure. He is working on an 
article about the constitutional right 
to confrontation. He proudly reports 
that he was the recipient of the 
Excellence in Teaching Award at 
Wake Forest in both 1983 and 1985.
There is another Rose in teaching. 
Michael D. Rose, '63, is a tax pro­
fessor at Ohio State. After three years 
in practice, he went to Columbia 
University for his LL.M. He has been 
teaching at Ohio State since 1973 and 
has visited at Minnesota (1974-75) 
and Florida (1978-79). Like most tax 
teachers he has been quite busy 
because of all of the recent tax 
reform activity. He is an editor of 
West's Selected Tax Statutes, Code and 
Regulations, a publication which has 
had to undergo several major revi­
sions in the last few years. He has 
written material for the Bureau of 
National Affairs' Tax Management 
Portfolio series and is working on a 
tax hornbook for West and a chapter 
of a book on estate planning.
Harold R. Weinberg, '69, is 
Alumni Professor at Kentucky. He 
took, and liked, all of Professor 
Shanker's commercial law courses at 
the law school and is now following 
in his footsteps as a commercial law 
teacher. He just finished a chapter on 
documents of title for a Matthew
Bender treatise on debtor-creditor 
law. He spent three years in practice 
with the Cleveland firm of Ulmer, 
Berne, Laronge, Glickman & Curtis 
before entering the academic world 
as a writing instructor at the Univer­
sity of Illinois in 1971-72. He moved 
to Kentucky the following year. He 
provided expert counsel to the Ken­
tucky legislature, which just recently 
got around to enacting the 1972 
amendments to the Uniform Com­
mercial Code, and he drafted some 
non-uniform amendments which 
were enacted at that time.
Another of Professor Shanker's 
students, Ralph Anzivino, '71, is 
teaching commercial law and bank­
ruptcy at Marquette University. He 
joined the law faculty there after five 
years' practice with the Cleveland 
firm of Parks, Eisele, Lawrence & 
Bates. He has just completed two 
major writing projects. His book. 
Partner and Partnership Bankruptcies, 
will be published this month. He also 
co-authored, with Professor William 
Hawkland, a chapter of Hawkland's 
Uniform Commercial Code Series. 
The chapter deals with UCC Article 
7—warehouse receipts and bills of 
lading. Frequently appointed as a 
trustee in Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
reorganizations, Anzivino is now 
serving as trustee in the largest such 
bankruptcy in the history of Wiscon­
sin. He loves his work as an aca­
demic, though. He says: "We still 
have the best jobs in the country."
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., '74, studied 
corporate and securities law with 
Professor Ron Coffey and later taught 
Corporations at the University of 
Wisconsin. He reports that my col­
league Juliet Kostritsky was in his 
7:45 a.m. class in his first year of 
teaching. That winter was dark and 
dismal, he remembers. The class was 
composed of the "gunners" who 
arrived on time and sat in the first 
row and the "others" who arrived 
late and sat the the last few rows—
18
with no one in between. Of course, 
Professor Kostritsky was one of the 
gunners. After a clerkship with Judge 
Richard H. Chambers of the Ninth 
Circuit, Davis practiced at Covington 
& Burling in Washington for three 
years. Unlike most academics, he did 
not go through the "meat market" 
hiring process. He never registered in 
the roster of persons seeking teaching 
positions and did not go to the Chi­
cago meeting at which candidates are 
interviewed. While in practice he 
decided to take a year and try teach­
ing. He wrote to a few schools, 
including Wisconsin, in January,
1978, and was interviewed and hired 
for the following school year. He 
spent last year as a visitor at 
U.C.L.A. His article, "Judicial 
Review of Fiduciary Decisionmak­
ing—Some Theoretical Perspectives" 
was just published in 80 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1. In his early 
years, Davis taught contracts but he 
now teaches only in the business 
associations and securities law fields.
Davis's class of 1974 also produced 
David H. Kessler and Margery 
Malkin Koosed, who are now fac­
ulty colleagues at Akron University. 
Koosed arrived first at Akron, 
although both entered the teaching 
field immediately after graduation. 
Kessler began at Ohio Northern Uni­
versity and stayed there for three and 
a half years before leaving to join a 
friend in practice for six months in 
California. He then went to the Uni­
versity of Florida, where he did his 
LL.M. in taxation, and then served as 
a judicial clerk (officially called an
attorney-advisor] in the U. S. Tax 
Court for two years. He describes 
that experience as "extremely posi­
tive" and says that it "added a 
dimension to his teaching." He 
returned to teaching when he 
accepted his present position at 
Akron in 1983. In addition to his tax 
courses he teaches contracts and 
serves as a consultant to the Tax 
Litigation Clinic.
Koosed developed a strong interest 
in criminal law and procedure in her 
classes with Professor Lewis Katz and 
now teaches such courses herself.
Her principal research interest is the 
subject of capital punishment. She is 
a member of the Ohio Public 
Defender Commission and chaired 
the committee that drafted regula­
tions setting out qualifications for 
lawyers to be appointed to represent 
indigents in capital cases. She con­
sults frequently in capital cases and
just completed work, with two other 
lawyers, on an amicus brief in the 
case of State v. Martin which will be 
decided this term by the United 
States Supreme Court. The argument 
concerns the allocation of the burden 
of proof of self-defense to the defend­
ant, an issue she first analyzed sev­
eral years ago for a clinic case.
Evelyn Ginsberg Abravanel, '75, 
served as a research assistant to Pro­
fessor Paul Haskell while she was a 
student here. She is now teaching 
Property, Estates, and Wills and 
Trusts at American University, where 
Marcia Murphy, a member of our 
faculty from 1977-1983, is a col­
league. Abravanel finds it hard to 
believe, she says, that she has been 
teaching for ten years. She went to 
Washington right after graduation to 
work for Shaw, Pittman, Potts & 
Trowbridge, then a 40-person law 
firm, which now has over 150 law­
yers. She is in her second year of 
chairing the Admissions Committee 
(she says "unfortunately") and was 
on a dean search committee a few 
years ago. Her current project is an 
article on spendthrift trusts.
There you have a sampling of our 
graduates in the teaching profession. 
We could call them our "shadow 
faculty" or, perhaps, our "faculty-in- 
waiting." However we refer to them, 
these graduates are making signifi­
cant contributions to the law and to 
the legal profession. Both their teach­
ers and their fellow alumni have 
reason to be proud of them.
20 Years of Library Service
Helen Brazynetz recently completed her 20th 
year on the staff of the law library. Members 
of her family joined the Law School's faculty 
and staff for a celebration, and one of Peter 
Gerhart's first official acts as dean was this 
presentation.
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The Year of the Presidents: 
A Retrospective
by Mary Beth Breckenridge 
Contributing Editor
everyone knows by now, in 1985-86 the 
nation's two largest bar associations were 
both headed by graduates of the Case West­
ern Reserve University School of Law: Wil­
liam W. Falsgraf '58, was president of the 
American Bar Association, and his counter­
part at the National Bar Association was 
Fred D. Gray, '54. Just before they began 
their term in office. In Brief talked with 
them both about the upcoming year (Septem­
ber issue, 1985j. For the current issue we 
asked them to look back on the experience, 
and to tell us what it is like to come back 
down from the mountain.
-K.E.T.
Ask Fred Gray and Bill Falsgraf 
about the past year, and they'll talk 
in enthusiastic terms: Fascinating. 
Intensive. Enjoyable. And exhausting. 
"It was a good experience. I really 
enjoyed it. But it's good to have it 
over with," says Gray, and Falsgraf’s 
sentiments are almost an echo.
Both ended their presidencies satis­
fied that they left the organization 
stronger and that they had worked to 
advance the causes of minorities and 
to promote national policy debate in 
the United States and abroad.
For Gray, the primary concerns of 
the past year were long-term ones: 
promoting blacks within the legal 
profession and seeking solutions to 
the problems that plague the black 
community. In keeping with those 
priorities, his year as president cen­
tered on the theme "Partners in 
Unity—the Black Lawyer and the 
Black Community."
"What we wanted to do was join 
hands with other organizations inter­
ested in improving the black commu­
nity. I feel that black lawyers should 
be a part of the community and 
should be willing to give back to the 
community," says Gray, who has 
made his career in Alabama. Fie is 
now a partner in the Tuskegee firm 
of Gray, Langford, Sapp, Davis & 
McGowan.
Under Gray, the National Bar Asso­
ciation made concerted efforts in that 
direction. At its three national meet­
ings and its annual convention the 
association presented Fe^al education 
seminars that focused on such topics 
as drugs, economic development, and 
voting rights. The NBA lobbied legis­
lators on issues affecting blacks, and 
representatives met with U.S. attor­
ney general Edwin Meese and with 
the chairman of the National Republi­
can Committee to stress the need for 
more black federal judges.
Gray also extended the organiza­
tion's battle for black opportunity to 
the struggle against South African 
apartheid, urging NBA members to 
push for the imposition of meaning­
ful sanctions against the South Afri­
can government.
Likewise, under Ealsgraf the Ameri­
can Bar Association continued efforts 
to increase the involvement of 
women and minority members in the 
association's leadership. One-third of 
Falsgraf's appointments were women 
or minorities, he says, and he encour­
aged the ABA's sections and other 
subgroups to follow his lead. He 
thinks that there is still a way to go 
in that direction, but, he says, "It's 
already had an impact. And over the 
years I expect it to have a significant 
impact."
Perhaps the most exciting aspect of 
Gray's and Falsgraf's presidencies 
was their involvement in interna­
tional affairs. The year saw Falsgraf 
squaring off with former Soviet for­
eign minister Andrei Gromyko over 
human rights and Gray making an 
impact on the fate of persons 
involved in an attempted coup in 
Liberia.
Falsgraf's confrontation with Gro­
myko happened in June, when a 
delegation of ABA members traveled 
to the Soviet Union to talk with 
Soviet officials about such concerns 
as the persecution of Soviet Jews, 
emigration policies, and the fairness 
of the Soviet legal system.
At one meeting Falsgraf, as head of 
the American delegation, found him­
self seated directly across the confer­
ence table from Gromyko. "I was 
very frank with him," he recalls. "I 
told him how upset we were" with 
the Soviets' record on human rights.
Though Falsgraf calls that visit 
"one of the highlights of the year," he 
stops short of attributing any substan­
tial changes in Soviet policy to the 
ABA's efforts. "Whether those types 
of exchanges of information lead to 
any tangible benefits is Hard to tell," 
he says. "But it's certainly worth the 
effort, because if you don't make the 
effort nothing ever changes."
One of Gray's proudest memories 
of his presidency is his sojourn in 
Monrovia, Liberia, in February and 
March. At the request of the ABA's 
Section on Human Rights and 
Responsibilities, he observed the trial 
of four defendants charged with 
treason in the attempted overthrow 
of the Liberian government in 1985. 
The ABA had reason to believe that
the defendants were wrongly 
charged, and so sent Gray to observe 
and report on the proceedings.
The trial was farcical by American 
standards. It resulted in a hung jury, 
but the judge ordered the jurors to 
return to deliberations. Nine refused, 
and three later maintained that they 
were coerced into the eventual guilty 
verdict.
Gray was one among several 
observers, who represented such 
organizations as Amnesty Interna­
tional and the newspaper group Free 
Expression. Their presence appar­
ently had an impact. After the trial 
Liberian President Samuel K. Doe 
granted clemency to the four defend­
ants and to all others who had been 
arrested as a result of the attempted 
coup.
During their presidencies Falsgraf 
and Gray addressed other issues as 
well. For Falsgraf and the ABA these 
included extensive study of the tort 
insurance crisis, particularly in the 
area of medical malpractice; consider­
ation of legal measures to combat 
international terrorism; and an 
increasing effort, through contact 
with legal groups in Central and 
South American countries, to 
strengthen their legal systems and 
lessen their political turmoil.
Much of Gray's efforts focused on 
strengthening the NBA. A fundraising 
campaign and increased membership 
averted a financial crisis. Under his 
leadership the NBA completed a 
directory of black lawyers, which 
Gray hopes will improve communica­
tion, and the association purchased a 
headquarters building in Washington, 
D.C.
Pursuing these goals meant count­
less hours on the road for both presi­
dents. Falsgraf figures that he aver­
aged only one day a week at his 
Baker & Hostetler office in Cleve­
land. Gray estimates that he covered 
more than 100,000 miles.
Both men seem happy to kick off 
their traveling shoes, get out of the 
limelight, and settle down again to 
less hectic routines. Both are still 
active in their organizations, but both 
are happy to resume their careers.
Fred Gray, who has been meaning 
for years to write a book about his 
life as a civil rights lawyer, says he 
may finally put pen to paper—but 
don't rush right away to your book­
store.
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Whatever happened to .. .
Richard E. Guster 
1955 Student of the Year
The plaque in the Law School's 
lower rotunda that displays the 
names of winners of the Student of 
the Year award, given annually "for 
outstanding scholarship and excel­
lence in extracurricular activities," 
begins in 1955 with Richard Evans 
Guster. He comments, with a self- 
effacement that is characteristic, "By 
no means do I think I was an Ezio 
Pinza, creating the role of Student of 
the Year." But he remembers that he 
was "extremely pleased" to hear his 
name announced that night at the 
dinner downtown, and that his own 
pleasure "was exceeded only by the 
joy of my parents and my future 
wife, Sharlee, who were there with 
me."
Dick Ouster's family lived in Can­
ton, and he started school there, but 
he finished at a military academy in 
Wisconsin. Someone has suggested 
that that may explain the rigorous 
self-discipline that has marked his 
career. He went on to Denison Uni­
versity, joined a Marine reserve pro­
gram, and was commissioned shortly 
after his graduation in 1950—just in 
time for the Korean war. But—"inex­
plicably"—he was sent not to Korea 
but to cruise around the Mediterra­
nean. "I was probably," he says, "the 
most highly trained and well-traveled 
noncombatant the Marine Corps has 
ever had."
Guster had been a pre-med student 
at Denison, but "with no burning 
desire to become a doctor," and he 
credits the Marines for his interest in 
the law: "I was thrown in with a lot
of lawyers, and I got intrigued." He 
enrolled at Western Reserve—"I 
decided I had been away from home 
long enough"—and made the transi­
tion "from a scientific to a philo­
sophic curriculum. There was a fasci­
nation in that—maybe even a certain 
terror."
Nevertheless, Guster has fond 
memories of his law school years: 
"The school was small, we all knew 
one another, and we had a great mix 
of people. I made great friendships. I 
got to know the faculty; Sam Sonen- 
field was a dear friend, and so were 
Ollie Schroeder and Bob Bensing. 
Dean Andrews was an absolute gem, 
such an inspiration—he was every­
thing a lawyer could hope to be.” He 
adds: "But I've had good experiences 
everywhere. I consider myself a child 
of good fortune."
Guster attributes his selection as 
Student of the Year to the fact that he 
was "involved in as many things as 
you could be involved in—Law 
Review, moot court, Phi Delta Phi— 
though I don't know that I did any of 
them especially well." Others would 
disagree with that assessment. Bens­
ing remembers him as "a student 
who always seemed to be prepared. 
He was very quiet—but you couldn't 
miss him because he was so tall!" His 
classmates remember him as a good 
student, universally popular. As 
Schroeder puts it, "You'd expect him 
to be Student of the Year."
Although he "kinda thought I'd go 
back to Canton," Guster heard of an 
interesting opening in Akron, inter­
viewed, got the offer, and joined the 
firm that now is known as Roetzel & 
Andress. "It was a great opportunity," 
he says, "and, again, I was a child of 
fortune: within a month after I was 
sworn in I was involved in a case 
that went all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. It was the first case 
of any real consequence that I had 
worked on. That was a real thrill."
Guster joined the firm as its twelfth 
man. Now, he says, "I don't feel 
ancient by any means, but I guess 
I'm the most senior of the fully active 
partners." He has spent his career as 
a litigator, starting with "a lot of 
personal injury work, insurance 
defense," and going on to complex 
patent litigation, securities, environ­
mental matters, and such products 
liability cases as those stemming 
from the Beverly Hills, MGM, and 
Air Canada fires. "The numbers 
boggle the mind," he says; "there is 
such an awesome potential for liabil­
ity. In a way it is glorified extortion— 
but of course I say that as a defend­
ant's lawyer."
Outside of his practice, he has done 
more than his share of civic endeav­
ors: his resume details such involve­
ments as St. Thomas Hospital, the 
Akron Child Guidance Center, and 
the Visiting Nurse Service, and he 
has been president of the Akron City 
Club and Portage Country Club. But 
perhaps what is closest to his heart is 
golf. He has been president of the 
Akron Golf Charities, general chair­
man (in 1972) of the American Golf 
Classic, and general chairman (in 
1975) of the P.G.A. of America Cham­
pionship. His wife was responsible 
for his getting involved in those tour­
nament activities, and they share a 
common interest in the game.
Dick Guster is an avid golfer: "I 
love the game, though I'm afraid I 
don't contribute much to it.” At 
times he looks forward to retirement 
years when he may at last be able to 
get in as much golfing time as he 
would like, but he fears that he 
would simply "prove conclusively 
that I'm a lousy golfer." So he also 
thinks about writing—"and it might 
be fun to teach."
Guster's younger colleagues will 
assure you that he has done a lot of 
teaching already. Craig Marvinney 
(who, by the way, was Student of the 
Year in 1982) began his career at 
Roetzel & Andress and left there only 
recently. "Dick Guster taught me 
much of what I know now," he says. 
"Mainly he taught me a technical and 
extremely thorough approach to liti-
gation. Even though he is tremen­
dously respected, and carries a repu­
tation that stretches across the 
country, he is always approachable, 
and he's always willing to stop what 
he's doing and take time to be help­
ful."
Tom Parker, '79, spent a summer 
clerkship with the firm and returned 
to a permanent position. Although 
Parker thought he wanted to attach 
himself to the firm's corporate side, 
he was turned over to Guster and the 
litigators. "Dick Guster took me 
under his wing," he says, "and I 
guess I'm still there and still learning 
from him. We worked on the MGM 
case together, and he made me into a 
lawyer while we did it."
Guster's teaching method, says 
Parker, typically is "to turn to the 
young associate in the courtroom and 
say: 'You do the opening statement.' 
He is not one to insist that you watch 
him do it a hundred times and then 
do it his way." Guster has told Parker 
and others that his greatest satisfac­
tion in the practice is in helping 
young attorneys get to be better law­
yers than he is.
Parker echoes Marvinney on the 
"uniform respect" that Guster enjoys 
in the profession. Early in his career 
Parker went with Guster before a 
legendarily tough federal judge in 
Cleveland; after that experience, 
Parker says, he was startled by the 
discovery that the judge did not treat 
all lawyers with the same deference 
he accorded Dick Guster.
From Parker, In Brief learned that 
Guster is a near-pro plumber and 
electrician, and that "he probably has 
a secret ambition to be a furniture 
maker." Parker thinks "the guy can 
do anything."
Above all, both Parker and Marvin­
ney speak warmly about Guster's 
concern for his firm's young associ­
ates and their families. His own son, 
Timothy, is an associate with the 
firm, but Guster is a father to others 
besides. He worries about whether 
his younger colleagues are spending
enough time at home. He is, says 
Parker, "the associates' true ally—he's 
just a good man."
As befits a patriarch, Guster is 
quietly proud of his law firm. He 
enjoys showing a visitor around the 
former public library that is now the 
Roetzel & Andress headquarters, 
pointing out, around the frieze, "our 
former partners—Shakespeare, 
Chaucer, Herodotus . . . ." He is 
pleased that they've opened satellite 
offices in Canton and Columbus.
Dick Guster's echoing theme is that 
he is a "fortunate" man. Concluding 
the interview, he said: "I really have 
been blessed in my opportunities. I 
feel fortunate to be a lawyer and to 
have been entrusted with the matters 
that have been placed with me. I 
can't think of a more exciting profes­
sion. And I can't imagine any activity 
that reaps the benefit of hard work as 
much as ours does."
-K.E.T.
When Jim Strawn learned that he 
had been selected as the 1986 recipi­
ent of the Alumni Association's 
award to a distinguished recent grad­
uate, he was not at all sure that he 
could be at the Law School to receive 
it. The Saturday of Alumni Weekend 
happened to be the date of the Cor­
porate Cup in Canton, Ohio, and 
Strawn was captain of his law firm's 
swim team, which had narrowly 
missed first place in 1985 and was 
counting on him for a victory in '86.
Frantic efforts were made to 
resolve the conflict—including calls to 
a helicopter service, which might 
have delivered Strawn (presumably 
still dripping) to the roof of nearby 
University Hospitals. Fortunately, it 
proved possible to re-schedule the 
swimming events for an earlier hour, 
and Strawn managed to squeeze both 
his obligations into that Saturday 
morning,without having to take to 
the air.
The point of the story is that Jim 
Strawn takes seriously—VERY seri­
ously—his obligation to his commu­
nity. Although he satisfies all the 
stated criteria as a Distinguished 
Recent Graduate—1) he is a more 
than competent practitioner, 2) he is 
active in professional organizations, 
and 3) as regional vice president he is 
active in law alumni affairs—his clear 
preeminence is in 4) community 
service.
Fundamental to Strawn's involve­
ment in the Canton community has
1986 Distinguished Recent Graduate
James R. Strawn, '76
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been his active (and that is an under­
statement) membership in the Jay- 
cees. He set a record for longevity on 
the local organization's board, serving 
' in successive years as legal counsel,
vice president, secretary, state direc­
tor, executive vice president, presi- 
, dent, and chairman. He has served as
the state organization's legal counsel 
and as metropolitan chapter director, 
and he is presently secretary, legal 
counsel, and trustee of its Charitable 
and Educational Fund. Along the 
way, in 1981, he picked up the Gene 
) Wayne Childress Award as the out­
standing Jaycee in Ohio.
Strawn describes the Jaycee organi­
zation as a "training ground" in lead­
ership and a "stepping stone” into 
other activities. "You develop con­
tacts, you show what you can do, 
you use what you've gained, and at 
age 36 they throw you out and you 
go on to other things." He adds: "I'm 
close to being thrown out."
One stepping stone was Strawn's 
chairmanship of the Jaycee Summer- 
fest in 1984. That was such a success 
that the Chamber of Commerce 
involved him in planning some event 
to increase downtown activity in 
conjunction with the football Hall of 
Fame weekend. Shamelessly (he 
admits it) borrowing from Cleveland, 
he came up with the idea of a Ribs 
Burn-Off. By now, largely through 
Strawn's efforts, it is securely estab­
lished as an annual event.
Another of his projects has been 
the renovation of Canton's downtown 
Palace Theater, once slated for demo­
lition but now refurbished and func­
tioning as a civic and cultural center. 
That began with Jaycees' efforts, but 
other groups were drawn into the 
enterprise. Strawn enthusiastically 
tours a visitor through the Canton 
downtown, pointing out all the com­
ponents of the city's ongoing renais­
sance, and clearly evidencing a feel­
ing of proprietorship and a sense of 
responsibility for the city's welfare.
Perhaps Strawn is proudest of the 
renovation of Canton's Stadium Park, 
a project which he conceived, orga­
nized, and has very nearly brought to 
completion. Strawn and his cohorts 
secured a $300,000 commitment from 
the Timken Foundation and then 
raised another $16,700 from private 
sources; the city has contributed an 
estimated $15,000 in resources and 
manpower. A major part of the proj­
ect has been the installation of an all- 
weather track, with twenty exercise 
stations. Strawn reports with obvious 
delight: "Any time of the day, you see 
hundreds of people on it. You can 
barely get on the track! There are just 
two complaints: one, it's too 
crowded, and two, it's not lit. Well, 
the lighting will be up in about three 
weeks!"
Now that that's about finished, 
Strawn is shoulder-deep in another
project, along with his wife Barbara. 
He explains how it happened: "Two 
years ago, in Indianapolis, we went 
to the children's museum just on a 
whim. We spent two full days there! 
We got back home, and I told some­
one in the office about it, and he 
said, 'Why don't you get involved 
with the one in Canton?' I said, 
'WHAT one in Canton?'
"Within a month Barbara and I 
were both on the board of the Chil­
dren's Museum of Northeast Ohio. 
They were undergoing a transition, 
trying to find a facility and funding; I 
had just done the funding for the 
track, and so I had the sources. Over 
the next six months we got the Chil­
dren's Museum merged with the 
Stark County Historical Society, and 
by now we have enough funding to 
get the museum off the ground. It's 
probably the quickest start of a chil­
dren's museum in the country. We 
hope to have it open by the end of 
the school year."
As that suggests, Barbara Strawn 
has had her own share of community 
activities. One gathers that the Junior 
League has had a place in her life 
similar to the Jaycees' place in her 
husband's. All of this has made for 
what Jim describes as "an intense 
lifestyle," but, as he explains it: "I 
think the family as a unit has to 
make a certain contribution to the 
community—to improve it for our 
own sake, and for our children's 
sake. When I was even more civi- 
cally active, and was home maybe 
one night every three or four weeks, 
and we were trying to think how that 
might be improved, Barbara and I 
struck a deal: if she would increase 
her involvement, I would decrease 
mine."
Both Strawn's wife and his law 
firm (Black, McCuskey Souers & 
Arbaugh) have been remarkably 
tolerant of his extracurricular pur­
suits, and even encouraging. In fact, 
as Strawn explains it, he got into a 
number of civic and charitable activi­
ties because, when he first joined the 
firm, there was a five-year hiring gap 
and he was one of only two associ­
ates: "Every partner had a pet proj­
ect, and only two of us were avail­
able. So every month I'd get called 
on for something or other."
According to Strawn, he got into 
law in the first place because "I was 
never at a loss for words, and I get 
along well with people. I've always 
been a people person." Not surpris­
ingly, he has mainly developed a 
practice in labor law; he estimates 
that that accounts for 75 percent of 
his professional time. "I also do liti­
gation," he adds, "especially in the 
oil and gas area. And I do some 
domestic relations. The analogy there 
is that labor relations and domestic 
relations are similar. They both 
involve compromise and negotia-
tion—and occasional litigation."
Strawn remembers that when he 
first began with the firm as a clerk 
his younger brother had a factory job 
with one of the firm's clients, and the 
employees were out on strike. "So all 
day long I'd hear about injunctions 
and restricting the pickets, and then 
I'd go home and hear the other side 
about management's mistreatment of 
the employees. It was a personal 
exposure to the issues.
"What sets labor law off from other 
areas is that you have to maintain the 
ability to work with the person 
you're facing in an adversarial situa­
tion. He's across from you at the 
arbitration table, but he'll be back on 
the job the next day. You have to 
respect each other's positions."
As Strawn has become more senior 
in the firm, he is continuing the pat­
tern of encouraging the firm's associ­
ates to get involved in community 
endeavors. One gathers that a new 
hire doesn't have a great deal of 
choice about whether or not to join 
the Jaycees! And woe to the hapless 
young person who pleads, "I'm too 
busy." Strawn says: "The biggest 
thing I've preached to younger peo­
ple in the office is that you don't 
know what your capacity is, either 
for work or for other projects, unless 
you extend yourself and find out 
what your limit really is. Busy people 
usually get beyond their capacity and 
then have to pull back. I know I've 
probably exceeded my capacity on a 
few occasions."
What makes it all worthwhile for 
Jim Strawn is the gratifying feeling 
that his efforts in the Canton commu­
nity have really made a difference. 
"I've tried to be involved in areas 
that aren't exactly traditional—things 
that, without my involvement, 
wouldn't get accomplished. Some­
thing like United Way runs itself, and 
it will run itself whether I'm in it or 
not. The Boy Scouts will keep going 
with or without my help. But the 
track in Stadium Park, and the Ribs 
Burn-Off, and the Palace Theater, and 
the merger of the Children's Museum 
with the Historical Society—there I 
think I've had an instrumental role."
-K.E.T.
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The Class of 1989
The Class of 1989 is smaller—by 
design—than its predecessor: 225 
students entered the school last fall. 
About 40 percent are from outside 
Ohio; and they come from 22 differ­
ent states, including Hawaii, and also 
from Puerto Rico, the United King­
dom, and Yugoslavia.
Half the class came straight to law 
school from college. For the other 
half, the gap between college and law 
school ranges from 1 to 40 years. The 
average age is 24.1 (24.7 for the 
women, 23.75 for the men).
The percentage of women is the 
highest ever at this law school—45 
percent. And the percentage of 
minority students (10 percent) con­
tinues the trend of the past few 
years. Three years ago there were 
only 30 minority students in the 
school, and today there are 64.
This year's entrants have degrees 
from 121 different undergraduate 
institutions, and 18 members of the 
class have advanced degrees. These 
include Ph.D.'s in economics and 
theology, an M.D., a D.P.M. (doctor of 
podiatric medicine), and master's 
degrees in accounting, architecture, 
English, business administration, 
public administration, forensic sci­
ence, and urban and environmental 
studies.
Certainly the best news about the 
Class of 1989 is that, in spite of the 
nation's shrinking pool of law school 
applicants, this class has better objec­
tive credentials (in terms of grade 
point average and LSAT score) than 
last year's class. As the good word 
gets out about the law school, the 
quality of the student body continues 
to increase.
Joan Arrington, a graduate of Hiram College, 
spent the summer as a CLEO Fellow 
(Council on Legal Education Opportunity). 
One of the instructors in the program was 
Tammy Lenzy, '88, and that connection 
helped to bring Arrington to the Law School 
Arrington has a special interest in civil rights 
law and says she hopes, after law school, 
to work "for those most in need of good legal 
representation, perhaps through the 
Legal Aid Society,"
Linda Davido, whose husband Scott is a 
third-year student, took a bachelor's degree 
from Ashland College in 1982 and then went 
to work for the Standard Oil Company first 
as a marine accountant, then as a systems 
analyst, then as an associate contract 
administrator. Courses at CWRU's 
Weatherhead School of Management have 
deepened her interest in computers and 
management information systems. She says 
now, "My dream would be to litigate high- 
tech computer law issues."
John Canala graduated from West Virginia 
University in 1976 and from the Ohio 
College of Podiatric Medicine in 1982; 
to our knowledge, he is the first podiatrist 
ever to come through the Law School.
Canala continues his podiatry practice and— 
not surprisingly—says he's particularly 
interested in "law-medicine relationships 
of any and all types."
Nancy Fleming finished college (Ohio State 
University) twenty years ago and made a 
career teacjiing mathematics, along the way 
picking up a master's degree at Miami 
University, completing most of a Ph.D. at 
Bowling Green State University, and raising 
four children. (She recently acquired four 
more via a second marriage.) She attributes 
her change of direction in part to an 
automobile accident three years ago that 
nearly cost her a leg and, she says, caused 
her to think hard about what she wanted to 
do with the rest of her life.
Terry Goldberg, like Nancy Fleming, has 
raised four children and is embarking on a 
second career. She began by completing a 
B.A. degree at Ursuline College (she had 
earlier attended Ohio State University); last 
May she and her son and two daughters were 
holding a joint graduation celebration. Susan 
Frankel, director of admission, reports that 
one of the most persuasive letters of 
recommendation that she has received in 
recent years was one from Goldberg's son 
Daniel, now a resident in general surgery at 
the New England Medical Center. Terry 
Goldberg is the daughter of a CWR U law 
graduate: Philip Synenberg, '28.
Lee Stockdale grew up in Florida, spent two 
years at Antioch College in the troubled early 
70s, worked for two years, and then finished 
a degree at the University of Washington.
Fie joined the Army as a military policeman 
and rose through the ranks to become a 
commissioned officer; he left as a captain.
He just returned to this country from an 
overseas tour of duty in Berlin. After living 
in all corners of the country he explains 
the special attraction ofCWRU: his wife 
is a Clevelander.
Jim Lang went from high school to the Navy, 
and after two years the Navy sent him to 
college. He received his B.S. in engineering in 
1982 from the University of Southern 
California, and since then he has been flying 
P-3 aircraft. "Each year," he explains, "the 
Navy offers five officers the opportunity to 
laterally transfer from the fleet to the JAG 
Corps. At my request the JAG Corps sent me 
to Case for my J.D. degree." Lang will spend 
his summers in a legal service office on an 
East coast naval base, and he hopes that the 
Navy will send him back to Hawaii after he 
graduates.
A native of Puerto Rico, Dinorah Manon 
graduated in 1980 from the university there, 
with a degree in chemistry. Since then she 
has worked for Roche Products as a 
laboratory analyst and for the Bristol Myers 
Corporation as coordinator of regulatory and 
compliance affairs. She moved to Cleveland a 
year ago, when her husband accepted a 
teaching position in the university's School 
of Medicine, and she began coursework 
in the spring at the Weatherhead School of 
Management. She is enrolled in 
the J.D./M.B.A. program.
Jeff Wolf (left) and Spike jDavid B.) Webster both have show business in their backgrounds. 
Wolf whose hometown is Hudson, Ohio, went to Colorado College for a B.A. degree because, 
he explains, "I was a figure skater and had the opportunity to train with many of the top 
national competitors in Colorado Springs." He liked what he found there, and now he hopes 
eventually to go back to the West to practice law. Meanwhile, he's earning some of his tuition 
money by coaching skating as an assistant to Olympic champion Carol Heiss Jenkins. Webster 
has a bachelor of fine arts degree in theater from Ohio University, and he has worked with the 
Milwaukee Repertory Company and the Monomay Theater on Cape Cod. He says that his 
immediate ambition is "to survive law school with my creative instincts intact," and that 
ultimately he hopes to be a litigator. He is the second David Webster to enter the Law School as 
a Merit Scholar: David J. is a second-year student.
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Moot Court Trounces Law Review
What would In Brief be without a 
sports page?
The great athletic event of the Law 
School's fall semester was a hard- 
fought football game between the 
Moot Court Board and the editorial 
board of the Law Review. The Student 
Bar Association sponsored the match, 
which means that they paid for the 
beer and pizza consumed on the 
sidelines.
They also recruited as referees 
Dean Peter Gerhart and Assistant 
Dean Maurice Schoby and elegantly 
attired them in regulation black and 
white stripes, complete with names 
on the back. In Brief is happy to 
report that Gerhart and Schoby per­
formed tirelessly, justly, and alto­
gether professionally. Should they tire 
of the academic life, they can apply 
to the NFL for employment.
This was the second annual 
encounter between Moot Court and 
Law Review. It seems to have 
replaced an older tradition, lapsed in 
recent years, which had the Law 
Review playing the faculty. At least 
one faculty member thinks that's just 
as well: "It probably saves us old 
guys from a lot of injuries."*
Sports fans are reminded that win­
ter brings that annual classic, the 
Phlegm Snopes Basketball Tourna­
ment, with its culmination at the 
Richfield Coliseum. February 12 is 
the date this year, and all are invited.
-K.E.T.
Referee Gerhart, whistle at the ready. The editor in chief of the Law Review, Dean 
Gamin, donned appropriate headgear but did 
not succeed in inspiring his troops to victory.
•After In Brief went to press, the Law 
Review—no doubt piqued by their 
trouncing and looking for an easily 
defeatable opponent—challenged the 
faculty. The Law Review won. No old 
guys were injured.
Sally Ackerman, chairman of the Moot Court 
Board, was overjoyed to accept 
the Dean's Cup.
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The Canada-U.S. Exchange 
A Student's Perspective
Program
Mick Moran came lo the Law School from Kent State University, where he majored in 
economics and won an award as outstanding student senator. The photo was taken last spring 
in London, Ontario. Moran says that his Canadian experience only whetted his appetite for 
international adventures in the law: he has dreams of returning one day to Ireland, his ancestral 
home, to practice as a barrister.
by Michael Moran, '87
In the fall of 1984, arriving at 
CWRU as a first-year law student, I 
happened to pick up a copy of In 
Brief (June 1984| that had an excel­
lent article tracing the history of the 
Canada-United States Law Institute 
and its student exchange program.
The idea of spending a semester of 
law school in the Great White North 
immediately attracted me. At the 
time I was not even interested in 
international law per se. But my par­
ents had always encouraged me to 
travel outside the country (I'm a first- 
generation American from Ireland), 
and I felt that a Canadian experience 
could only broaden my perspective.
Furthermore, the article struck a 
nerve when it noted that Canada is 
our number-one trade partner, 
number-one investment partner, and 
number-one military-strategic partner, 
and yet Americans are generally 
ignorant about Canada. I realized that 
I knew next to nothing about Canada: 
their politics, their system of govern­
ment, their legal system. In fact, I 
could not even name the Canadian 
prime minister!
Today, with the advantage of hind­
sight, I firmly believe that Americans 
are often better informed about 
sparsely populated countries halfway 
around the world than they are about 
our thirty million neighbors to the 
north. How many readers know who 
the leader of Libya is? Now, how 
many know who the leader of Can­
ada is? I rest my case.
Undoubtedly, the general lack of 
interest that Americans display 
toward Canada can be attributed to 
the fact that the two countries enjoy 
such a peaceful relationship. The 
border between them is the longest 
peaceful border in the world. But one 
wonders whether that justifies such 
ignorance.
At any rate, three of us were cho­
sen from my class—the others were 
Spencer Rand and Lisa Slage—to 
attend the University of Western 
Ontario's law school in the spring 
semester of 1986.
At the outset, it might be noted that 
Canada has ten provinces, two terri­
tories (whose climate keeps them 
sparsely populated), and sixteen law 
schools, including one in Quebec 
where instruction is entirely in 
French. The capital of Canada, 
Ottawa, and a large percentage of the 
Canadian population are in the prov­
ince of Ontario.
Canadian law students do not get 
experience in summer clerkships as
American students do. Rather, upon 
graduation, they participate in a 
twelve-month "articling" program, 
which is essentially a year's appren­
ticeship with a law firm. After that 
they prepare for the bar exam. This 
mandatory apprenticeship struck me 
as an idea worth adopting. Even in 
this country not all law students get 
clerking experience, and many new 
lawyers are simply thrown into prac­
tice.
In many respects Canada is quite 
similar to the United States, but I 
immediately noticed two striking 
differences. First was how clean and 
litter-free Canada is. I still have no 
explanation for that—unless it is the 
fact that beer is considerably more 
expensive there! Second, Canada is 
safer than the United States. You can 
walk anywhere in any major city 
with no fear for your life; no areas 
are out of bounds. The most obvious 
explanation for this difference is that 
handguns are prohibited in Canada 
and rifles are subject to strict regula­
tion. In contrast to the United States, 
Canada has very few homicides com­
mitted with handguns.
I decided that I would concentrate 
my studies on the comparative 
aspects of Canadian and U.S. tax law.
I took courses in Canadian income 
tax, taxation of shareholders and 
corporations, company law (a course 
comparable to this school's Business 
Associations II), and—at Western's 
business school—a course in invest­
ment management. One of my prede­
cessors, John Krajewski, '85 (now a 
member of the Canada-U.S. Law 
Institute's advisory board) had told 
me that Western had a really high- 
caliber tax department, and I found 
that it lived up to his billing.
In essence, the Canadian system of 
taxation for individuals is quite simi­
lar to ours, but Canadian corporate 
taxation has many features not 
present in our system. For example, 
there are lower rates and many other 
tax breaks available for Canadian- 
owned private corporations. There 
are many protective devices built into 
the tax code to reward investment of 
capital in Canada and to discourage 
investment abroad.
Interestingly, the overall Canadian 
tax rates on investments and corpora­
tions are remarkably similar to those 
in the United States. Obviously, this 
is due in part to the relative ease 
with which investments and corpora­
tions could be relocated across a
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border to a more favorable tax cli­
mate. It will be interesting to observe 
what happens once this country's 
new tax scheme is fully imple­
mented. Incidentally, I found it 
refreshing to note that Canadian tax 
lawyers are just as ingenious as 
American lawyers are at exploiting 
loopholes in their tax code.
The course called Company Law 
was strikingly similar to CWRU's
B.A. II, mostly because Canada's 
recently enacted Business Corpora­
tions Act is modeled after the New
York Business Corporations Act. The 
similarity between the two acts is 
necessary because, as noted earlier, 
there is so much commercial activity 
across the border.
My favorite class was Investment 
Management in Western's M.B.A. 
program. We studied pension plan­
ning, estate planning, stock market 
and bond market strategies, and a 
variety of investment vehicles avail­
able in both Canada and the United 
States. When I returned to the states,
I interviewed with an attorney spe­
cializing in pension planning and I 
secured a summer job. As far as I 
know, I'm the first American student 
to find the exchange program so 
directly helpful in a job search.
In my Canadian classes the 
intensely competitive, even cut-throat 
atmosphere of many American law 
schools was notably absent. And the 
teaching method was not Socratic; in
Canadian law schools that ends with 
the first year.
The first time I spoke in class, I 
could not understand why everyone 
turned to stare at me. A friend later 
told me that my American accent 
ricochets off the walls. It was strange 
to think of myself as a foreigner.
When I heard other students talking 
about events "south of the border," I 
thought at first that they were talking 
about Mexico. Then it hit me that it 
was my country they were talking 
about!
Like my American predecessors, 
and like the Canadian students who 
have spent a semester at Case West­
ern Reserve, I found myself repeat­
edly raising my hand and saying:
"But where I come from we don't do 
it that way." For example, I found 
myself explaining that in the U.S. 
married couples usually benefit from 
filing a joint income tax return. In 
Canada there is no provision in the 
tax code for joint filing; everyone 
files individually. These differences in 
perspective were beneficial, I think, 
both to me and to my classmates: we 
were prompted to discuss and ana­
lyze the merits of each system.
Both Canada and the United States 
share the tradition of common law, 
and Canadian law students read 
many English common law cases. But 
Canada is also a member of the Com­
monwealth. Consequently, you read 
cases decided by courts in New
Zealand, Australia, and Scotland that 
are valid precedent in Canada,
It interested me to learn that the 
Canadian bar prohibits contingency 
representation, presumably because 
they feel that contingency fees would 
lead to numbers of unwarranted 
lawsuits. I would often argue the 
other side: that there are probably 
many injured persons who cannot 
afford to bring suit. The typical Cana­
dian response to that was that Ameri­
can attorneys are overly anxious to 
sue. Query: what would happen to 
many personal injury attorneys in 
America if we suddenly prohibited 
contingency fees?
Again and again, at social func­
tions, Canadians would ask me,
"How do you like Canada?" I learned 
that the easiest way to start a lively 
political discussion was to reply, "I 
love it, and—by the way—when are 
you going to join the U.S. as the fifty- 
first state?" I am happy to report that 
Canadian nationalism is as strong as 
ever.
More seriously, I did like Canada, 
and I'm glad that I took advantage of 
the exchange program. I'd recom­
mend it to any other law student as 
an excellent opportunity to immerse 
oneself in another legal system and 
appreciate the differences between it 
and our own. There's only one bad 
thing about a Canadian semester- 
having to leave at the end of it!
BLSA Activitie
The Case Western Reserve chapter 
of the Black Law Student Association 
is having a busy and productive year.
Its executive board consists of Hewitt 
Smith, president; Sylvester Summers, 
vice president: Alison Nelson, secre­
tary; and Joseph Williams, treasurer. 
Tammy Lenzy a second-year student, 
holds a regional office: she is the 
Midwest BLSA recording secretary.
BLSA has lent considerable support 
to the efforts of the school's admis­
sions office to increase the numbers 
of minority applicants and, ulti­
mately, the number of minority 
matriculants. In recent years those 
efforts have borne fruit. Thanks in no 
small part to B-LSA, the_ 1986-87 stu­
dent body includes about 60 black 
students—almost certainly the largest 
number in the school's history. BLSA 
began the year by welcoming the 
new black students with a picnic at 
the North Chagrin Reservation during 
the school's orientation days.
Just after the fall term began, on 
September 6, BLSA invited black 
attorneys in the area—both alumni 
and non-alumni—to a reception at the
s
Law School to meet the new dean. It 
was an occasion, too, for them to 
meet students and faculty.
In November BLSA sponsored its 
fourth annual pre-law seminar for 
undergraduate minority students 
interested in applying to law school. 
BLSA members and area practitioners 
discussed application procedures and 
all aspects of the law school experi­
ence, and faculty members presented 
a mock first-year class. About thirty 
high school and undergraduate stu­
dents came from all over Ohio and 
from nearby states. ^
BLSA is working in other ways to 
establish a relationship with area 
youth. As In Brief went to press, 
there were plans for classes and sem­
inars that would focus primarily on 
improving analytical skills and writ­
ing skills.
February is Black History Month, 
and the BLSA chapter plans a series 
of speakers at the school. The focus, 
says BLSA president Hewitt Smith, 
will be on the role of the lawyer in 
the community. Black jurists and 
practitioners, elected officials, and
persons in government agencies will 
be invited to participate.
In the spring CWRU's BLSA chap­
ter will join with the BLSA chapter at 
Cleveland State University's Cleve- 
land-Marshall College of Law in 
sponsoring the annual scholarship 
banquet. April 11 is the tentative 
date. CWRU's black graduates can 
expect an appeal for their financial 
support, but in the meantime BLSA 
will welcome their assistance and 
support in less tangible but no less 
meaningful form. Smith and his
BLSA colleagues hope to be in regu­
lar communication with them.
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Forsan et haec olim meminisse 
juvabit...
University archivist Dennis Harrison with the file of Dean Finfrock's wartime correspondence. 
Harrison took charge of the CWRU archives in 1985. He had been, for many years, curator of 
manuscripts for the Western Reserve Historical Society. A graduate of Heidelberg College, he 
holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Case Western Reserve. Among other professional activities, 
he is a past president of the Society of Ohio Archivists and the current chairman of the 
society's Legislative Committee.
by Dennis I. Harrison 
University Archivist
For attorneys, schooled in the 
written word and cognizant of the 
authority inherent in even the sim­
plest legal document, it is hardly 
necessary to explain the significance 
of the Law School records stored in 
the Case Western Reserve University 
archives. The legal value of a corpo­
rate charter, a constitution or a set of 
by-laws, or a list of students meeting 
the requirements for graduation is 
immediately apparent.
Equally obvious is the value of 
the collection to administrators of the 
university. Such records as a series of 
accreditation reports or the dean's 
annual reports provide a historical 
perspective essential to current deci­
sion making.
There is another dimension to the 
archives: the collection brings to life 
the personalities and events of days 
gone by. As Virgil put it, in the words 
I have borrowed as a title: "Perhaps 
the remembrance of these things will 
prove a source of pleasure."
Some of the items among the 
Law School records have proved to 
be just that. For example, among the 
very oldest records in the archives 
are small notes written in 1836, in 
ink now faded to a reddish brown, 
attesting that Franklin Thomas 
Backus "has just completed a course 
of education at Yale University" and 
has placed "among the most distin­
guished of his class in literary and 
scientific attainments."
Among the records actually cre­
ated by this law school are the min­
utes and records of attendance at 
faculty meetings, both of which begin 
in 1892, as well as catalogs of the 
school from 1893 on, and copies of 
the Law Journal from 1895. Among 
the earliest photographs are portraits 
of the Class of 1899 and a photo­
graph of the Class of 1904.
The collection includes records of 
many former faculty who are still 
well remembered by their students. 
Professor Clarence M. Finfrock's 
well-known love of birds is apparent 
in a thin volume labeled simply "Bird 
Diary," in which he recorded hun­
dreds of bird sightings from 1921 
through 1931.
A gradebook of Professor Archi­
bald P. Throckmorton, kept as care­
fully as the bird counts of Professor 
Finfrock, records the marks of his 
students in Torts and in Constitu­
tional Law from 1923 to 1938, the 
year of his death. In still another 
portion of the collection a letter from
Dean Walter T. Dunmore catches the 
eye. Written in 1942, three years 
before his death, it expresses the 
desire that the settlement he envi­
sioned after World War II would "at 
least give us a reasonably long 
peace." This letter, to a much youn­
ger man, closes with the opinion that 
"after all, the hope of the world lies 
with the young."
One of the earliest records of 
student activities at the school is a 
file on the Rufus P. Ranney Club, 
including a petition of the club for 
incorporation as the Ranney Chapter 
of the Phi Delta Phi legal fraternity 
and a short history detailing the 
efforts of club members to secure a 
charter. (The history was written by 
Frank M. Cobb, '99, who later joined 
the faculty. Among the club members 
responsible for securing the charter 
were William R. Hopkins, '99, later 
city manager of Cleveland, and Carl 
D. Friebolin, '99, who also served on 
the law faculty and whose satirical 
wit was well known through the City 
Club's annual production, the Anvil 
Review.)
The students encountered numer­
ous difficulties in securing a charter 
despite endorsements from existing 
chapters and from alumni, including 
a statement from the Swan Chapter 
at Ohio State University attesting to a 
personal acquaintance with members 
of the Ranney Club and assuring the 
national secretary that "the best
material of the college is collected in 
this club." The petition was rejected 
in 1899 by three negative votes of the 
existing chapters and, after this hur­
dle had been overcome, was then 
rejected by a vote of the fraternity's 
national council in March 1901. At 
this point two prominent Cleveland­
ers, Judge Frederick A. Henry and 
Frank B. Williams Choate, personally 
intervened with the national council 
and secured a reversal of the deci­
sion.
Other student records include the 
book of minutes of the Garfield 
Debating Club, formed in 1909 to 
debate issues of interest to law stu­
dents. Over the years a number of 
secretaries put their hand to the 
book, including Garvin Amster, '12; 
Maurice L. Gelfand, '13; and George 
R. Platt, '14. In later years there are 
records pertaining to the moot court, 
and a short skit survives from the 
1930s satirizing the faculty in verse.
A more serious note is struck in a 
letter written November 12, 1917, by 
Benjamin F. Roth, then a third-year 
student, to the president of the senior 
class at the University of Cincinnati 
Law School, following the entry of 
the United States into World War I. 
Roth noted that "a large percentage 
of the present Senior Class is desirous 
of immediately entering military 
service" and requested that the stu­
dents at Cincinnati join with their 
faculty, in cooperation with other
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Ohio law schools, to pressure the 
state Supreme Court to schedule 
early bar exams in December for 
students desiring to enlist. Within a 
year, the rush to colors was such that 
all of the day law schools in Ohio 
except Western Reserve were closed, 
and enrollment here had dropped 
from 115 in 1917 to 46 in 1918 
despite the school's admission of the 
first women in its history.
Twenty-five years later Professor 
Finfrock, who had corresponded with 
his former students in service during 
the first war, once more found the 
law building nearly empty as the 
students again joined the armed 
forces. The correspondence of this 
period is a moving testimonial to 
Finfrock's devotion to the school and 
its students.
The letters date from 1942 
through 1946 and originate in 
Europe, Asia, Africa, and North 
America. One of the earliest is from 
Sergeant Robert E. Jaffe, '41, inform­
ing Finfrock that on the day the bar 
results were announced he was being 
inducted into the U.S. Army. He 
passed the bar and was sworn in 
while training at Fort Hayes. In 1943 
Norman Sugarman, '40, was standing 
guard, digging foxholes, cleaning 
barracks, and oiling rifles. He also
won medals as a marksman. Michael 
Presti, who was stationed in Egypt 
near the Suez Canal, was actually 
practicing law; he had appeared in 
court to defend a soldier charged 
with assault "to wit with a 30 cal. 
rifle." His client was acquitted. In 
1945 William J. Kraus, '34, wrote 
that he had landed at Normandy and 
was now in Paris. Ivan L. Miller, '38, 
who had received a bronze star at 
Normandy, was temporarily housed 
in a private home in Belgium.
■IWo years later, in 1947, the 
students were home again, and law 
school enrollment shot from 48 in 
1943-44 to almost 500 in 1947-48. 
These students are still remembered 
for the unusual maturity and serious­
ness that they brought to the 
classroom.
Twenty years later a younger 
generation of students took part in 
the domestic struggles for civil rights 
that characterized the 1960s. A report 
by David N. Strand, '68, outlines the 
activities and goals of the Law Stu­
dents Civil Rights Research Council 
of Case Western Reserve University, 
which grew out of a student legal aid 
committee founded in early 1966 by 
Stephen M. Pfarrer and James L. 
Rigelhaupt, Jr., both '67. By 1968 the 
chapter was working closely with the
Cleveland Legal Aid Society, with 
Louis Stokes and Russell Adrine of 
the NAACP, and with officials of 
several community organizations. A 
major goal of the council was to 
secure a greater degree of latitude for 
law school students in supervised 
clinics to appear on behalf of indigent 
clients.
The work of preserving the Law 
School records continues in the Uni­
versity Archives on a daily basis. 
Existing records must be properly 
kept, and more recent records must 
be identified, transferred to the 
archives, and catalogued for retrieval. 
Administrators, faculty, and students 
frequently request information from 
the records.
The University Archives wel­
comes donations of documents rele­
vant to student life. In fact, such 
material is likely to survive only if it 
finds its way to an archive. The 
materials used in preparation of this 
article were available because they 
had been placed in the University 
Archives. Letters, photographs, and 
other materials given the Archives 
today will be here to give informa­
tion—and pleasure—to the genera­
tions of tomorrow.
1986 Law Alumni Weekend
By all accounts the 1986 Alumni 
Weekend was a smashing success. 
Some 500 alumni participated in one 
or more of the weekend's events, and 
spouses and friends nearly doubled 
the crowd. The planners in the 
school's Office of External Affairs 
were particularly pleased by the 
number of graduates—about 80—who 
journeyed in from some distance. For 
many of these, it was the first visit to 
the Law School's present quarters in 
Gund Hall.
By now the Alumni Weekend is 
well established as an annual event, 
and plans are already under way for 
the festivities of 1987. The date is set: 
it's the weekend of Saturday, Septem­
ber 19. Ten classes will gather for 
special reunion parties that evening: 
1937, 1942, 1947, 1952, . . . 1977, 
1982. If you're in one of those classes 
ending in -7 or-2 and you'd like to 
help in the planning, please call Ker- 
stin Trawick, director of external 
affairs, at 216/368-3860.
Meanwhile, here's a report on the 
1986 reunions. Many, many thanks to 
the reunion planning committees, 
and special thanks to those graduates 
(and their spouses!) who hosted the 
events. The Law School's faculty and 
staff party-hoppers unanimously 
report: every single one was a 
GREAT party.
James R. Strawn is the 1986 Distinguished Recent Graduate (see profile, page 22}. 
Ann Womer Benjamin, '78, presented the award.
IOn behalf of the Tau Epsilon Rho legal fraternity, David Sindell, '36 (right) presented the 
Fletcher Reed Andrews Graduate of the Year Award to Ivan L. Miller, '38.
Michael Button, '26, came from Columbus to 
celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of his 
graduation. He's with his son, Eugene.
The Judicial Outfitters sold truckloads of T-shirts during the Alumni Weekend. Allan Kleinman, 
'52, and Allen Bickart, '56, are the models in this photo, while Winther McCroom, '61 (behind 
Kleinman's shoulder) and Carolyn Bickart look on admiringly.
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Classmates ('331 Clark Morrow 
and Walter Whitlatch.
Ruth 1'45) and Austin Klein and Emmet Pedley, both '34.
Winther j'611 and Shirley McCroom.
Class of 1936
Nearly half (45 percent) of the 50- 
year class joined in the golden anni­
versary celebration at the Playhouse 
Club. Dave Sindell was the master of 
ceremonies; other committee mem­
bers were Howard Bernstein, Bert 
Colclaser, John Jaeger, Larry Knecht, 
and Bing Zellmer. Travelers included 
Charles Chaney from Columbus, Ted 
Kremer from Senecaville, Norman 
Miller from Florida, Bill Stickle from 
New Hampshire, Norman Faulk from 
Pennsylvania, Norman McDonough 
from Missouri, Charlie Vanik from 
Washington, D.C., and Jim Reigert all 
the way from Washington state.
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Janette Pierce Vogelgesang 
and Alberta Colclaser
Standing: John Jaeger, Howard Bernstein, Arthur Mentall, Joseph Robbins, David Sindell, 
Maurice (Jimj Reigert, Norman Faulk, Charles Vanik, Theodore Kremer, Norman McDonough, 
Charles Chaney. Seated: Alberta Colclaser, Janette Pierce Vogelgesang, Otto Schutz, Norman 
Miller, William Stickle, Warren Smith.
Class of 1941
When Ray Robertson's illness (from 
which he is now fully recovered) 
forced a last-minute change of loca­
tion, Tony and Ruth Klie invited the 
class to their home instead. Eleven 
class members (out of thirty on the 
mailing list) were there, coming from 
New Jersey (Manning Case), Canton 
(Bob Eshelman), Akron (Bob Peter- 
silge), Carl Engel (Columbus), and 
Joe Quatman (Lima). Case, Robert­
son, Eshelman, and Petersilge were 
on the planning committee, along 
with Jim Carney, Ed Warren, and 
Bob Horrigan.
Dora and Edward Warren, Sally Fridrich and James Carney.
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Class of 1946
Stan and Hope Adelstein invited 
Stan's classmates to be their guests at 
the Cleveland Racquet Club, and 
exactly half the class members were 
able to accept their invitation. 
Attendees included George and Jean 
Sauter (from Mansfield) and other 
members of the planning committee: 
Rita Newton, George Kasik, Jay 
White, and Francis Talty.
Francis Tally, George and Jean Sauter.
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Class of 1951
The Class of 1951 has scattered 
widely, but 23 of them came back 
(including Bill Strachan from Texas, 
Lloyd Doran from Illinois, and Ken 
Thornton and Don Zimmerman from 
elsewhere in Ohio] for the 35-year 
reunion. That was the biggest 
reunion group the class has ever
mustered, and it meant a move from 
Anne and Charles Landefeld's home 
to the Faculty Dining Room on the 
CWRU campus. Professor Morris 
Shanker and former Professor Robert 
Bensing joined in the revelry and 
were accepted into the group photo­
graph as honorary members of the 
class.
A sizeable committee lent their 
backing: Charlie Ault, Jack Gherlein, 
Ed Gold, A1 Gray, Charlie Griesinger, 
Bill Haase, Ted Jones, Anne Lande- 
feld, Joe Spaniol, Bill Stein, Jack 
Stickney Pat Thomas, Ken Thornton, 
George Umstead, Fred Weisman, and 
Jim Wilkinson.
Front row: Rudolph Zadnik, Wallace Krivoy, Edward Gold, William Strachan, Lloyd Doran. Behind them: Robert Bensing (formerly on the 
faculty), John Butala, Jr, Alvin Gray, Donald Zimmerman, Charles Griesinger. Standing: Kenneth Thornton, John Sullivan, Mario Corsi, 
James Wilkinson, Professor Morris Shanker, Fred Weisman, John Stickney, Allard Rosen, Charles Ault, Robert Grogan, Neil Conway.
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Class of 1956
Bill and Janet Smith hosted the 
class at their home and arranged a 
grand clambake. Others in on the 
planning were Marty Blake, Jack 
Cronquist, Jerry Ellerin, Larry Gor­
don, Ron Rice, Dan Roth (who came 
from Youngstown), Keith Spero, Tony 
Viola, and Bob Weber. A1 Gandal 
came in from Washington, D.C., 
Sherm Titens from Kansas City, and 
A1 Bickart from Arizona. In all, 
nearly a third of the class came 
together for the occasion.
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Class of 1961
The silver anniversary class gath­
ered at the home of Bob and Donna 
Jackson, coming from Canton (John 
Werren), Cincinnati (Tim Garry], 
Wisconsin (Mike Joseph), Illinois 
(Harvey Adelstein), and even Califor­
nia (Alan Arnold and Ken Brown). 
The 23 class members attending 
represented nearly half the total.
Harvey and Doris Adelstein
Class of 1966
Paul Brickner, Tom LaFond, Dale 
LaPorte, John Lindamood, Jim Strei- 
cher, and Leon Weiss put together the 
twenty-year celebration at the Cleve­
land Skating Club. Close to a third of 
the class was there, including J. C. 
Argetsinger from Washington, D.C., 
and Californian Mike DiSanto.
Leon Weiss
John Werren, Thomas Mason, Myron Joseph, Kenneth Brown.
Erwin Apell and host Robert Jackson
Admiring 20-year-old photographs: Thomas LaFond, Thomas and Elsa Pavlik, 
and Michael Di Santo.
Dale LaPorte and Kenneth Boukis (with Richard Binzley and Phillip Campanella 
in the background!.
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Class of 1971
Cray and Peggy Coppins had nearly 
a third of the class at their home, and 
the group included an amazing array 
of travelers: Tom Africa and Norman 
Levine from Pennsylvania, Jerry 
Boykin from Virginia, Doug Carr 
from Maine, A. J. DiMattia from 
New Jersey, Karen Hammerstrom 
from D.C., Charlie Peck from Massa­
chusetts, Herb Phipps from Georgia, 
Jerry Scanlan from Nevada, Ruth 
Zack Sorenson from California, and 
former faculty member Ovid Lewis 
from Florida.
Committee members were Coppins, 
Peck, Phipps, John Demer, Jerry 
Jackson, Willie Kohn, Joyce Neiditz, 
Tim Reed, Maynard Thomson, Greg 
Weiss, and John Wilbur.
Karen Hammerstrom and Carl Utrata
Ovid Lewis (formerly on the faculty}, 
A. J. Di Mattia, and John Demer.
Charles Peck and Herbert Phipps, 
with Dean Gerhart.
Cray Coppins and Douglas Carr, with Professor Lewis Katz.
Class of 1976
Exactly a fourth of the class came 
together at the home of Pat and 
Franklin Plotkin. Those included 
John Campion from North Carolina, 
Roland Eckert from Chicago, Buzz 
Guida and Karen Savransky from 
Massachusetts, Barney Katchen and 
Vicki Morrison from New Jersey,
Joan Moore from Michigan, Dixon 
Miller from Columbus, Bob Sassone 
from New York, and four from Wash­
ington, D.C.: Joe Baldinger, Sander 
Bieber, Steve Glazer, and Barbara 
Gordon.
A big committee helped in the 
planning: Plotkin, Katchen, Miller, 
Morrison, Savransky, Lee Fisher,
Mark Hoffman, Peggy Kennedy, Joan 
Mandel Gross, Bruce Mandel, Rob 
McCreary, Barbara Saltzman, Gilda 
Spears, Roger Shumaker.
Robert Sassone and Gilda Spears
Steven Glazer and William Jacobs flank Mr. and Mrs. T (Irene and Perry Tenenbaumj.
David Rowthorn and 
Patrick McLaughlin
Patricia Plotkin and party-hopper 
Owen Heggs, '67, formerly on the 
taw faculty.
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Class of 1981
Jean and Walter Kalberer welcomed 
68 members of Jean's class (29 per­
cent of the total) to their home, plus 
spouses and others. Along with Jean 
Kalberer, the committee included 
Virginia Brown, Laura Chisolm, Col­
leen Conway Cooney, Stuart Cordell 
(who came from Ashtabula), Susan 
Frankel, Karen Greve, Bob Griffo 
and Dawn Starr and Paul Gutermann 
(who all came from Washington), 
Susan Metzenbaum Hyatt (who came 
from Kansas City), Peter Koenig 
(from Cincinnati), Neil Kozokoff, 
David Posteraro, and Ted Prasse.
Other travelers were Leo Daly 
(Minnesota), Tim Danello and Lorie 
Nierenberg (D.C.), Lee Gottesman 
(New Jersey), Stephanie Pardo and 
Jeff Kaufman (New York), Mark Kim­
ball (Texas), Tom Lodge (Cincinnati), 
Amelia Nichols Lombardo (Mary­
land), Linda Rhone (Pittsburgh), Les­
ter Rosensaft (Massachusetts), John 
Stillpass (Cincinnati), and Dan Trim­
ble (Virginia).
Clinic Reunion
In celebration of the Law School 
Clinic's tenth anniversary, all the 
participants in its history were 
invited to get together at the home of 
Patricia Yeomans, '84. Several former 
faculty came back for the occasion: 
Owen Heggs, '67, Lee Hutton, Robert 
Kirk (now in Washington, D.C.), 
Robert Stotter, Mary Jo Long (now in 
Albany, New York). The range of 
former clinicians went from a '76 
graduate, David Rowthorn, through 
Dennis Harrington, '86. It is reported 
that the Mexican dinner was terrific 
and the margaritas flowed freely.
Stuart Van Wagenen
Thomas Horton, Timothy Danello, and 
James Phillips.
Julia Gleisser, Neal Wainblat, '80, and 
Jerome i/Vebhs, also '80, with 
Dean Gerhart.
Ruth Harris, the Clinic's longtime secretary, 
and her husband Edward.
Lester Rosensaft, Steven Miller, 
and Steven Shagrin
Matthew Moriarty and Jean Kalberer
Classmates ('SO) Waldemar Wojcik 
and Mary Jane Trapp.
Kathryn Mercer and Ruth Spencer, both '83.
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New Alumni Officers
The 1986 Alumni Weekend 
included the Annual Meeting of the 
Law Alumni Association and the 
election of new leadership for the 
1986-87 academic year.
Thomas A. Heffernan, '64, suc­
ceeded William W. Allport, '69, as 
president of the association. A part­
ner in the Cleveland firm of Spangen- 
berg, Shibley, Traci & Lancione, Hef­
fernan has been a trustee of the 
Cleveland Bar Association, president 
and trustee of the Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers, and a member of the 
Board of Governors of the Associa­
tion of Trial Lawyers of America.
Last year he was elected a member 
of the Law School's Society of Ben­
chers.
The new vice president, replacing 
Susan G, Braden, '73, is Patrick M. 
Zohn, '78. Heffernan and Zohn are a 
continuing partnership; last year 
Heffernan chaired the Alumni 
Annual Fund, and Zohn chaired one 
of its major components—the Tele­
thon. Zohn holds the all-time record 
for zealous telephoning: in eight
Patrick M. Zohn, '78, is the new vice 
president. He was presented with a 
personalized Official CWRU Law Suit T-shirt 
in recognition of his outstanding performance 
as telethon chairman.
Jerry Whitmer, '60, new member of the 
Board of Governors.
years of Law School Telethons, at the 
rate of four or five nights per year, he 
attended every evening but one. Like 
Heffernan, Zohn is a trial attorney, in 
the Cleveland office of the United 
States Department of Labor.
The association's secretary and 
treasurer were re-elected. John S.
Pyle, '74, the continuing secretary, is 
with Gold, Rotator!, Schwartz & 
Gibbons, a Cleveland criminal 
defense firm, and Ivan L. Otto, '62, 
treasurer, is with Squire, Sanders & 
Dempsey.
Five members of the Board of Gov­
ernors retired as their three-year 
terms ended: Ann Womer Benjamin 
and Colleen Conway Cooney, both 
'81; M. Patricia Donnelly, '80; Daniel 
L. Ekelman, '52; and George J. Mos- 
carino, '58. Five new members were 
elected to replace them:
Richard H. Bamberger, '72, clerked 
for U.S. District Court Judge William 
K. Thomas for two years before join­
ing Baker & Hostetler. His principal 
area of practice is pensions and 
employee benefit plans; he teaches a
The Alumni Association's new president, 
Thomas A. Heffernan, '64.
seminar at the Law School as a mem­
ber of the adjunct faculty.
J. Michael Drain, '70, began his 
career at Ernst & Whinney, spent a 
year with Ulmer, Berne, Laronge, 
Glickman & Curtis, and now is a 
partner in Fillo, Ristau & Drain, an 
insurance defense firm, and also 
assistant law director of the City of 
Solon.
Patricia Marcus Holland, '77, spent 
several years in Chicago with Schiff 
Hardin & Waite. Now she is a part­
ner in Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan 
& Aronoff, concentrating in corporate 
and securities law.
James W. McKee, '69, is a patent 
attorney. He started out with Meyer, 
Tilberry & Body, and since 1972 he 
has been with the firm now known 
as Fay, Sharpe, Fagan, Minnich & 
McKee.
Jerry F. Whitmer, '60, the one non- 
Clevelander among the five, is with 
Brouse & McDowell in Akron. He 
joined that firm in 1968 after eight 
years' practice with Johnson, Whit­
mer & Sayre.
J. Michael Drain, '70, new on the 
Board of Governors.
Classmates ('691 James W. McKee, a new governor of the Alumni Association, 
and William W. Allport, who concluded a year as president.
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New Development Director
Effective January 1, 1987, the Law 
School has a new director of develop­
ment, Kevin L. Gladstone.
Gladstone grew up in Cleveland, 
attended St. Ignatius High School, 
and went from there to Xavier Uni­
versity in Cincinnati, where he 
received a B.A. in political science in 
1974. He stayed in Cincinnati for 
four years, working for the Early & 
Daniel Company as a grain merchan­
diser, and then returned to St. Igna­
tius High School as director of alumni 
relations and annual support.
After four years with St. Ignatius, 
he moved on to Trinity High School, 
where he established that school's 
first development office.
In 1984 Gladstone was appointed 
Cleveland State University's assistant 
director of development for annual 
support and alumni programs. Last 
summer he was promoted to director.
Gladstone says that what mainly 
attracted him to the Law School was 
its reputation and that of the univer­
sity as a whole. The institution is
"about the best there is,” as he puts 
it, and he looks forward to being a 
part of it.
He sees his first task as, simply, to 
get acquainted: to meet alumni and 
friends and understand their percep­
tions of the Law School. Then, not 
far down the road, some thought will 
have to be given to a capital cam­
paign: Should we? Or shouldn't we?
Gladstone assures In Brief that the 
prospect of working with a bunch of 
lawyers holds no terrors for him. His 
brother, Stephen, is a 1981 CWRU 
graduate, now with Thompson, Hine 
& Flory. And he reminds us that St. 
Ignatius has a particularly strong and 
active group of law alumni: he's 
expecting to renew many old 
acquaintances.
-K.E.T.
Journal Editors
Dean Gamin, right, is editor-in-chief of the 
Law Review, following in the footsteps of 
his brother Mark, '83, now an associate with 
the Cleveland firm of Thompson, Hine & 
Flory. (The photographer caught them 
together at the Law Review banquet last 
April.) Dean is a 1984 graduate of Kent 
State University, where he majored in 
telecommunications, concentrating in 
business. He spent the summer in Cleveland, 
his hometown, working for the firm of 
Cavitch, Familo & Durkin, and burning 
midnight oil in the Law Review office.
Mitzi Cole, editor in chief and Leon 
Davidoff executive editor, head the staff of 
Health Matrix this year. Cole is from Exton, 
Pennsylvania; she is a licensed pharmacist, 
with a B.S. degree from the Philadelphia 
College of Pharmacy and Science. She was 
back in Philadelphia last summer, working as 
a law clerk at Wyeth Laboratories, a division 
of the American Home Products Corporation, 
Davidoff's home is Newington, Connecticut. 
He is a graduate of Clark University 
(Worcester, Massachusetts), where he double- 
majored in government and economics.
The Law Review's managing editor is 
Douglas Bell, a 1980 Haverford College 
graduate (major: economics) who spent four 
years with Cleveland's National City Bank as 
an investment officer before entering 
CWRU's J.D./M.B.A. program. He was in 
Cleveland during the summer, at Jones, Day, 
Reavis & Pogue. Bell and his wife are both 
Clevelanders; she is the daughter of 
Morton L. Stone, '54.
Christopher Bauman, editor in chief of the journal of International Law, was born and raised 
in Caracas, Venezuela; his father worked for an American oil company there. A wide-ranging 
recruiter for the College of Wooster brought him to Ohio; he received his B.A. degree in 
philosophy in 1982. Bauman spent the past summer in New York with Grant, Herrmann, 
Schwartz & Klinger, a small firm specializing in international—especially Latin American—law. 
Renee Chudakoff is editor-in-chief of the Canada-United States Law Journal. A Clevelander, 
Chudakoff stayed home last summer and worked in the city prosecutor's office. She is a 1983 
graduate of Ohio State University; English was her major there.
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What We Learned from the 
Alumni Directory
by Kerstin E. Trawick
Director of Publications & External Affairs
We're delighted to report that the 
1986 Law Alumni Directory has been 
generally well received. For us at the 
Law School it was, as they say, a 
learning experience.
It was not the nearly effortless 
project that we had imagined. Exactly 
3,367 of our graduates—nearly 60 
percent of the total—returned the 
directory forms, and many hundreds 
of person-hours went into entering 
the new data. Our hard-working 
computer generated the book—with a 
little human coaxing—and saved us 
(by the printer's estimate) 54 person- 
days of typesetting. But we still had 
to edit. Some graduates wanted their 
home addresses or phone numbers 
omitted; others wished not to appear 
in the directory at all. And even a 
quick proof-reading found misspell­
ings here and there. What we had 
imagined as a minimal editing chore 
turned into many hours of red ink.
We learned (but we had suspected 
this earlier) that we're not perfect. In 
the listing by class year we left out 
1904. In the listing by state we left 
out Indiana. One graduate who did 
not want to be in the directory found 
himself included there, and to him 
we apologize. At least two persons 
marked as deceased—Robert S.
Fulton, '72, and Jay R. Slobey '76- 
are very much alive. Again, our sin­
cere apologies. The other errors 
we've discovered so far have been 
less glaring. And we are still welcom­
ing corrections.
The directory was a learning expe­
rience in another way: it gave us a 
reason to look at the distribution of 
the Law School's graduates. In the 
geographic section we sorted alumni 
by business address, or by residence 
if we had only a home address.
The accompanying map shows you 
at a glance which states have the 
greatest numbers. To no one's sur­
prise, Ohio is way at the top with 
3,293, or 59 percent of the total.
The state of New York is a distant 
second place with 311. Five other 
states (not counting Ohio) and the 
District of Columbia have more than 
a hundred. Another ten states have 
fewer than a hundred but more than 
thirty.
Three states—Montana, North 
Dakota, South Dakota—have none at 
all. Imagine that vast, desolate space, 
absolutely void of CWRU law 
alumni!
A count strictly by state doesn't do 
justice to the two biggest concentra­
tions of Law School graduates. There 
are 320 alumni in and around New 
York city (counting in southern Con­
necticut and northern New Jersey). 
And if you add northern Virginia and 
Washington's Maryland suburbs to 
the D.C. count, you get a D.C.-envi­
rons total of 298.
The whopping number of alumni in 
Ohio prompted us to take some 
counts of alumni of different vintages 
and compare the Ohio percentages.
Of the 1,649 alumni who graduated
in 1960 or earlier, 1,174—or 71 per­
cent-are in Ohio. Graduates from 
1961 on are a much bigger group— 
3,978. Of these, only 54 percent are 
in Ohio.
Looking more closely at graduates 
of the past 25 years, we found out 
that 56 percent of the 1961-76 classes 
are in Ohio, compared with only 52 
percent of the 1977-86 group. How­
ever, the trend just may be reversing. 
Of 1977-81 graduates, 50.4 percent 
are in Ohio, but the percentage for 
1982-86 is slightly higher: 51.9.
That's interesting to us, because we 
know that more of our students in 
recent years have come to the school 
from outside of Ohio. Apparently 
many of those supposedly-temporary 
immigrants into the state decide that 
Ohio looks like a pretty good place to 
settle.
The alumni directory was 
mailed at no charge to every 
graduate on the school’s mailing 
list, in most cases to the home 
address. Anyone who failed to 
receive it can request a copy 
from the Office of External 
Affairs, which has a limited 
supply of leftovers.
Massachusetts 
101
Rhode Island 34 
Connecticut 65
District of Columbia 
Maryland ^35
58
West Virginia 
8
Alaska 6 
Hawaii 14
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University Alumni Census
The Alumni Development Office of 
Case Western Reserve University is 
planning a census of all the univer­
sity's graduates, and of course that 
includes law graduates. Census forms 
will be mailed in February.
This may strike you as unnecessary 
duplication, since the Law School just 
completed a directory project, but we 
assure you that we welcome every
opportunity to update our address 
data. The university alumni office 
will share new information with us.
Furthermore, the university's cen­
sus form includes much more than 
address information. It asks for infor­
mation about spouse and children; 
past and present employment and 
affiliations; degrees received from 
institutions other than CWRU; stu­
dent activities and alumni activities; 
income (this section is optional, of 
course]; and attitudes and interests.
When the census is completed, 
we'll know a great deal more about 
our alumni population. We hope as a 
result to serve you better. And we 
really mean that.
Visitors to the Law School
On October 21 the Eighth District Ohio 
Court of Appeals held sessions at Gund Hall. 
Joseph Nahra, Blanche Krupansky, '48, and 
Richard Markus, the district's chief judge, 
were the panel.
E. C. Ubaezonu, associate justice of the High 
Court of Nigeria, visited the Law School in 
September and addressed a faculty gathering, 
describing the Nigerian judicial system. Judge 
Ubaezonu received his legal training in 
England at the Bristol University College of 
Law, clerked for Lord Wigoder of the British 
High Court in London, and practiced law in 
Nigeria for more than twenty years before his 
appointment to the bench.
An October visit by Judge R. Eugene 
Pincham of the Illinois Appellate Court was 
co-sponsored by the Student Bar Association 
and the Black Law Students Association. 
Judge Pincham addressed the Academy fhis 
topic: "In Spite of the Judges—Why the 
Adversary System Works"I, met informally 
with students, and visited classes of his old 
friend Professor James McElhaney. The judge 
and his wife are shown here with McElhaney 
and Hewitt Smith, BLSA president.
William F. Nelson, chief counsel of the 
Internal Revenue Service, visited the school 
in November as the Norman A. Sugarman 
Tax Lecturer. He is with Joan Sugarman, 
whose late husband (a 1940 graduate) 
established the lectureship.
James M. Stephens, '71, labor counsel to the 
National Labor Relations Board, addressed 
the Academy last fall. He talked about the 
role of politics in the selection and service of 
NLRB members.
The Stockdale brothers were the youngest 
participants in the annual Parents' and 
Partners' Day on October 18.
43
Alumni Annual Fund 
We Need Your Help!
by Fred Weisman, '51 
Chairman, Alumni Annual Fund
We set an ambitious goal for the 
1986-87 Law Alumni Annual Fund— 
$375,000—and we've made a good 
start toward achieving it. As of 
December 1 cash contributions 
totaled $108,265, or 29 percent. An 
additional $139,622 has been 
pledged. I'm happy to report that 
many donors are making significant 
increases over their last year's gifts.
$117,672 of the pledge total is the 
result of three nights of telethon in 
October. Led by a triumvirate—tele­
thon co-chairs Colleen Conway 
Cooney, '81; Michael Drain, '70; and 
Mary Anne Garvey, '80—48 alumni 
volunteers, reinforced by 21 students 
and staff, made contact with 1,169 
Law School graduates.
Three more nights of telethon are 
scheduled for February. WE NEED 
VOLUNTEERS! The number of fall 
telethon volunteers was down from 
the year before, and several classes 
were not represented at all. This 
means that much, much more is still 
to be done! If you can help, call our 
Annual Fund coordinator, Janet Scott,
Two new endowment funds have 
been begun in recent weeks, and 
both are well on the way to the 
$10,000 that will qualify them for 
formal establishment by the Case 
Western Reserve University Board of 
Trustees.
One fund, which will benefit the 
Law School's Center for Criminal 
Justice, is named in honor of Dr. 
Samuel R. Gerber, Cuyahoga County 
coroner, who has completed an aston­
ishing fifty years in elective office.
An emeritus member of the univer­
sity's medical faculty, Gerber was one 
of the founders—with Dr. Alan 
Moritz and Professor Oliver Sch- 
roeder—of the Law-Medicine Center. 
Schroeder and Judges Harry Jaffe,
'33, and Francis Talty, '46, organized 
this tribute to Gerber arui raised (as 
of December 1) $12,965 for the 
Samuel R. Gerber Endowment Fund.
The other fund was the happy 
inspiration of Lois Weisman, who 
threw a bang-up surprise birthday 
party for her husband Fred ('51) and 
suggested to his friends and col­
leagues that the best birthday present 
would be a gift in his honor to the 
Case Western Reserve Law School.
at 368-6355. You'll have a lot of fun, 
plus the satisfaction of helping a good 
cause.
If you are among the 4,000 alumni 
who have not yet made a gift to the 
1987 fund, please remember that the 
Law School and its students depend 
on you. Your gift of any amount is 
deeply appreciated. Checks payable 
to Case Western Reserve University 
can be sent to Janet Scott's attention 
at the Law School, 11075 East Boule­
vard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106.
As an extra incentive to your gener­
osity we're promising an Official 
CWRU Law Suit T-shirt to 1) every 
first-time donor of $30 or more, 2)
The Fred Weisman Endowment Fund 
will be designated for student schol­
arships.
Speaking for the Law School, Dean 
Peter Gerhart commented: "Honor 
endowment funds like these are a 
splendid way for alumni and friends 
to commemorate the accomplish­
ments of distinguished individuals 
while contributing to our ability to 
train students to be persons of 
accomplishment for the future. They 
are important adjuncts to the Annual 
Fund because they give us an occa» 
sion to appreciate the distinguished 
past of our alumni and friends while 
building for the future."
everyone who joins a donor club for 
the first time, and 3) everyone who 
moves up from one club to another. 
And remember that the donor clubs 
receive special recognition in the 
annual Report of Giving and in Gund 
Hall's upper rotunda. (If you have 
not seen the handsome Donor Club 
Register, you should drop by the 
school and take a look at it.)
Here are the minimum contribu­
tions for donor club memberships: 
President's Society—$5,000 
Dean's Fellow—$2,500 
Dean Andrews Club—$1,500 
Dean Hopkins Club—$1,000 
Dean Dunmore Club—$500 
Century Club—$100 (open only to 
the 1982-86 classes)
If you have already contributed to 
the 1987 Alumni Annual Fund, 
thanks a million! And many, many 
thanks to our class agents and to all 
those who have helped—or who will 
help!
Anniversary 
Class Gifts
Three of the 1987 reunion classes 
have special campaigns under way to 
raise a significant anniversary gift. 
These are the classes celebrating 10, 
25, and 50 years since graduation: 
the classes of 1977, 1962, and 1937.
Their class agents for the Alumni 
Annual Fund also chair the anniver­
sary gift campaigns: William R. Van 
Aken, '37; Ivan L. Otto, '62; and, for 
the class of 1977, James A. Clark and 
Beverly J. Coen.
Gifts to the 1986-87 Annual Fund 
will count as part of the Anniversary 
Class Gift, and so will gifts or pledges 
to the 1987-88 fund which are 
received before December 31, 1987. 
Furthermore, the anniversary gift 
will include contributions to endow­
ment funds, special-purpose gifts, 
new or increased will commitments, 
life-income trusts—in short, virtually 
all donations and commitments 
within the 18-month period from July 
1, 1986, to December 31, 1987.
The anniversary chairmen hope 
that when each class convenes at the 
1987 Alumni Weekend, on Saturday, 
September 19, they will have a really 
impressive dollar figure to announce 
to the reunion revelers.
New Endowment Funds
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CLE News
by Kenneth R. Margolis, '76 
Director of Continuing Legal Education
As you have probably noticed, over 
the last year and a half the Law 
School's Department of Continuing 
Legal Education has made a renewed 
effort to bring you valuable and inter­
esting courses to sharpen your law­
yering skills, keep you abreast of the 
latest developments in your field, and 
help you expand your practice into 
new areas. We are constantly on the 
lookout for timely topics, and we 
welcome feedback about the courses 
we have given. You, the alumni, have 
a role to play in the direction of the 
CLE program. Please let us have your 
comments and suggestions.
Response to our courses has been 
so favorable that we hope to increase 
our offerings and to offer videotapes 
of particularly effective seminars. 
Even now we can offer some excel­
lent course materials. Please see the 
list of materials available. We are 
now planning the spring program, 
and you should receive information 
around the first of February. If you 
find courses of interest to you, please 
register without delay. We can plan 
more effectively if we know well in 
advance how many will participate.
Thank you for making the CLE 
program such a great success. We 
hope to see you at the spring semi­
nars!
FALL 1985
Liability of Insurance Agents, Brokers, 
and Other Intermediaries
Wilbur C. Leatherberry...........................................$15
Fifty New Evidence Decisions
Richard M. Markus................................................. $40
Anatomy of a 1983 Action Abraham Cantor, 
Terry H. Gilbert, Barbara Rook Snyder,
and Eric Zagrans........................................................ $40
Medical Malpractice: A TVial Seminar 
Update Fred Weisman...........................................$25
SPRING 1986
Toxic Tort Litigation: The New Frontier
Peter H. Weinberger................................................. $35
Fifty New Civil Procedure Decisions
Richard M. Markus................................................. $40
Wrongful Discharge: A Trap for the 
Unwary Employer Keith Ashmus and
Richard G. Ross........................................................ $30
Private Remedies and Consumer 
Protection Ric Sheffield and Spencer Neth . . $25
Order Form for Course Manuals
FALL 1986
Handling the Products Liability Case 
Harry Philo, Robert E. Sweeney, James A. Lowe, 
John L. Herron, Mark McCarthy,
and R. Eric Kennedy..................................................$25
How to Handle a Drunk Driving Case
Alec Berezin...............................................................$35
Basic Estate Planning Leslie L. Knowlton . $40
Representing the Health Care Professional 
Michael P Coyne, Richard S. Cooper, and
Richard A. Naegele....................................................$25
Recent Developments in Ohio Appellate
Procedure Richard M. Markus........................ $40
How to Manage a Law Practice
Avery H. Fromet........................................................ $25
Anatomy of a Libel Action Brent L. English
and Richard D. Panza.............................................$35
Note:
Prices are subject to change without notice.
PLEASE PRINT: 
Name______ . Telephone i
Address . . Suite # .
City/State/Zip .
PLEASE SEND ME THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION
1)--------------------------------------------------
2)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3|-----------------------------------------------------
PRICE TOTAL
TOTAL ENCLOSED: $
Checks should be made payable to CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY 
Orders will not be processed without payment 
Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery 
D RUSH-add 10% to purchase price. Delivery within 10 days.
Return this form to: Department of Continuing Legal Education, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law, 11075 East Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106.
Class Notes
by Amy Ziegelbaum
A
1928
Willis L. Hotchkiss has
published The Hotchkiss Luck: 
An Autobiography, 1901-1928. 
Now retired and living in 
Toronto, Hotchkiss was a 
celebrated antitrust attorney 
for 26 years: he also travelled 
widely around the world.
Since the book covers the early 
part of his life, it includes 
quite a bit about his studies at 
Western Reserve Law School.
1933
Benjamin Reich was 
recently elected commander of 
the Lyndhurst UFW post; he 
also has recently completed a 
course in philosophy at 
Hiram's Weekend College— 
"much to my regret—I didn't 
understand a bit of it!"
1934
Karl Krastin, dean emeritus 
of the University of Toledo 
College of Law (and now 
professor of law at Nova Uni­
versity), was recently honored 
by the Toledo Law Alumni 
Association at its annual gath­
ering.
1937
Of course the 1987 Law 
Alumni Weekend will include 
a grand 50-year reunion dinner 
for the Class of 1937 on Satur­
day, September 19. Bill Van 
Aken, Elliott Hannon, Bill 
Victor, and Adrian Miller 
have already said they would 
join in the planning of this 
event. Anyone else who would 
like to help should get in touch 
with one of them or with the 
Law School's director of exter­
nal affairs, Kerstin Trawick.
William H. Victor, former 
Ohio ninth district appeals 
judge, was the recipient of the 
University of Akron Law 
School's Dean's Club Award.
1942
Anyone who would like to 
help in planning a 45-year 
reunion for the Class of 1942 
should get in touch with Ker­
stin Trawick, the Law School's 
director of external affairs, or 
with one of the class members 
who have already indicated 
their interest: Dan Belden, 
John Conway, Joe Lom­
bardo, Phil Hermann. The
45
date of the party will be Satur­
day, September 19.
1947
Bruce Griswold, Hal 
Newell, Ev Krueger, Jack 
Hecker, and Bob McCreary
have begun the planning for a 
40-year class reunion on Satur­
day, September 19, in conjunc­
tion with the 1987 Alumni 
Weekend, and they would be 
happy to hear from any class­
mate who would like to help. 
Or you can call Kerstin Tra- 
wick, the school's director of 
external affairs.
1948
U.S. District Judge Alvin I. 
Krenzier was honored by 
Cleveland State University for 
his major donation to the 
university's soccer field. The 
facility has been named in his 
honor.
1950
Thomas O. Matia received 
the Ohio Supreme Court's 
Excellent Judicial Award, along 
with CWRU Law graduates 
William E. Aurelius, '55, and 
Richard J. McMonagle, '67. 
Milton D. Holmes and 
George W. Spanagel were the 
recipients of the Supreme 
Court's Superior Award, along 
with 1951 graduate Robert J. 
Grogan.
1951
Alvin L. Gray, senior part­
ner with Gray, Luria & Belkin, 
was named the 1986 Man of 
the Year by the Cleveland 
Men's OR’T Federation. ORT— 
the Organization for Rehabili­
tation through Training—has 
honored Gray for his contribu­
tions to the Jewish community.
For Robert J. Grogan, see 
1950.
R. William Rosenfeld
writes that he is living in 
California, where he is a clini­
cal social worker in the Cancer 
Research Institute and Hema­
tology/Oncology Service of the 
University of California Medi­
cal Center, San Francisco.
1952
The Class of 1952 will cele­
brate its 35th anniversary at 
the Alumni Weekend, Satur­
day, September 19. Allan 
Kleinman, Joe Cook, Dan 
Ekelman, Bill Warren, Dick 
Sternberg, and Warren Gib­
son have already signed on 
the planning committee, and 
others are welcome to join 
them: call one of the above, or 
call the school's director of 
external affairs, Kerstin Tra- 
wick.
1955
For William E. Aurelius,
see 1950.
1957
This year marks the 30th 
anniversary, and Ron Ruben- 
stein, Stan Gottsegen, Ray 
Griffiths, Joe Schneider, and 
Chuck Stack have begun to 
plan a party for June or Sep­
tember. Anyone else who 
would like to help should get 
in touch with one of them or 
with Kerstin Trawick at the 
Law School.
Ronald M. Rubenstein,
managing partner of Sindell & 
Rubenstein, was recently 
sworn in as president of the 
Cuyahoga County Bar Associa­
tion.
1960
Robert M. Lustig has been 
elected president of the City 
Club of Cleveland. Lustig 
practices with Lustig, Icove & 
Lustig.
1962
The Class of 1962 marks 25 
years in 1987 and—yes—there 
will be a reunion. The date is 
Saturday, September 19. Dan 
Clancy, the Law School's vice 
dean, tells us that he and Ivan 
Otto and Fred Lombardi 
have already begun to lay 
some plans, and they need a 
few more volunteers for a 
committee.
Marc and Judith Meshorer,
'69, have coauthored a book 
entitled Ultimate Pleasure: The 
Secrets of Easily Orgasmic 
Women, published by St. Mar­
tin's Press. Playboy has run 
excerpts in two issues; New 
Woman has bought excerpt 
rights, and the Book-of-the- 
Month Club made the volume 
an alternate selection this past 
fall. The Meshorers live in 
Cleveland: Judith is a partner 
with Bialosky, Abel &
Meshorer.
1967
Jerry Chattman has 
recruited several other class­
mates to help in planning a 20- 
year reunion on Saturday, 
September 19: Owen Heggs, 
Garry Schwartz, Lloyd 
Mazur, George Sadd, Dan 
Lovinter, Dick McMonagle, 
Joe Valentino, Mike Ritz, 
Marian Ratnoff, Mark 
Schwartz, Leonard Wolkov. 
More volunteers would be 
welcome: call Jerry Chattman, 
or call Kerstin Trawick at the 
Law School.
For Richard J. McMonagle, 
see 1950.
1968
Martin A. Fishman, for­
merly with Burke, Haber & 
Berick, is now vice president 
and general counsel for the 
Associated Estates Corpora­
tion, Cleveland.
1969
For Judith Meshorer, see
1962.
1971
C. Ruth Sorensen is now 
the Modoc County district 
attorney in Alturas, California.
1972
The Alumni Weekend in 
September (Saturday, the 19th) 
will include a 15-year celebra­
tion for the Class of 1972. Lee 
Koiczun, Rick Bamberger, 
Gary Andrachik, Bob Rapp, 
Chuck Zellmer, Chuck 
Guerrier, and Diane Rubin 
Williams have signed on the 
planning committee, and they 
invite others to join them. Call 
any one of them, or call 
Kerstin Trawick at the Law 
School.
Norton Gordon writes from 
Miami Beach that he has been 
nominated for the Case 
Reserve Athletic Club Hall of 
Fame: he was an undergradu­
ate wrestler.
Edward H. Tetelman, a
lawyer with the Division of 
Public Interest Advocacy in 
the New Jersey Department of 
the Advocate, was named 
assistant commissioner for 
inter-governmental affairs of 
the New Jersey Department of 
Human Services.
1973
Jeffrey H. Friedman has
become a member of the 
Cuyahoga County Bar Associa­
tion Board of Trustees and the 
Board of Trustees for Goodwill 
Industries.
Michael K. Magness, for­
merly executive director of 
Martindale Services and direc­
tor of placement services for 
New York University Law 
School, has formed the man­
agement consulting firm of 
Magness & Wehmann in New 
Yor^.
Jeffrey N. Silverstein has 
joined the Marathon Develop­
ment Corporation in Burke, 
Virginia; he was formerly with 
the firm of Baumann & Silver­
stein,
Stephen D. Webster is now
associated with Woodward & 
Griffiths in Chagrin Falls; he 
was previously with Webster, 
Morhard & Koach in Cleve­
land.
1974
Glenn G. Galbreath, for­
merly deputy director for 
litigation with Advocates for 
Basic Legal Equality in Toledo, 
has moved to Ithaca, New 
York, where he is teaching in 
the civil law clinic at Cornell 
Law School.
Stephanie Tiibbs Jones has
been appointed to the board of 
the Cleveland Public Library 
for a seven-year term.
1976
Roger L. Shumaker spoke 
to the Tax Section at the 
annual ABA meeting on 
"Using Micro Computers in 
Estate Planning" and served as 
a moderator and panelist on a 
Probate and Trust Division 
program on "Computerized 
Planning and Probate—Demon­
stration and Examples." He 
also spoke recently at the 
Notre Dame annual Tax and 
Estate Planning Institute.
1977
The Class of 1977 is plan­
ning a 10-year reunion in 
conjunction with the Alumni 
Weekend, Saturday, September 
19. So far the committee con­
sists of David Benjamin,
Fran Goins, Peter Joy, Bev 
Coen, Jim Clark, Sandy 
Hunter, Chevene King, 
Chuck Whitney, Patty Hol­
land, Mark Holbert, Steve 
Thomas, Bob Reffner,
Wayne Marta, John Sopko. 
Others are welcome to join 
and can call any committee 
member or Kerstin Trawick at 
the Law School.
Mark M. Biars has been 
promoted to vice president and 
senior lawyer in the law 
department of National City 
Bank, Cleveland.
David I. Hammond moved 
from the Cleveland office of 
Arter & Hadden to the Dallas 
office of Arter, Hadden &
Witts, where he was made a 
partner.
David L. Huber was made 
a partner in White & Case,
New York.
Marvin L. Weinberg, who 
was with the National Labor 
^ Relations Board for nine years, 
has joined the labor depart­
ment of the Philadelphia law 
firm of Fox, Rothschild,
O'Brien & Frankel.
1978
A. John Hauschulz was 
elected as a principal in the 
Cleveland office of Peat 
Marwick & Mitchell; Haus­
chulz specializes in executive 
compensation and employee 
benefits in the management 
consulting department.
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Charles R. Kowal was 
made a partner in Ernst & 
Whinney, Cleveland.
1979
After three years with the 
Tax Court in Washington,
D.C., Barbara F. Chalfant 
has joined Strauss & Troy in 
Cincinnati.
Robert A. Fuerst has joined 
Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz in 
Cleveland; he specializes in 
real estate law.
Edison Hall and Kenneth 
J. Freeman, '81, have formed 
a partnership. Hall & Freeman, 
with offices in Cleveland.
Ann K. Stevens writes from 
Tampa: "After four and a half 
years with the Traveler's 
Insurance Company, I have 
moved to the law firm of Lyle 
& Skipper, PA. As an associate 
here, I am doing insurance 
litigation. I am enjoying the 
transition from the corporate 
world to the firm world."
1980
Kendrew H. Colton has
become a member of 
Cushman, Darby & Cushman 
in Washington, D.C.
Eunice Bickel Hester is the 
manager of the editorial 
research department at Banks- 
Baldwin Law Publishing Com­
pany, Hester had been on In 
Briefs Missing Persons list, 
and we are glad to have found 
her!
David C. Vanaman, for­
merly assistant general counsel 
for the Fru-Con Corporation in 
Ballwin, Missouri, has joined 
the Sverdrup Corporation in 
St. Louis.
C. David Zoba has joined 
Arter, Hadden & Witts in 
Dallas as a real estate partner, 
^ba practiced for four years 
with Cravath, Swaine & Moore 
in New York, and more 
recently he was with the 
Herring Marathon Group, Inc., 
a major Dallas-based shopping 
mall developer.
■1981
Brian K. Brittain, who
practices in the labor law 
department of Wickens, Her- 
zer & Panza in Cleveland, 
received a Master of Business 
Administration degree in 
management and labor rela­
tions from the James J. Nance 
College of Business of Cleve­
land State University.
John A. Collins III was
made a partner in the New 
London, Connecticut, firm of 
Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Bren­
nan & Gray.
Mary T. (Rzewnicki) Cush­
ing has moved from the Mid- 
land-Ross Corporation to the 
LTV Steel Company in Cleve­
land.
For Kenneth J. Freeman,
see 1979.
Michael L. Malkin writes 
from Girard, Ohio: "Was a law 
clerk to several judges: then 
was legal counsel to ELTECH 
Systems Corporation for 2-1/2 
years: recently became legal 
counsel to Easco Aluminum 
Corporation . . . responsible for 
the pension and thrift plans, 
all insurance matters, leasing, 
employee benefits, and other 
legal and administrative func­
tions."
Scott M. Watson, formerly 
with Naval Legal Services in 
Millington, Tennessee, is now 
with the firm of Reese, 
McNenny Pyle & Drake in 
Newark, Ohio.
1982
The Class of 1982 will gather 
at Alumni Weekend (Saturday, 
September 19| for its first 
reunion, celebrating five years. 
Anyone who would like to 
help in the planning should 
call the school's Office of 
External Affairs or one of the 
classmates who have already 
signed on the committee: Tom 
Cawley, Cynthia Smith,
Dave Green, Liz Barker 
Brandt, Stacy Smith Quinn, 
Kathy Lazar, Jon and Judy 
Colenback Savage, or Andre 
Craig.
Michael O. Adelman has 
accepted a position with Shan- 
ley & Fisher in Morristown, 
New Jersey; he was formerly 
with the New York firm of 
Carb, Luria, Glassner, Cook & 
Kufeld.
Sheryl A. DeSantis writes:
"I was appointed municipal 
judge of the Borough of Bound 
Brook in Somerset County,
New Jersey. I am the first 
woman to be appointed as a 
municipal judge in Somerset 
County. I also started my own 
law firm in Bridgewater, New 
Jersey."
David Clark Worley has 
joined the New York firm of 
Cadwalader, Wickersham & 
Taft, following a year and a 
half with Jones, Day, Reavis & 
Pogue in Los Angeles.
1984
Kenneth J. Borg is now the 
research attorney for the 
Municipal and Superior Courts 
in El Cajon, California. He was 
previously with the law offices 
of Lionel P. Hernholm in San 
Diego.
Betsy A. Breese and John 
E. Schiller have married and
have moved back to Cleve­
land. Breese, who was with 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore in 
New York, is now with Baker 
& Hostetler: Schiller was with 
the State Employment Rela­
tions Board in Columbus and 
is now with Young, Kaufman 
& Cumberland.
Scott Douglas Porter has
moved from Morris & McVeigh 
to Kaplan Russin Vecchi & 
Kirkwood, New York.
Jane I. Rolnick has
accepted a position in the 
corporate law department of 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan 
& Aronoff in Cleveland.
Rolnick had been with Thomp­
son, Hine & Flory since gradu­
ating.
1985
Lawrence Paul Hampton
is now with Chamberlain, 
Hrdlicka, White, Johnson & 
Williams in Houston. His 
article, "The Continuing 
Debate over Recoverability of 
the Costs of Child-Rearing in 
Wrongful Conception Cases: 
Searching for Appropriate 
Judicial Guidelines," appeared 
in the ABA's Family Law Quar­
terly, vol. 20, Spring 1986.
Kenneth D. Johnson has
moved to Irvine, California, 
where he is with the firm of 
Allen, Matkins, Leek, Gamble 
& Mallory.
Jeffrey W. Krueger, for­
merly with the Ohio Bureau of 
Taxation in Columbus, has 
joined the Cleveland offices of 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.
Michael R. Spreng has 
joined Porter, Wright, Morris & 
Arthur in Cleveland; he had 
been working with the Dallas 
firm of Evans, Loshinsky & 
Zoba.
Frederic M. Wilf writes, "I 
have associated with the law 
firm of Elman Associates, 
which practices high technol­
ogy law in Philadelphia. I will 
be practicing in the areas of 
computer software licensing 
and litigation, business and 
corporate law including the 
starting-up of high technology 
companies."
1986
The last In Brief reported on 
jobs as of August 1, 1986. The 
following have been reported 
since then:
Brian S. Belson
Camden Regional Legal
Services
Camden, New Jersey
Mark D. Euster
Zion, Tarleton & Siskin
Decatur, Georgia
Arl H. Jaffe
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Ohio
Cleveland, Ohio
Stephen Kutenplon
Bernkopf, Goodman & 
Baseman
Boston, Massachusetts 
Michael R. Maiman 
Benefits Review Board 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Washington, D C.
David G. Meany 
Fahrenkopf Mortimer 
Sourwine Mousel & Sloane 
Reno, Nevada 
Inese A. Neiders 
solo practice 
Columbus, Ohio
Rebecca Anne Rea 
White, Milano & Miller 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Lynn Disney Sivinski 
Rubin Guttman Co., L.P.A. 
Cleveland, Ohio
Cheryl M. Tyson
Environmental Protection
Agency
Dallas, Texas
IN MEMORIAM
John W. Barkley, ’14- 
Society of Benchers 
September 28, 1986
Ruben H. Sacharow, '23 
October 3, 1986
Leonard Danaceau, '24 
October 13, 1986
Dennis W. Palmquist, '28 
November 14, 1986
Sanford Schwartz, '30 
September 9, 1986
Gerald E. Johnson, '32 
September 16, 1986
Donald W. Lentz, '35 
November 22, 1986
Clayton J. Oberholtzer, '39 
October 6, 1986
George S. Warner, '40 
August 21, 1986
George A. Costello, '44 
August 27, 1986
Barbara E. Gorman, '48 
September 16, 1986
Thomas J. Miller, '61 
November 9, 1986
Dale T. Evans, '64 
September 17, 1985
Patricia Jones Anderson, '65 
November 16, 1986
Paul Michael Cadden, '83 
May 11, 1986
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Missing Persons
This list of "lost” alumni—persons for whom we have 
no current mailing address—is longer than in past is­
sues of In Brief because in producing the Alumni Direc­
tory we discovered that several graduates had never 
made it into our computer system. A certain number of 
these may be deceased; if you have such information, 
please let us know.
We will appreciate any help you can give us in track­
ing down our missing persons. Call (216/368-3860) or 
write the Office of External Affairs, Case Western Re­
serve University School of Law, 11075 East Boulevard, 
Cleveland, Ohio 44106.
Class of 1937
George Ben Golden 
Robert E. Sheehan 
Beatrice Handy Ulrich
Class of 1938
Santo Dellaria 
Francis J. Dowling 
Paul Riffe
Class of 1939
Thomas J. McDonough 
Theodore Thomas 
Thorwald
Class of 1940
Norman Finley Reublin
Class of 1942
Peter H. Behrendt 
William Bradford Martin
Class of 1943
David J. Winer
Class of 1945
Doris Birtic Adams
Class of 1946
Pericles J. Polyvios
Class of 1947
Robert H. Adler 
George J. Dynda
Class of 1948
Hugh McVey Bailey 
Walter Bernard Corley 
Charles S. Doherty 
Joseph Norman Frank 
Kenneth E. Murphy 
John Francis O'Brien 
Frederick Carl Prasse 
James L. Smith
Class of 1949
Coleman L. Lieber 
Dallas Edward Riddle 
Mary Nicholson Snyder
Class of 1950
Oliver Fiske Barrett 
Marion T. Baughman 
William Warren Bolin
Class of 1951
Robert L. Quigley 
Donald Edward Ryan
Class of 1952
Anthony C. Caruso 
Allan Arthur Riippa
Class of 1954
Owen Montague 
Cornell, Jr.
Class of 1956 
Edward R. Lawton 
Ray James Roche
Class of 1957
Robert H. Cummins
Class of 1958
Leonard David Brown 
Donald F. Smith
Class of 1961
James E. Meder 
Thomas A. Parlette
Class of 1963
John R. Dwelle
Class of 1964
Frank M. VanAmeringen 
Ronald E. Wilkinson
Class of 1965
Joseph J. Pietroski 
Salvador y Salcedo 
Tensuan
Class of 1966
Robert F. Gould 
Gerald N. Mauk
Class of 1967
Joseph H. Downs 
Thomas F. Girard 
David Bruce Harrison 
Donald J. Reino 
George Michael Simmon
Class of 1968
Robert Stanley Wilson, Jr.
Class of 1969
Gary L. Cannon 
Robert Sherwood Carles 
George E. Harwin
Class of 1970 
John F. Strong
Class of 1971
Christopher R. Conybeare 
Michael D. Franke 
David V. Irish
Class of 1972
Alex Gerhart Logan III
Class of 1973
Thomas A. Clark 
Thomas D. Colbridge 
Robert Dale Conkel
Class of 1974
Bruce Ira Haber 
Douglas H. Kohrt 
Kenard McDuffie 
John W. Wiley
Class of 1976
A. Carl Maier
Class of 1977
Sherman L. Anderson 
Lynn Sandra Golder 
Maureen M. McCabe 
Daniel V. Zemaitis
Class of 1978 
Lenore M. J. Simon
Class of 1979
Elizabeth Kinchen Kozul 
Gregory Allan McFadden
Class of 1980
Lewette A. Fielding 
Shayne Tulsky Rosenfeld
Class of 1981
James Franklin Anadell 
Peter Shane Burleigh 
Luis A. Cabanillas, Jr. 
Shippen Howe
Class of 1982
Stephen A. Watson
Class of 1983
Mary Victoria White
Class of 1984
Richard S. Starnes
Case Western Reserve 
University
Law Alumni Association
Officers
President
Thomas A. Heffernan '64 
Vice President 
Patrick M. Zohn, '78 
Regional Vice Presidents 
James A. Clark, '77 
Chicago, Illinois 
Lee J. Dunn, Jr., '70 
Boston, Massachusetts 
Joseph M. Gray, Jr., '72 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
Dixon F. Miller, '76 
Columbus, Ohio 
Robert P. Reffner, '77 
Akron, Ohio 
John F. Sopko, '77 
Washington, D.C.
James R. Strawn, '76 
Canton, Ohio
Alexander and Mary Ann Zimmer, '75 
New York, New York 
Secretary 
John S. Pyle, '74 
Treasurer 
Ivan L. Otto, '62
Board of Governors
Bruce Alexander, '39 
Elyria, Ohio
Richard H. Bamberger, '72 
Virginia S. Brown, '81 
Lawrence J. Carlini, '73 
J. Michael Drain, '70 
William T. Drescher, '80 
Los Angeles, California 
Mary Anne Mullen Fox, '83 
Washington, D.C.
John M. Gherlein, '80 
E. Peter Harab, '74 
New York, New York 
Patricia M. Holland, '79 
Kurt Karakul, '79 
John J. Kelley, Jr., '60 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Allan D. Kleinman, '52 
Stuart A. Laven, '70 
Ernest P. Mansour, '55 
James W. McKee, '69 
Patricia Mell, '78 
Wilmington, Delaware 
Leo M. Spellacy '59 
Paula M. Taylor, '83 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Ralph S. Tyler, '75 
Jerry F. Whitmer, '60 
Akron, Ohio 
Charles W. Whitney, '77 
Atlanta, Georgia 
Diane Rubin Williams, '72 
Perrysburg, Ohio 
Bennett Yanowitz, '49
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Calendar of Events
January 6
Los Angeles Alumni Luncheon 
Association of American Law Schools
January 8
San Francisco Alumni Luncheon
January 23
Akron Alumni Luncheon
February 6
Canton Alumni Luncheon
February 7
Jessup Moot Court Team Night
February 12
Phlegm Snopes Basketball Tournament, Final Game
February 20
Youngstown Alumni Luncheon
February 23, 24, 25
Alumni Annual Fund Telethon
February 27
Faculty/Alumni Luncheon, Cleveland 
Speaker: Professor Sidney I. Picker, Jr.
Ault Moot Court Competition, Final Round
March 6
Niagara Moot Court Team Night
March 27
Pittsburgh Alumni Luncheon
April 3
Dunmore Tournament, Final Round
April 3 to 5
Canada-U.S. Conference.
Competition and Dispute Resolution in the North American Context
April 10
Faculty/Alumni Luncheon, Beachwood 
Speaker: Professor James W. McElhaney
May 1
West-of-Cleveland Alumni Luncheon—Elyria
May 15
Ohio State Bar Association 
Alumni Breakfast—Dayton
4
May 18
Commencement
June 12
Columbus Alumni Luncheon
September 18 and 19
Alumni Weekend—Class Reunions
For further information: Office of External Affairs
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law 
11075 East Boulevard 
Cleveland, Ohio 44106 
216/368-3860
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